Negroponte’s Visit
Undersecretary of State John Negroponte’s visit to Pakistan is probably the week’s biggest event. Having arrived in Pakistan on Friday, Negroponte met with President Gen. Pervez Musharraf, his advisor Tariq Aziz and Vice Chief of Army Staff Gen. Ashfaq Kayani. Wratcheting up pressure on Musharraf, the Bush administration dispatched Negroponte to demand a specified date when Musharraf would end the state of emergency. Negroponte went home dateless on Sunday.

The visit itself is not significant, but the potential American response is. In the eyes of the White House, Musharraf may no longer be the reliable ally he once was. Yes, there have been disagreements between the Bush adminstration and Musharraf from time to time (e.g. the Iran-Pakistan-India gas pipeline), but never on high-profile matters like this. Couple Musharraf’s recalcitrance with the fact that Washington probably doesn’t appreciate how his alleged power grab could compromise the war on terror, and you may have a recipe for an American backed effort to remove Musharraf from power.

To those of you gasping at the thought, just take into account the fact that Negroponte met with Gen. Kayani twice during his visit, which according to many indicates American support for the general. If Musharraf goes, willingly or unwillingly, there’s atleast a fall back option. Kayani is a known Musharraf loyalist and unlikely to engage in any intrigues, but power does have its allure.

Interim Government Announced
The other big news of the week centered around Pres. Musharraf’s appointment of Senate Chairman Mohammadmian Soomro as caretaker prime minister along with the rest of his cabinet that will form the interim government.

Sources had reported over a week ago that Soomro would be appointed interim prime minister but I questioned the veracity of the news and did not report it. After all, Soomro is a known Musharraf loyalist and PML(Q) party member; a caretaker prime minister would need to be neutral for national elections to have any semblance of legitimacy. Surprisingly, not only was Soomro included in the interim government, but so were a whole host of vocal Musharraf supporters.

Musharraf, it appears, was not about to take any chances by having an interim government create a sticky situation for him or voice any opposition to him.

Some eyebrows were raised with the inclusion of Salman Taseer in the interim government given his prior links to the PPP. Taseer is the business magnate behind WorldCall and the Daily Times among other major business ventures. Sources insist that there is no signfiicance, however, Taseer’s involvement and Bhutto’s relative freedom vis-a-vis other opposition leaders may imply that some sort of accomodation is still possible between Musharraf and the PPP.

Skyguard Delivery Halted
On Wednesday, Switzerland indefinitely halted the delivery of Skyguard air defense batteries to Pakistan due to the on-going situation in Pakistan. Intended for the Pakistan Army, the 21 vehicle mounted anti-aircraft systems were excess inventory from the Swiss armed forces. In addition to the Skyguard units already owned and operated by the Pakistan Army, six batteries had already been delivered from the most recent purchase.

The prevention of delivery will not significantly damage Pakistan’s air defense capabilities, but it does raise fears that other left-leaning government may do the same for more vital defense equipment. One prime example is Sweden, with whom Pakistan recently signed a multi-billion dollar deal to purchase seven Erieye Airborne Warning and Control Systems (AWACS).

The Swiss will ultimately relent, however, the damage has been done to their future prospects of arms sales to Pakistan. Pakistan will likely turn to more reliable partners, such as France and China, for purchases and co-development of more advanced air defense systems. The same happened after the United States’ continual embargo of F-16’s that had been paid for by Pakistan; Pakistan, in conjunction with China, ended up developing and producing the JF-17 Thunder, a plane arguably better than earlier block F-16’s.

The Countdown Begins
Musharraf stepping down from his post as Chief of Army Staff (COAS) would mark an interesting turn of events, especially in light of the recent attempt on Benazir Bhutto’s life and strife in the country’s border regions. One would have reasoned that given the level of instability, Musharraf would have dragged his feet on shedding his uniform, but instead, we’re potentially witnessing the opposite. He may step down as COAS to facilitate a Supreme Court verdict in favor of his presidential candidacy; though it’s unlikely that the Supreme Court will rule against Musharraf, lest it’s seeking to trigger a governmental crisis.

Musharraf’s expedited schedule can also be interpreted as a vote of confidence for Gen. Ashfaq Kayani, Musharraf’s successor in the army. Musharraf would be signalling that he trusts Kayani enough to run the army without fear of being ousted or betrayed, though many in the opposition have long been anticipating the day that Musharraf doffs his uniform as it has been his only source of power. If and when he does remove his uniform, Musharraf will rely more than ever on the loyalists he has strategically placed throughout the military and the government.

Shaukat Aziz to Remain Premier
Sources are also indicating that the powers-that-be intend for Prime Minister Shaukat Aziz to remain prime minister after general elections. They describe Aziz as being a “non-controversial” public figure and cite his proven track record in managing the economy. They go on to categorically state that Benazir Bhutto will not be the next prime minister.

This news, coupled with our previous reporting that Musharraf will not be abandoning his current civilian allies (read: the Chaudhries), rules out a major power-sharing agreement between Bhutto and Musharraf. It is likely that government intends to continue to dangle the idea of a power-sharing accord in front of Bhutto as a means of keeping both her and the public occupied while it prepares for general elections.

Though there may not be a major power-sharing agreement between Musharraf and Bhutto, we do foresee them coming to some sort of political accommodation along with the rest of the players on Pakistan’s scattered political field.

The government should be wary though not to underestimate Bhutto’s popularity or political abilities – she may just end up surprising everyone.

Speculation in the media over Kayani’s future role is now hotter than ever, with pundits chiming in from all corners.  Sources have indicated that Taj will not officially be taking over the responsibilities of his new post until next week, and it is then that the decision will be made determining where Kayani will go. At this point in time, it is likely that no one but Pres. Gen. Musharraf knows the real answer, but we certainly have a good idea.

Individuals familiar with the matter stated that in his future role, Kayani would be given oversight of all major intelligence agencies (e.g. the ISI, MI, etc.). Unless Musharraf intends on strengthening the office of the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff (CJCS) and thereby alienate his support base in the army, we can infer that Gen. Kayani will most probably be given the coveted role of Vice Chief of Army Staff (VCOAS); which would immediately translate into Chief of Army Staff (COAS) upon Musharraf’s retirement from the army.

In the meanwhile, Lt. General Tariq Majeed is the growing favorite by many to be the next CJCS.

WHO IS ASHFAQ PARVEZ KAYANI?
The reclusive Gen. Kayani, who often prides himself in how very little others know about him, is about to be thrust into the limelight.

The things that we do know about him reveal him to be a likely favorite of some very important stakeholders, namely President Musharraf, Benazir Bhutto, and the United States.

Kayani is described by many as first and foremost a professional soldier with no political aspirations. In Musharraf’s eyes, this alone, coupled with the fact that he is fiercely loyal the president, makes him the ideal candidate for the next COAS.

An infantryman, he got his start in the famed Baloch Regiment. Kayani also underwent training tours in the United States and still retains links within the US military. He rose to eventually serve Benazir Bhutto as her deputy military secretary during her first stint as prime minister.

His career progressed and he went on to serve as Director General of Military Operations (DGMO). It was during his tenure as DGMO that the intense military standoff of 2001-2002 between Pakistan and India took place. Reportedly, Kayani only slept a few hours a night during that period as he diligently oversaw the army’s mobilization and preparedness on the border.

In September 2003, he was appointed Corps Commander of the powerful X Corps at Rawalpindi. (It was the X Corps that launched the coup of October 1999 that brought Musharraf to power.) As Corps Commander, Kayani was tasked with hunting down the terrorists behind the twin assassination attempts on Musharraf’s life in December 2003. He successfully did so, infiltrating their networks and resultantly was awarded the Hilal-i-Imtiaz or the “Crescent of Excellence,” Pakistan’s second highest civilian award.

Nearly a year later, in October 2004, he was named DG ISI. While occupying the post, Kayani has operated relatively quietly. It was only this year that he appeared on the public’s radar due to his involvement in a number of high profile stories including the president’s negotiations with Benazir Bhutto.

However, nothing is perhaps more telling of Kayani’s apolitical nature than his involvement in President Musharraf’s dismissal of Chief Justice Iftikhar Chaudhry. Kayani was present at the infamous March 2007 meeting that took place between Musharraf and Chief Justice Chaudhry, when the latter was informed that he was suspended. Accounts of that meeting narrated that Kayani was the only one among Musharraf’s aides that did not speak a word. Furthermore, Kayani was also the only one present not to have filed an affidavit against the Chief Justice.

Last but not least, even though he is admittedly not a regular player, Kayani is also president of the Pakistan Golf Federation (PGF). After he’s appointed to his next role in the coming week, the next big question will be: what’s his golf handicap? We’d like to be the first to address that – it’s 18.

MUSHARRAF TO BHUTTO: SHAPE UP
Though not officially ISI chief yet, Nadeem Taj is already tasked with an assignment. Well placed individuals have reported that Taj will be flying to Washington sometime next week to meet with Bhutto, who herself is due to arrive on September 26th. He will be carrying a hardline, Armitagian message with him from Musharraf: “Agree to a deal, or else.”

This news implies a number of things. It first tells us that as of yet, there is no final agreement between Musharraf and Bhutto. It also gives us the impression that Musharraf is anxious to come to an agreement as the time draws near for him to shed his uniform. With the powers of the Presidency and COAS, Musharraf is still negotiating from a position of relative strength. Bhutto may just be biding her time, awaiting for someone with a potential soft spot for her (read: Kayani) to move into the Army House at GHQ. Finally, the meeting’s location – Washington, DC – highlights the continued role that the US is playing in trying to cobble together a coalition of moderate secularists in Pakistan.

The pace of wheeling, dealing, and change is quickening. The situation is as fluid as ever. Stay tuned.

Nawaz Sharif’s highly anticipated return from exile on September 10th very quickly dissipated into an anti-climactic return to exile.

In the wake of his deportation, Benazir Bhutto has announced that after nearly a decade in self-imposed exile, she herself will be returning to Pakistan on October 18th. The government has responded by saying she is welcome back but will have to face the corruption charges that await her at home.

Will Benazir Bhutto hold firm to her October 18th arrival date or will she back track as she’s done in the past?

INSIGHT INTO THE DEAL
By very publicly declaring a formal date of return, Bhutto has no choice but to return as announced unless she’s willing to take a severe hit to her credibility and popularity. An astute politician, Bhutto wouldn’t risk announcing a return date, let alone a return, unless she knew it was a safe bet. This alone leads us to believe that Bhutto is confident in the progress of any negotiations between herself and Musharraf.

We’re also inclined to believe that the timing of Bhutto’s return indicates that her and Musharraf have already come to some sort of initial accomodation. Musharraf’s term as President officially ends November 15th, but government officials have stated that Musharraf would be seeking re-election sometime between September 15th and October 15th. Not incoincidentally, Bhutto’s arrival steers clear of that period, allowing Musharraf to focus on being re-elected. These facts, coupled with Mushahid Hussain’s comments that Musharraf will “doff” his uniform sometime after re-election, reveal that perhaps Bhutto has good reason to be confident.

However, there remain some major hurdles between herself and the premiership. Sources in my last post mentioned both the two-term limit for Prime Ministers and the remaining corruption charges as major sticking points in negotiations for a power-sharing agreement. The government’s response, that Bhutto will have to face pending charges upon her return, reinforced that these sticking points still exist. It also represented some serious posturing on Musharraf’s part since Bhutto will be unable to contest elections for any parliamentary seat while there are open charges against her. Knowing the speed at which cases are dispensed in Pakistan and with elections looming, Bhutto may be forced to make some major concessions to Musharraf in order to secure a pardon. Whether Musharraf is willing to grant a pardon at all is another question.

But if Musharraf was willing to drop all charges, a third term for Bhutto as Prime Minister would still require amending the constitution, something the PPP itself cannot undertake alone, either now or even after the next round of parliamentary elections. Enter the “King’s Party” – the PML-Q. With the combined voting power of the PPP and the PML-Q, a constitutional amendment suddenly becomes viable. It additionally raises the specter of a coalition government.

My sources had stated that Musharraf was not about to abandon his “allies” in the PML-Q, notably the Chaudhry cousins. I interpreted this to imply that there was a possibility of some sort of watered down coalition government between the PML-Q and PPP. That interpretation is gaining increased traction as Dawn reported today that Musharraf had directed the PML to hold direct talks with the PPP over a post-election power-sharing “formula.” It will be interesting to witness how the dynamic between the Chaudhry’s and Bhutto unfolds, as neither likely wants to work with the other.

With PPP requests for the import of armored transport for Bhutto declined by customs officials, some well connected individuals have omniously speculated that the Chaudhry’s may seek to assassinate Bhutto. We hope that these speculations remain just that – speculations.

Assassination plots, negotiations, and sticking points aside, there remains another major irritant for a final deal – Nawaz Sharif’s failed return.

SHARIF’S MONKEY WRENCH
Hoping to show up Bhutto, Nawaz Sharif elected to return to Pakistan before her, gambling that Musharraf would not risk another confrontation with the Supreme Court of Pakistan by deporting him. He gambled wrong and was deported to Saudi Arabia. In the process, he threw a major wrench in Musharraf’s plans.

First, he created the potential for another show down between Musharraf and the Supreme Court as the latter decides whether the Musharraf government is to be held in contempt of court. Secondly, he made it increasingly difficult for Bhutto to strike a formal accord with Musharraf without damaging her public image. This was exacerbated by the United States’ perceived role in both the deportation of Sharif and the deal between Bhutto and Musharraf.

We don’t think Nawaz Sharif intended for all this to happen – he’s not that smart. Had he planned for all this, he wouldn’t have ended up in Saudi Arabia where his movement and activities are severely limited. The worst Sharif likely expected was that he would end up jailed in Attock Fort after which the courts or public outcry would grant him reprieve.

Had Sharif shown some patience and political maturity (lacking in Pakistan), he would have waited for Bhutto to return or returned with her, making it very difficult for Musharraf to show him the way back to exile without utterly compromising Bhutto’s public standing.

UNHAPPILY EVER AFTER?
Ultimately, we foresee that Musharraf and Bhutto will successfully achieve a power-sharing agreement. We question however, whether the deal will translate into a stable polity, sustainable development, or democracy.

It is a question that President Gen. Pervez Musharraf and self-exiled former Prime Minister Benazir Bhutto will have to answer soon if they hope to counter the growing momentum of Nawaz Sharif’s campaign to return not only to Pakistan, but to power.

AN UNLIKELY SCENARIO
A decade ago, no one would have believed, let alone foreseen, the political reality that exists in Pakistan today. We are witnessing a Pakistani military dictator seeking political survival through a power sharing agreement with the anti-establishment Pakistan People’s Party, all the while facing off against a faction of the Pakistan Muslim League, once a favored proxy of the military establishment.

Musharraf and Bhutto have been flirting with a political settlement for at least five years now. As far back as November 2002, we learned of meetings between Musharraf’s close associates and aides debating the release of Asif Zardari – Bhutto’s husband – two years before his actual release. And again, at the end of 2003, we received word that Musharraf was readying to send a personal confidante and childhood friend to visit Bhutto in Dubai and initiate parleys by asking in very plain terms, “What is it that you want?”

In those days, Musharraf was negotiating from a position of strength, when the worst of his worries were troublesome Baloch nationalists. Today, he is fighting for his political life and willing to concede ground to Bhutto and her demands.

THE TERMS
Questions, speculation, commentary and criticism have been swirling around the surprisingly public negotiations between the two camps.

The media has speculated that a power sharing agreement between the two would leave Musharraf in control of national security and foreign policy issues and Bhutto with all remaining national issues. Under such terms, the question then becomes, how different would Bhutto’s tenure really be from the neutered prime ministerships of Shaukat Aziz or Zafarullah Jamali?

Others have theorized that Musharraf will take a hardline stance against all opposition and declare a state of emergency. Such a move would be fatal for Musharraf, likely galvanizing his opposition to the point that he would be forced to step down. We like to believe that Musharraf is smarter than that.

Sources close to the negotiations have stated that a deal between Musharraf and Bhutto is inevitable. They also confirmed much of what has been reported in the media already, that there are currently three major sticking points upon which negotiations still continue:

1. The dropping of all charges against Bhutto
2. Bhutto to be allowed a third term as Prime Minister
3. The repeal of the President’s power to dismiss the government

It’s clear why these are sticking points. Not willing to relegate herself to a behind-the-scenes role, like Sonia Gandhi across the border, Bhutto wants the premiership and visibly so. She also wants to remove the presidential power that brought down her government twice.

In Musharraf’s eyes, the latter two sticking points not only require constitutional amendments, but rolling back presidential power would deny him any leverage over Bhutto. And if good governance remains an issue to him, appearing soft on corruption and allowing for a third term would be counterproductive.

Lastly, the same sources said that Musharraf would not abandon the PML-QA or the Chaudhry cousins as they are his “allies.” We’re unsure of what this implies about the future power sharing arrangement, but it does open up the possibility for a coalition government between the PML-QA and PPP. Whether this is a workable, effective or acceptable solution for any of the involved political parties is questionable. For Musharraf, a diluted coalition government may just be what he is looking for. It would shield him from criticism for being undemocratic, all the while allowing him to carry on his policies unchecked while coalition members bicker among one another.

SHARIF’S RETURN
Regardless of what a future power sharing agreement looks like, Musharraf and Bhutto must agree posthaste. Parliamentary elections are looming and more importantly, Nawaz Sharif is due to arrive in Pakistan in a matter of hours.
Once written off, Sharif is quickly emerging as a dark horse in the coming parliamentary elections having maintained a consistently anti-Musharraf stance, defiantly rejecting all calls to adhere to his exile agreement. Pakistanis and Pakistan watchers alike have been apprehensively awaiting Sharif’s potentially explosive return.

Now aboard a flight to Pakistan, sans his brother Shabhaz, Nawaz’s return is promising to be confrontational. Senior officials indicated to us that surveillance has been established at all major airports and routes to jails have been secured. Using “pressure tactics,” they hope to coerce Sharif into leaving Pakistan on his own accord, thereby avoiding the contempt of court charges associated with deportation. Given the unlikelihood of this outcome, officials are also prepared to arrest Sharif, keep him out of the public eye and jail him.

Whether Sharif or his supporters will go quietly remains to be seen.