Successful Strategy
As part of its strategy, the military initially sought to strike Taliban hideouts, training camps, arms caches, tunnels and safe houses.  This was done to destroy their infrastructure and also minimize the degree of fighting taking place in populated, urban areas.  Taking aim at these targets forced the Taliban to fight “outwards” in the mountains and provide more tactical space for army personnel in the Swat Valley itself.

Precision strikes were carried out by the air force while the army launched three brigade-size offensives from three different directions, forcing the Taliban to fight on multiple fronts.  The Special Services Group (commonly referred to as the SSG, Pakistan’s special forces) conducted a large-scale airborne raid on the primary Taliban base in Peochar Valley.

A month into its campaign, Pakistan’s military has wrested control of and secured Mingora, Swat’s largest city.

The military continues to maintain persistent pressure on militants by carrying out raids, laying ambushes, and cordoning off zones for search and destroy operations.  The purpose for all of which is to ensure psychological and tactical ascendancy against the Taliban.

There is also a strong desire on the part of the military to eliminate Taliban leadership in Swat.  Recent rumors that Maulana Fazlullah, leader of the Taliban in Swat, was killed by Pakistani gunships were discredited after the Pakistani government increased its bounty on Fazlullah’s head.  Insider Brief sources within the Pakistani military report that US sources originated the rumors but that chatter on Taliban networks also spoke of Fazlullah’s death.  The chatter was likely a means of diverting the military’s focus on hunting the “Radio Mullah.”

From Swat to South Waziristan
Having taken Mingora, the military has set its sights on Charbagh where action is expected soon.  Other pockets of Taliban resistance still remain in several valleys north and west of Mingora.

Beyond Swat lies South Waziristan, which the military believes to be the center of gravity for the Taliban.  Our sources also report that operations can begin in South Waziristan as early as the first week of June.

It’s worth noting that despite official claims that upwards of 3,000 militants have been killed in Swat, our sources state that the number of dead militants is likely somewhere between 500 and 600.  It’s important to be mindful of this as the military seeks to consolidate the gains it has made in Swat and hold territory.  The number of militants in Swat likely ranged in the thousands at its peak, meaning that many militants were merely pushed back into the mountains or dissolved into the general population.

As internally displaced persons (IDPs) and administrative structures return to Swat, it will be important for the military to maintain much of its strength (two divisions) there.  This ultimately means that more troops will have to be called up for the far more difficult operation that lies ahead in South Waziristan.

Sovereignty in Swat
Over 2.4 million people have been displaced by the fighting, creating what the UN describes as the worst refugee crisis since Rwanda.  With fighting winding down in Swat, these IDPs will begin returning home to widespread destruction (many have started returning home to neighboring Buner).  The resulting discontent has the potential to turn Swat into a breeding ground for the Taliban.

Back in November 2007, we contended that, “only when you have a hand in bettering someone’s life can you claim sovereignty over where they live.”

With US financial support, Pakistan must use the opportunity provided by the devastation in Swat to undertake massive rebuilding and modernization efforts there.  Model villages can be developed similar to the ones built after the massive earthquake that struck northern Pakistan in October 2005.  Administrative structures can be built from the ground up keeping in mind that prior discontent in Swat related to government inefficiencies (particularly in the judicial system).

This can prove to be an important first step in bringing Pakistan’s Wild West into the fold.

However, sources report that the helicopter was one of the brand new Bell 412 helicopters provided to Pakistan by the United States. They also state that militants in South Waziristan have been using anti-aircraft missiles. Sources narrate further that the helicopter had been visiting a unit in South Waziristan and was on its way back when, within 3 minutes of taking off, it came down.

If militants did indeed manage to shoot down the helicopter, it would mark the first time militants have downed a Pakistani helicopter.

Individuals within the establishment have said that US, Indian, and/or Afghan involvement in the helicopter crash/downing cannot be ruled out. They cite a recent decision by the government of Pakistan to review its strategy in FATA. Downing the helicopter maybe a means of instigating the Pakistan Army to use more force or to get out of the region all together.

More to come.

In addition to military action, sources also report that a major facet of the newfound campaign involves choking off Baitullah’s sources of funding and logistics. This will be done in part by assailing the business interests of the Mehsud tribe from which Baitullah hails. By pursuing the tribe’s assets and businesses, primarily focused in more developed areas such as Karachi, Tank, and Dera Ismail, the Army seeks to indirectly pressure the tribe and show them how self destructive it can be supporting Baitullah.

If history has taught us anything about the Pushtun tribes it’s this: money talks. The Army’s strategy should not only prove effective but also go a long way in driving a wedge between jihadist militants and the tribes that support them. As extremist Islam fast becomes the primary vehicle of Pushtun nationalism in Pakistan, making this wedge permanent is a vital objective in ensuring Pakistan’s territorial integrity.

Pakistani intelligence is also increasingly wary of Indian collusion with Afghan intelligence in fomenting instability along Pakistan’s borders. They consistently point to the presence of six Indian consulates in Afghanistan, four of which are not only close to the Afghan-Pakistan “border” and are in areas where few if any Indians reside. Recent news of resurgent militant Sikh activity in India after years of quiet may be warning shots from Pakistan that it too, can return the favor.

… AND RETREATS.
Pakistan’s Chief of Army Staff, Gen. Ashfaq Kayani, is living up to his reputation as a professional soldier. Sources state that the general has initiated the process of making sweeping changes in organization in the Army. On top of having re-instituted the role of Director General of Planning, the head of what amounts to the Army’s think tank, Kayani is systematically withdrawing the Army from the political arena.Told to us by sources months ago, Gen. Kayani’s directive that all officers abstain from interfering in politics under the threat of court martial has become widely reported. Now, sources have stated that the Army Chief has also directed Military Intelligence (MI) to desist from interfering in politics at all levels.

The big question is now this: when’s the ISI’s turn?

ELECTION ENDNOTES:

1. A senior Pakistani official recently conveyed to the Insider Brief how deeply distraught they were at the current state of affairs in Pakistan and at how President Pervez Musharraf was single mindedly focused on ensuring a pliant parliament to maintain his hold on power. Another senior official from within the ranks of the military stated that it was only a matter of “when, not if,” Gen. Ashfaq Kayani withdrew his support for President Musharraf.
2. Sources have reported that Pakistan People’s Party members informed President Musharraf that the will produced by Asif Zardari was indeed fake and that party officials kept quiet for the sake of capturing the “sympathy” vote in February’s upcoming parliamentary elections. They intend on seeking Zardari’s ouster after elections.
3. Media outlets have widely reported the ongoing dialogue between President Musharraf and Shahbaz Sharif, Nawaz Sharif’s chief lieutenant and younger brother, through common acquaintance Brigadier (retired) Niaz Ahmed. Sources close to Ahmed state that parlays between Musharraf and the younger Sharif are over the creation of an alliance to prevent the rise of the PPP in upcoming elections and that the two will be meeting in Ahmed’s home in London. They also state that there is a strong possibility that a deal has been struck between the two seemingly antagonistic forces. If true, it marks a return to “normalcy” in Pakistan’s constellation of forces: the establishment allied with its usual proxy, the Pakistan Muslim League, against the anti-establishment Pakistan People’s Party.

Part I: AH1 Cobra Attack Helicopter and MEDEVAC

The News: Reuters
With Gen. Ashfaq Kayani’s ascendancy to the role of Chief of Army Staff (COAS), Reuters published an article on Nov. 28th titled, “Five Facts on Pakistan’s New Army Chief – Kayani,” in which they cited the Insider Brief.

On the Web: Watandost
In his latest blog post entitled, “Three New Excellent Blogs on Pakistan,” Hassan Abbas of Watandost recommended three Pakistan-focused blogs to his readers, one of which happened to be the Insider Brief. A published author and former Pakistani government official, Abbas is also a Research Fellow at the Belfer Center’s Project on Managing the Atom and International Security Program. His recognition, like that of the PCR Project, means a lot to us.

On the Radio: The John Batchelor Show
Last night, I appeared on the John Batchelor Show to discuss the rise of Gen. Ashfaq Kayani and President Musharraf’s future. You can listen to my conversation with John by using the player below.

Download audio file (wabc-interview-20071202-pakintel.mp3)
(Download file)

John’s show airs on Sundays, WABC 770AM in New York from 7-10pm EST (webcast), and KFI 640AM in Los Angeles from 7-10pm PST (webcast).

In short: there’s a heck of a lot going on.

When the situation is this fluid, it creates an environment rife with speculation. At the center of all the speculation has been President Musharraf’s relationship with General Kayani. We’d like to clear the air.

Army Reshuffle in March 2008
The Asia Times Online reported that Gen. Ashfaq Kayani was engaging in a major reshuffle of the Pakistan Army, consolidating his hold on power and removing Musharraf loyalists. Many in the news media picked up on this article, reported it and interpreted it as movement by Kayani against Musharraf. However almost immediately after the news came out, DG ISPR Maj. Gen. Waheed Arshad categorically stated that it was false.

One of the first things worth noting is that the Asia Times Online has never been a reliable source of news. Always engaging in some form of sensationalism, its Pakistan correspondent, Syed Saleem Shahzad, has consistently been wrong over the course of the past few years. It is absolutely confounding that respectable news outlets and private intelligence organizations (e.g. Stratfor — whom I have deep respect for, having worked with them in one way or another since 1999) continue to be duped by the Asia Times Online.

That being said, sources report that there is a scheduled reshuffle expected in March 2008 within the army. This reshuffle will likely take into account Pakistan’s post-election scenario, the status of the Musharraf presidency and the progress of military operations in the country’s northwest. In terms of what to expect for a reshuffle of the army’s mid-level officer corps, sources are reporting that Gen. Kayani is looking to replace the ISI provincial heads (Brigadiers) for Sindh and NWFP. Apparently they have been causing some big headaches and potentially may have Islamist leanings.

The Loyalty Question: the Army and Kayani
As speculation has implied, the big question is whether Kayani will stay loyal to Musharraf. We believe he will — for now. Through discussions with our sources, there appears to be a consensus that Gen. Kayani does not have political aspirations of his own. The consensus among our sources also reveals that for the time being, the current grouping of corps commanders remains loyal to Musharraf as well.

Kayani’s decision thus far to not appoint a Vice or Deputy Chief of Army Staff validates the notion that he intends on remaining apolitical. As we’ve stated in the past, a VCOAS/DCOAS is really only appointed when the Chief of Army Staff (COAS) is busy muddling in the country’s governance to the extent that he cannot effectively oversee the army’s day-to-day affairs. (Editor’s Note: VCOAS and DCOAS are the same position, the difference is in the number of stars. A VCOAS is a full 4-star general, while a DCOAS is a full 3-star general.)

So what could sway Kayani’s support away from Musharraf? The two most likely scenarios in which Kayani would withdraw support for Musharraf would involve either:

1. The US government determining that Musharraf is a liability to the war on terror.
2. Kayani determining that Musharraf’s presence in the presidency is either hurting the army’s image or counterproductive towards his goal of transitioning the army out of national affairs.

And though many in Pakistan seek to have the army completely extricate itself from the affairs of governance, at present, it’s not an entirely realistic goal. We argued recently that Musharraf stepping down from the army does not mark a paradigm shift. The Pakistan Army is likely to have a role in governing Pakistan for the near-to-medium term, something that we believe is not sustainable for the army or the nation in the long run. A consensus on a vision for the country’s future must be developed among all of Pakistan’s major power brokers so that the armed forces may finally take on their rightful role as the defenders of Pakistan, not its governors.

Outlook on Musharraf’s Future
We believe that as long as President Musharraf retains the support of Gen. Kayani, he will continue to hold the upper hand on the political scene as the country transitions back to democracy. After all, President Musharraf has no popular support base on which to rely. His constituency was and is the army. Without its support, he’s dead in the water. Working in coordination, Musharraf and Kayani have the potential to be a major force in this transition, setting the agenda for the country’s future. Five years is a long time however, and a lot can happen before then. We have a feeling that regardless of how much support President Musharraf receives from the army, he won’t be completing his second term as president.

We at the Insider Brief contend that the real, imminent crisis exists in Pakistan’s current inability to tame and integrate the country’s northwestern frontier — also known as the Federally Administered Tribal Areas (FATA) — which stems from a larger crisis in governance that afflicts the rest of the nation. The latest symptoms of this failure include the twin bombings in Rawalpindi and ongoing military operations in Swat, the latter of which seek to rollback Islamist forces that have now expanded their reach from the tribal regions into NWFP proper.

Gordian Knot
The Pushtun tribes and people that occupy the tribal belt that straddles the Afghan and Pakistani border have lived in that region with their way of life in times predating Islam and even Jesus Christ. Every empire and nation that has attempted to enter and impose its rule on those lands has often regretted it — be it Alexander, the Mughals, the British, and now Pakistan. Even the British Empire, despite its vast resources and experience in ruling even the unruliest of places, had an incredibly tenuous hold on the region which for the most part remained largely autonomous

Couple this unmanageable region’s history with a heavy saturation of weapons (there are more guns than people) left over from the Soviet invasion and the throngs of unemployed, well trained and battle hardened jihadist guerillas jointly created by the CIA and ISI during the 1980′s, and you have the ingredients for what the CIA calls blowback. Sprinkle in the fact that every Afghan regime since Pakistan’s inception has challenged the legitimacy of the Durand Line border demarcation that splits these tribal regions down the middle and you have to ask yourself, can Pakistan really claim sovereignty over this region?

It’s a miracle in itself that President Musharraf managed to pour nearly 100,000 soldiers (~ 2 heavy infantry divisions and 2 infantry divisions) into FATA and the surrounding areas, set up check points, and launch military operations without sparking an all out rebellion.

Cutting the Knot … with an AK?
The New York Times reported last Sunday that the Pentagon was considering enlisting the help of tribes in Pakistan’s northwest against Islamist militants. This strategy mirrors the successful American strategy in Iraq’s Anbar province but may not be applicable to Pakistan. Though some tribes view foreign and local Islamist militants as a cancer for the tribal system – destroying the very system that safeguarded them and from whence they came – there are some tribes, like the Mehsuds and Aurakzai, that have been defending the very same militants.

Hypothetically speaking, if the US strategy were to work, it presents a double-edged sword. What happens after the US-armed and financed tribals have rid themselves of the Islamists? They’ll likely turn their guns right back on the US, demanding the US withdraw from the region. It is unlikely that the US will comply.

So then, what is the solution for quelling the violence in FATA, disarming Islamists and bringing the region into the fold? Does it involve a paradigm shift in the way counterinsurgency operations are carried out? Does it involve a Marshall Plan for the region with billions of dollars in developmental spending? Does it mean destroying the tribal system? They say the lifespan of an insurgency is around a decade, sadly, the struggle for the tribal belt is one that has been ongoing for centuries.

At the Insider Brief, we don’t pretend to know the answers to these questions, but we do know what doesn’t work. The solution for the region as a whole doesn’t lie in Predator-fired Hellfire missiles or heavy handed tactics. It doesn’t lie in blanket clemency for militants either. The solution must lie somewhere in the middle. For starters, Pakistan and the US should join hands with the same commitment they did near the end of the Cold War, and spend on poverty alleviation and education, not just military supplies and training for the local populace. One thing must be clear: only when you have a hand in bettering someone’s life can you claim sovereignty over where they live.

As military operations continue in the nation’s northwest, we intend on bringing you new guest posts and exclusive content aimed at developing a fresh perspective of a region that has perplexed many. Stay tuned and stay informed.

US-Pakistani Relations
Many out there are declaring their own emergency for the state of US-Pakistani relations. The fact of the matter is that despite the increasing criticism emerging from the White House, relations between the two countries remain strong. President Bush may have touted his recent phone call to Musharraf demanding that he step down as army chief and hold elections, but the reality is that Musharraf had already committed to both, as my sources had stated. That’s why Bush was able to make the demands he did, he knew that Musharraf already intended on doing what he’s asking.

The bigger news may be that despite repeated denials, the Bush administration knew that emergency rule was coming in Pakistan. High-level sources have reported that the Bush administration, specifically Deputy Secretary of State John Negroponte, had been informed days in advance of the decision.

Though Musharraf’s relationship with the Bush administration is strong, sources are also indicating that the establishment fears fall-out from the US Congress, the American media and think tanks. This was already evidenced by Musharraf’s recent calls to members of Congress, attempting to allay concerns and prevent a halt in the flow of financial aid to Pakistan.

Emergency Rule’s Financial Impact
When markets opened the Monday after the declaration of emergency, the Karachi Stock Exchange (KSE) plummeted 5 percent, experiencing its worst single-day decline in the exchange’s history. Though the news of emergency rule and the resultant stock market plunge may be worrying for investors and Pakistanis alike, they should rest assured that the current volatility is only a short term phenomenon.

(courtesy of the Wall Street Journal Online)

The primary concern of both foreign and Pakistani investors is whether the fiscal and monetary policies of the current government will continue down the road. We witnessed this when the Supreme Court declared Musharraf’s presidential candidacy valid (the first time around) and as a result, the KSE skyrocketed the following day. After all, it’s been Musharraf’s policies over the course of the past 8 years that have generated Pakistan’s immense economic growth; last year alone Pakistan attracted nearly $8 billion in foreign investment, no small accomplishment.

What investors must further realize is that even if Musharraf is forced to step down, his economic policies won’t go with him.

The army is at the center of the Pakistani state and will be involved in the country’s governance for decades to come if not in perpetuity. Its role as the guarantor of the Pakistani state has now expanded to include the economy and for good reason. It became painfully aware to the Pakistani military that a strong economy was needed to fund its war machine, as sanctions and economic weakness set the country’s defense acquisition programs back years if not decades. But most importantly, the Pakistani military, and in particular the army, has massive business concerns across the country. To keep Army Inc. profitable, the health of the economy must remain strong.

That is why investors shouldn’t fret when it comes to Pakistan and current economic policies – they’re not going anywhere.

The Army’s Cohesion and Pakistan’s Wild West
Several times now, rumors have arisen suggesting Musharraf has been placed under house arrest. Likely spread by the opposition, the rumors fly in the face of what can be expected of the Pakistan Army.

With the exception of the Rawalpindi Conspiracy in 1951, there have never been any incidents of open insubordination within the Pakistan Army. If the situation becomes untenable for Musharraf and the army’s popularity diminishes as a result, the army as an institution will quietly ask Musharraf to step down. We’ve also stated in the past that the current Vice Chief of Army Staff (VCOAS) and successor to Musharraf, Gen. Ashfaq Kayani, is a thoroughly professional soldier who not only respects the chain of command but is also a Musharraf loyalist.

What does the army think about the emergency though? Sources have indicated to us that the army remains unified and the response to the emergency has been relatively positive. On the other hand, sources have also stated that there is resentment within the army regarding operations in Pakistan’s northwest, particularly Swat, with many in the army stating that they do not want to fight fellow Pakistanis. This may be why despite the declaration of emergency, we haven’t seen immediate action in Swat as the army internally debates a course of action. The situation is worsening though. Dawn has reported that a third major town in Swat recently fell to Islamist forces loyal to Maulana Fazlullah.

Humorous Anecdote: Many are aware that former ISI chief, Gen. Hameed Gul had been arrested when the emergency was first declared. Many of you however, may not know what he was up to when he was arrested. Much to my amusement, very close relatives of his informed me that the wily 71 year-old was on his way with flowers and cake for the now-deposed Supreme Court justices, who had just struck down the PCO. He is currently in jail, detained for 30-days.