Analysis
At first glance, this was a typical Taliban assassination against an official in the U.S.-backed Afghan government. However, there are two facts to consider. First, this was no ordinary official – this was the brother of President Hamid Karzai. Second, the U.S. is currently engaged in negotiations with the Taliban. The death of Karzai’s brother will undoubtedly complicate those negotiations. Hamid Karzai will be far less likely to come to an accommodation with the Taliban now that they’ve offed his younger brother. Not to mention, Ahmed Wali Karzai was a major asset to his elder brother, who relied on him for maintaining Pashtun support in southern Afghanistan.

So why did the Taliban execute the assassination now? The sleeper agent presumably could have acted at any time, in the recent past or even later on down the road. Why now?

The answer may lie across the border. (Before you start howling conspiracy theory, try to bear with me.)

This past weekend, a frustrated Obama administration announced that it was suspending $800M of military aid to the country. This very public rebuke, following accusations that the murder of Saleem Shahzad was state sanctioned, likely ruffled some feathers in Rawalpindi.

It could be that Pakistan’s military, with its (albeit lessened) influence over the Taliban, prodded the militant group to assassinate Ahmed Wali Karzai. By having him eliminated, Pakistan could have been underhandedly reminding the U.S. that it has the ability to make the U.S.’ life in the region very difficult — and that it may want to reevaluate its recent tact.

OPERATION NEPTUNE’S SPEAR
Here’s the picture that’s been painted for us of Operation Neptune’s Spear (formerly identified as Operation Geronimo):

On April 29th, President Barack Obama approved a special forces raid in Abbottabad, Pakistan to kill Osama bin Laden. On the night of May 2nd (late afternoon May 1st US EST), two Black Hawk helicopters departed from Afghanistan (either Bagram or Jalalabad) for Abbottabad, carrying a team of over two dozen special forces operators from the Navy SEAL’s elite detachment, Team 6. According to the Pakistani Foreign Ministry, the helicopters used “advanced equipment”, terrain hugging techniques and “blind spots” in Pakistani radar coverage to evade detection. Once at their target location, the operation commenced, during which time, one of the helicopters crashed due to a malfunction. (Wreckage from the crashed helicopter indicates that the Black Hawks were modified variants with stealth features and radar absorbing paint.)

One of the two Chinook helicopters that were also in Pakistani airspace to provide backup to the Navy SEAL team, arrived at the scene of the operation following the crash one of the Black Hawks. On completion of the operation, which lasted about 40 minutes, the two helicopters flew to the North Arabian Sea where they landed on the USS Carl Vinson – a U.S. aircraft carrier. The Pakistani army chief and the chief of Pakistani intelligence were informed of the mission by their respective U.S. counterparts shortly after the U.S. helicopters were clear of Abbottabad. Allegedly, Pakistani jets were scrambled before then.

AWARE OF ABBOTTABAD?

The operation lasted 40 minutes, was relatively noisy (people were tweeting about it as it happened) and concluded with the explosion of the inoperable Black Hawk. This was followed by the long transit time of at least 4 hours from Abbottabad to the Arabian Sea, which required travel down the length of Pakistan, passing by six major Pakistan Air Force bases. (The distance from Abbottabad to the Pakistani coast is roughly 740 miles as the crow flies. The top speed of a Black Hawk helicopter is 183 mph. Traveling at a top speed over that distance would take just over four hours.)

It appears impossible that the helicopters, especially the Chinook, which was likely not stealth modified, could go undetected by the Pakistanis under the circumstances.

Could the Americans have been jamming Pakistani radar? Unlikely. An individual intimately familiar with USAF electronic warfare operations informed the Insider Brief that jamming a sovereign nation’s radar systems is technically an act of war. We are told that the best the U.S. could have hoped for in a situation like this was to be granted general autonomy in the region’s airspace by Pakistan. This, however, would imply a degree of cooperation from Pakistan.

Two possible scenarios emerge:

1. The Pakistanis were aware of the operation in advance and had authorized it.
2. The Pakistanis did not have advance notice, but detected the incursions and decided not to engage.

The first scenario can be written off. If the operation was authorized, why would the U.S. dispatch stealth helicopters for the mission? Secondly, if Pakistan had advance knowledge of the operation, the response by the Government of Pakistan wouldn’t be as delayed, confounded or mishandled as it has been. The Pakistan Army only just released a statement to the press nearly five days after the raid.

The second scenario is most likely. On both detecting the raiding helicopters and being informed by the Americans, the Pakistanis likely decided against confrontation (e.g., firing on the Black Hawks or forcing them to land). Avoiding confrontation with the U.S. despite violations of sovereignty has been a policy articulated by the Pakistani military in the past. Last month, the chief of Pakistan’s Air Force stated to the media that despite Pakistan’s ability to shoot down CIA operated Predator drones, Pakistan could not risk escalation or conflict with the U.S. given the United State’s vast technological and quantitative superiority.

With what “facts” that we have, it can be safely reasoned that Pakistan did not have advance knowledge of the operation. The U.S. claim that it acted alone and without authorization is likely accurate. However, the biggest question remains: who in Pakistan, if anyone, knew of Osama Bin Laden’s presence in Abbottabad?

Ashley J. Tellis voices his opposition to the recent sale of Chinese nuclear reactors to Pakistan (“Stop the Sino-Pak Nuclear Pact,” op-ed, Aug. 17). As a former State Department official, Mr. Tellis exhibits in his stance the same shortsightedness and double standards that often mar U.S. foreign policy.

By opposing Chinese-made nuclear plants with International Atomic Energy Agency safeguards in Pakistan, the U.S. would be denying a valuable energy source to a key ally whose stability is threatened by a crushing energy deficit. How would Mr. Tellis suggest Pakistan bridge its 4,000-megawatt energy gap, which is expected to grow by another 22% by 2015?

There is also a clear double standard embedded in Mr. Tellis’s criticism. The U.S.-India nuclear pact that Mr. Tellis helped negotiate exempts eight power plants, including Indian “breeder reactors,” from the IAEA-inspected civilian list. (Breeder reactors produce more fissile material than they consume.) The exemption allows India to advance its military nuclear program and only sets back U.S. nuclear nonproliferation efforts.  [According to Mr. Tellis himself, the operation of India’s unsafeguarded plants alone would provide enough weapon-grade plutonium to add more than 2,000 nuclear weapons to India’s arsenal.]

For the U.S. to be taken seriously in South and Southwest Asia, it needs to have clear and consistent policies [towards its allies, foes and] on major international issues [(e.g., non-proliferation)].  [Mr. Tellis’ opinion does not serve that end.]

At the INSIDER BRIEF, we believe that instead of opposing the Sino-Pak nuclear pact, the U.S. should be looking to support the Chinese sale.  Chinese support of Pakistan should be viewed as welcome relief to the United States, which over the last decade, has almost singlehandedly helped stabilize Pakistan.

Pakistan and its seemingly endless crises present an opportunity to draw the U.S. and China together in strategic cooperation.  By approaching each other as partners in bolstering the stability of an ally — through economic support, beating the energy deficit and curbing Islamism — the U.S. and China can work to reduce their trust deficit in South and Central Asia.

SUMMARY
The first two months of 2010 have brought about a sea change on the ground in Afghanistan and Pakistan.  The U.S. has initiated a surge in both drone strikes and troops (40,000 more boots expected on the ground in Afghanistan) in an attempt to reshape the Afghan war.  Pakistan, many analysts have observed, has had a seeming change of heart, allegedly capturing half of the Taliban’s Quetta Shura including the Taliban’s number two, Mullah Abdul Ghani Baradar.  However, the spate of high profile arrests shouldn’t be construed as a change of heart or a capitulation to American pressure.  Pakistan is betting on itself in a complex game to further its interests in the region.

“WE HOLD ALL THE CARDS”
The following (Afghan) Taliban members have been either killed or captured in Pakistan:

• 01/26/10 – Mullah Abdul Salam – Shadow governor of Kunduz province – Captured – Faisalabad, Pakistan
• 01/26/10 – Mullah Mir Muhammad – Shadow governor of Baghlan province – Captured – Faisalabad, Pakistan
• 02/15/10 – Mullah Abdul Ghani Baradar – Second in command of Afghan Taliban – Captured – Karachi, Pakistan
• 02/18/10 – Mohammed Haqqani – Brother of Sirajuddin Haqqani – Killed – North Waziristan, Pakistan
• 02/20/10 – Maulvi Abdul Kabir – Former shadow governor of Nangarhar – Captured – Nowshera, Pakistan
• 03/03/10 – Agha Jan Mohtasim – Son-in-law to Mullah Omar and Taliban commander – Captured – Karachi, Pakistan
  

According to Christian Science Monitor, other Taliban members allegedly also captured by Pakistan include: Mullah Abdul Qayoum Zakir, who oversees the movement’s military affairs, Mullah Muhammad Hassan, Mullah Ahmed Jan Akhunzada, and Mullah Abdul Raouf.

The U.S. is a distant power that has signaled that it’s aiming to withdraw from the war ravaged nation by July 2011.  The Taliban are Pakistan’s strategic hedge in Afghanistan.  So why on earth has Pakistan decided to turn so forcefully against its (former?) proxy?

The answer is that it hasn’t.

The arrests are part of a larger strategy through which Pakistan is seeking to roll back Indian influence in Afghanistan and revitalize its own influence.  With leverage on both sides of the Afghan conflict (i.e., the U.S. and the Taliban), confidence is running high in the Pakistani establishment right now, with high level INSIDER BRIEF sources stating, “we [Pakistan] hold all the cards.”

On the one hand, Pakistan believes it has convinced Americans that U.S. success is highly dependent on Pakistani cooperation.  In return for cooperation, the U.S. has recognized Pakistani concerns vis-a-vis India in Afghanistan.  Pakistani sources report that this was in part exhibited by the marginalization of the Indians at the Afghan conferences in London and Turkey.

On the other hand, Pakistan has been urging the Taliban to moderate themselves and cooperate towards a post-American set-up in Afghanistan (but not one that was independent of Pakistani considerations).  Pakistan has conveyed this through two means: quiet nudging and arrests.  Of course, the latter has been heavily publicized.  Using its superior human intelligence and murky relationships, Pakistan has identified amenable elements for “collection” (read: arrest) for use in a future dispensation in Afghanistan.  The intent is that the remaining hard-line elements (e.g., those aligned with Al Qaeda) will be sidelined and eliminated.  The strategy may explain Pakistani actions to prevent handover of captured Taliban figures to Afghanistan or the U.S.

INTERPRETING RECENT DEVELOPMENTS
On Friday, February 26th, the Lahore High Court (LHC) barred the government from extraditing captured Afghan Taliban leaders (including Mullah Baradar) abroad.  The ruling came on the heels of a Pakistani decision to hand over top Taliban militants over to Afghanistan.  Some may view the LHC ruling in the context of Pakistani judicial activism that has proven to be a thorn in the side of Pakistani anti-terror efforts.  However, the court decision is likely an example of judicial pliability and not independence.  The Zardari administration can now comfortably deflect American and Afghan pressure under the cover of the LHC ruling.  After all, handing over top Taliban militants over to the Afghan would reduce Pakistan’s leverage in the process and possibly lead to the revelation of some embarrassing links between Pakistan and the Taliban.

That Friday also brought a string of Taliban suicide bombings in Kabul that targeted Indians (9 of the 17 killed were Indian and 12 Indians were also injured).  Two rationales appear to be developing for the attack.  The first is that the Taliban are trying to throw a wrench in recently re-initiated Indo-Pak talks.  The second is that the attacks were coordinated by Pakistan’s intelligence agencies, who in the past have been blamed for previous attacks on the Indian embassy in Kabul.  I believe that there exists a third rationale.  Certain factions in the Taliban, under new found pressure by their former sponsors, may be trying to demonstrate their usefulness to Pakistan by targeting the Indians in Afghanistan as a reminder that they can help counter Indian influence in the country.

Pakistan believes it holds all the cards for success in Afghanistan.  However, a number of factors could possibly ruin Pakistan’s hand.  A highly decentralized Afghan Taliban may not be responsive to calls to reconciliation by Taliban leaders captured in Pakistan far from the fighting.  Or U.S. resolve in Afghanistan may not last and an antagonized Taliban may fail to cooperate or even turn on Pakistan after the Americans leave.  The list goes on.

The chips are on the table.  Let’s see how this hand plays out.

It’s a grim picture that, at first, reaffirmed for me the need for consensus among the country’s elite. At the Insider Brief, we have long called for a single cohesive and comprehensive agenda agreed to by the military, politicians, bureaucracy, business interests, and the media to undo the crisis in governance and set the country back on the path to socio-economic development.

However, the more I’ve thought about it, the more the problem presents itself as one that is rooted in perspective – Pakistan’s elite appear to be out of touch with geopolitical reality.  After all, when the situation is so dire, why is the military-bureaucratic complex hacking away at the PPP-led government? Why does the media remain mired in conspiracy theories? Why are the country’s political parties locked in a cycle of political opportunism? The behavior isn’t rational.

The disconnect with reality appears to stem from two core flaws in the Pakistani perspective:

1.  Failure to understand the limitation of national resources/capabilities.

• Pakistan cannot go it alone. Pakistan’s geography makes the nation strategic, but its geography also acts as an inhibitor. Pakistan does not have the resources to achieve self-sufficiency; Pakistan must trade and seek external investment not just to flourish, but also to survive. That’s why it’s vital that Pakistan not alienate its key sponsors (the U.S., China, Saudi Arabia, etc.) or its regional neighbors (Iran, Afghanistan, etc.).
  • The Kerry-Lugar Bill: When the U.S. tripled non-military aid to Pakistan through the Kerry-Lugar Bill, the Pakistani military did exactly what it shouldn’t have done – it voiced massive opposition to the bill and alienated the U.S.  The military’s opposition is rooted in language tying the aid to civilian control over the military. The military blames President Asif Zardari for the wording and is out for blood.  Being the single most powerful institution in Pakistan and after governing the Pakistan for over half its existence, the Pakistani military must be acting out of sheer pride if it feels that the wording in the Kerry-Lugar Bill will undermine its pre-eminent status in Pakistan overnight.  (People who sought to have that wording placed in the Kerry-Lugar Bill should have also taken this rationale into account. It was a tactical misstep to think that conditional U.S. aid would work to strengthen democratic institutions in Pakistan. The best way to strengthen democracy is to garner overwhelming public support through capable leadership and socio-economic progress.)

• Pakistan cannot seek parity with India – military or otherwise. Since its inception, Pakistan has viewed itself as a strategic equal of India – and to disastrous ends. India is far too large and developing at far too quick a pace for Pakistan to be its peer.  Though it has far to go, India is on the road to becoming a global power. Pakistan is a regional power at best. Militarily, Pakistan has achieved a minimum deterrence through its nuclear capability.  It should reduce the size of its standing military and focus on becoming smaller, more mobile, and technologically advanced.  Rely on force multipliers and redirect funds towards development.

• Pakistan cannot win Kashmir from India. Three wars over the disputed state (Kargil included) have demonstrated that Pakistan cannot wrest Kashmir from India’s control – India’s military is far too superior in terms of quality and quantity. The best Pakistan can hope for is recognition of the status quo or a Musharrafian solution (joint governance of Kashmir).  Again, focus on effectively governing existing Pakistani territory and create a model that demonstrates why Kashmir is better in Pakistani hands.

2.  Failure to understand that the state’s actions have consequences.

• Militant groups, sponsored by Pakistan’s military, have turned on the state. These militant groups are no longer national security assets to leverage against India or to attain “strategic depth” in Afghanistan. They are not the product of a conspiracy hatched by any combination of Indians, Israelis or Americans. The only conspirators here are those who nurtured these groups and now do not want to shoulder the responsibility for the deaths of hundreds of innocent Pakistani civilians.
• Ineffective and inequitable governance results in a loss of sovereignty. Poor and inequitable governance spawned an insurgency in East Pakistan, providing India the opening for the 1971 war and Pakistan’s subsequent dismemberment.  Once again, poor and inequitable governance has spawned not one, but two insurgencies in Pakistan’s west (i.e., Balochistan and the NWFP/FATA).
• Irresponsible behavior with nuclear technology is the biggest threat to Pakistan’s arsenal. Many Pakistanis believe that the U.S. is out to denuclearize Pakistan.  Pakistanis also view it as unfair that the Indians have a civil nuclear deal with the Americans but they don’t.  However, none of this should come as a surprise after Pakistan, through Dr. Abdul Qadeer Khan, proliferated nuclear technology to the likes of Libya, North Korea, and Iran.  Pakistan must demonstrate responsibility and maturity in handling its nuclear capability if it wants cooperation from western powers.

Knowing where the problem lies, the greater question then becomes:  how do we go about changing mindsets? How do we go about awakening a nation from its daze?

The answer?  We talk about it.

Educate.  Encourage mature discourse.  Repeat (as many times as necessary).

Footnote:
I recently had the opportunity to sit down with Pakistan’s Ambassador to the United States, Husain Haqqani, whom I’ve known since he was a professor at Boston University. In discussing U.S.-Pakistan relations and Pakistan’s role in the wider world, it occurred to me that Haqqani is arguably among the best envoys Pakistan has had in Washington in a long time.  He is articulate, well connected, and knows what he’s talking about.  Even if the PPP government falls or if Zardari is ousted, it may not be a bad idea to keep Haqqani around.  Pakistan, I believe, is best served with him as its ambassador.

Analysis
Viewed in the context of multiplying reports covering US cross-border incursions and strikes in Pakistan’s northwest, the downed UAV was likely a Predator drone. Whether the drone was a UCAV – unmanned combat aerial vehicle – equipped with Hellfire missiles, is unclear. What is increasingly clear from reports, however, is that the drone and its parts were collected by Pakistani security forces largely in tact. Gaining access to the Predator’s technology should prove to be a boon for Pakistan.

Pakistan’s indigenous UAV technology is by no means rudimentary. Its UAV industry has been growing at a rapid pace over the course of the past decade, driven by both government-funded and private sector programs. In fact, the US Border Guard even purchased the Pakistani-made “Border Eagle” UAV in 2004. But while it has been adept at developing short-to-medium range tactical UAVs, Pakistan’s industry has faced a gap in its ability to develop longer range, long endurance UAVs.

To fill this gap, Pakistan sought to purchase the Predator UAV from the US. The US declined to sell the Predator to Pakistan, despite its utility in monitoring Pakistan’s treacherous border with Afghanistan. Now, Pakistan has access to some of the best American-made UAV technology at the cost of a few dozen shell casings.

It’s worth noting that this wouldn’t be the first time that Pakistan has used access to American technology to further its own indigenous defense programs. In August 1998, near the tail end of the Clinton administration, the US launched Tomahawk cruise missile strikes on terrorist training camps in Afghanistan. At least two of those cruise missiles failed to reach their targets and landed in Pakistani territory – unexploded. Seven years later in August 2005, Pakistan test launched its first cruise missile, the Babur (Hatf-VII). The Babur, a high-speed, low-level terrain following cruise missile, bore a number of similarities to the Tomahawk.

Let’s see what Pakistan is test flying five years from now.

(Editor’s Note: Apologies for my conspicuous absence over the last month or so. I’m afraid my posting will likely be sporadic in the coming months as I’m occupied with multiple projects. In the meanwhile, I’ve got 3 posts in the queue and hope to have them published soon. I’ll be dealing with the Marriott bombing, Pakistan’s armed forces, and relations with the US, keep an eye out.)

What’s the Rush, Mr. Zardari?
So why the sudden anxiousness on Zardari’s part to move negotiations forward with Sharif and impeach Musharraf? There are two, contrasting explanations. The first is desperation. After his failed attempt to gain control of the ISI as well as ISI efforts to undermine his government (for the purposes of maintaining a political stalemate), Zardari is now attempting to go after Musharraf. President Musharraf still represents the military’s institutional foothold in politics. The second explanation could be that Zardari has received US approval and backing for his actions after potentially convincing the current administration that Musharraf is what stands in the way of effective anti-Taliban operations in Pakistan. The second explanation is less likely however, as it was the current government that immediately and repeatedly sought to negotiate with the “Pakistani Taliban” from a position of weakness.

Regardless of his reasons, Zardari faces a major hurdle – the Army. Despite stepping down as Army Chief, Insider Brief sources report that the Pakistan Army remains very loyal to the President and is willing to go to bat for his political survivial, especially against the likes of Zardari. This brings us to the crux of this post.

The Coming Storm
The weight of recent events, shifting attitudes, and intense internal and external pressure on Pakistan are such that things can no longer continue as they have been. From our perspective at the Insider Brief, something has to give and it will undoubtedly be in the form of radical, tumultuous change in the near-to-medium term. Consider the following:

• The present civilian government (read: Zardari and co.) has picked a needless fight with the Army over the ISI and lost. It is yet again picking a needless fight against President Musharraf; a fight that will ultimately lead to another confrontation with a pro-Musharraf military.
• Insider Brief sources let slip that if things continue on their current trajectory, the military may be forced to (reluctantly) re-take the driver’s seat.
• Insider Brief sources also report that discontent is growing within the Army against its chief, Gen. Ashfaq Kayani. He is increasingly being perceived as an American lackey from within the ranks.
• Pakistan’s government and military have been unable to effectively roll back a raging Taliban-led insurgency in its northwest. This is moving beyond a crisis of governance into a crisis of existence.
• US and US-allied forces are preparing to conduct larger, more overt military action in Pakistan and have already openly admitted to conducting air strikes on Pakistani territory.
• The CIA publicly identified the ISI as having a hand in the recent bombing of the Indian Embassy in Kabul.
• Sources further indicate that there is a common perception within the Pakistani military that the US is colluding with the Indians to foment trouble in Balochistan and Pakistan’s northwest.
• Intermittent hostilities have broken out between India and Pakistan on the Line of Control in Kashmir after 5 years of peace.
• Public discontent is being compounded by a slowing economy and food and oil inflation.

Pretty picture, right? It depicts how unsustainable the current state of affairs is.

Ultimately, we’re witnessing a web of competing interests intersect and conflict in a big way. At the center of it all is the Pakistani military establishment. It currently finds itself in conflict with the US, India, the Pakistani civilian government, insurgents and perhaps even itself. This is no fault of the military’s — this merely reflects the reality that the military is at the center of the Pakistani state. It is the only institution that is capable of holding Pakistan together as the country tears itself apart.

It would behoove the present elected government to work in lockstep with the military, instead of engaging it and other parties in petty power struggles. The reinstatement of sacked judges or Musharraf’s impeachment will not save Pakistan. That will instead be determined by how Pakistanis and their leaders come together as a nation.

Zardari’s Miscalculation
It’s an open secret that Benazir Bhutto’s widower, Asif Ali Zardari, calls the shots in the current government, not Gilani. According to Insider Brief sources, the decision to place the ISI under the Interior Ministry and thereby Interior Minister Rehman Malik, was Zardari’s decision. Sources further state that Zardari miscalculated and did not anticipate the response the decision received. Like a kid with a stick, he prodded too hard only to awaken a nest of (khaki) hornets.

Kayani Intervenes
In our last post, we indicated that Pakistan’s Army Chief, Gen. Ashfaq Kayani, would have to respond forcefully to the government’s decision so as not to appear weak, but also, to defend his turf; the ISI for all practical purposes, answers to the Chief of Army Staff. Insider Brief sources report that the night of the announcement, Kayani personally intervened and ensured that the decision was reversed.

Aftermath
The government’s initial decision should not be contextualized within the framework of US-Pakistani relations. This was not about “reining” in Pakistani intelligence at the behest of the Americans. This was an attempt by Zardari to halt ISI activity against the PPP government in Punjab and gain full control of what is essentially Pakistan’s most powerful “policy” tool. He overplayed his hand against what he perceived was a discredited and demoralized military. Now, he will likely have to face the consequences of increased hostility from the establishment and a possible intensification of the campaign to unseat his government.

With each passing day, a once golden opportunity to turn things around for Pakistan is slipping from the grasp of the Pakistan People’s Party. There’s still time to take a stand, make some bold policy decisions and reverse the atrophy that is nibbling away at the current government. Pakistan can no longer afford more of the same.

Radio: The John Batchelor Show
Earlier tonight, I appeared on the John Batchelor Show to discuss the continued volatility in Pakistan’s northwest, the assassination attempt on Hamid Karzai, as well as Senator Barack Obama new conciliatory tone towards Pakistan.

John’s show airs on Sundays, WABC 770AM in New York from 7-10pm EST (webcast), and KFI 640AM in Los Angeles from 7-10pm PST (webcast).

However, sources report that the helicopter was one of the brand new Bell 412 helicopters provided to Pakistan by the United States. They also state that militants in South Waziristan have been using anti-aircraft missiles. Sources narrate further that the helicopter had been visiting a unit in South Waziristan and was on its way back when, within 3 minutes of taking off, it came down.

If militants did indeed manage to shoot down the helicopter, it would mark the first time militants have downed a Pakistani helicopter.

Individuals within the establishment have said that US, Indian, and/or Afghan involvement in the helicopter crash/downing cannot be ruled out. They cite a recent decision by the government of Pakistan to review its strategy in FATA. Downing the helicopter maybe a means of instigating the Pakistan Army to use more force or to get out of the region all together.

More to come.

MISSION ACCOMPLISHED?
Hillary Clinton is many things, but one thing she is not is unintelligent. Nor are those she surrounds herself with. Her foreign policy team — which includes former Secretary of State Madeleine Albright, Ambassador Richard Holbrooke, and of course, her husband, former President Bill Clinton — is painfully aware of how impractical her proposal for joint oversight is. After all, it was under President Bill Clinton’s watch that Pakistan defiantly tested its nuclear weapons, despite the threat of new sanctions when its economy was teetering on the brink of collapse.

So then why did she issue such an undeniably flawed policy statement?

The answer is right in front of us in the media’s response. Following her third place finish in Iowa at the hands of Senators Barack Obama and John Edwards, Sen. Clinton’s policy appears to be a ploy designed to attract attention to her campaign on the eve of the crucial New Hampshire primary. With a media that thrives on soundbites, it’s a ploy that in the past has proven effective.

NUCLEAR FALLOUT
Not convinced that the proposal is a campaign tactic? Assume for a moment that Clinton is serious in proposing joint US-UK stewardship of Pakistani nuclear weapons. Implications abound, the proposal would risk severe fallout for Pakistan as well as US interests in the region:

Violent and Vocal Reaction in Pakistan. It’s safe to say that any sitting government in Pakistan that would agree to US oversight of the nation’s nuclear weapons would be overthrown either in a military coup or by an overwhelming response from the Pakistani public. President Pervez Musharraf is afraid to openly acknowledge American boots on the ground in Pakistan’s northwest, let alone American oversight of Pakistani nukes. (Just today, Pakistani spokepeople were bristling at alleged deliberations by the Bush administration to give the CIA expanded powers to operate within Pakistan.)

Spike in Anti-Americanism in Pakistan and the Muslim world. Pakistan is currently the world’s only Muslim nuclear weapons state. US supervision of Pakistan’s nukes would be viewed as a continuation of the American “crusade” against Muslims. Pakistanis in general have long been convinced that the US is seeking to destablize their country in the hopes of an excuse to defang its nuclear capabilities. Many average Pakistanis are convinced that the US had a role to play in the assassination of Benazir Bhutto for that very reason. Sen. Clinton’s proposal is a sure fire way of stoking anti-Americanism and bringing Islamists to power in Pakistan.

Disruption of Sino-US relations. China was heavily involved in helping facilitate the funding and technical expertise towards the Pakistani nuclear program. China’s involvement reflects a long-standing strategic relationship between itself and Pakistan. The Chinese will not take pseudo-US control of nuclear weapons in their backyard lying down. The US government should be prepared for a severe reaction from the Chinese govement including aggressive behavior around Taiwan, Central Asia and the support of a military coup in Pakistan.

Loss of Credibility for the Democratic Party in Pakistan. The Pakistani establishment has long favored the Republican Party given the party’s record of, more often than not, engaging Pakistan. Many in Pakistan have not forgotten the treatment meted out to them by President Bill Clinton, particularly during his second term in office. If Hillary Clinton pushes her policy proposal, she would be helping ensure a poor working relationship with the government of Pakistan anytime a Democrat is in office.

The aforementioned are only a handful of the potential (frightening) outcomes from the promotion/imposition of Sen. Clinton’s proposal. It’s unlikely that the likes of Madeleine Albright, Richard Holbrooke, or Hillary Clinton herself would have overlooked these.

LESSONS LEARNT
The buzz generated by Clinton’s statement lasted a heartbeat and as of now, she trails behind Barack Obama by 9 points in New Hampshire. It’s a poignant lesson for all presidential candidates who seek to use controversial statements as a short term means of boosting their respective campaigns. Instead of formulating strong messages backed by well thought out policies, they end up right back where they started while looking, well, unintelligent.

The list of requirements — as to what they are we can’t quite say — are being provided discreetly to avoid the perception that Musharraf is capitulating to or acquiescing to American demands.

The White House appears to be taking a pragmatic (some would say flawed) approach to Pakistan’s elections, allowing for imperfections and potential manipulation in exchange for what in its eyes may be stability and the empowerment of a coalition of “moderates” in Pakistan.

The long, windy march to democracy continues.

The News: Reuters
With Gen. Ashfaq Kayani’s ascendancy to the role of Chief of Army Staff (COAS), Reuters published an article on Nov. 28th titled, “Five Facts on Pakistan’s New Army Chief – Kayani,” in which they cited the Insider Brief.

On the Web: Watandost
In his latest blog post entitled, “Three New Excellent Blogs on Pakistan,” Hassan Abbas of Watandost recommended three Pakistan-focused blogs to his readers, one of which happened to be the Insider Brief. A published author and former Pakistani government official, Abbas is also a Research Fellow at the Belfer Center’s Project on Managing the Atom and International Security Program. His recognition, like that of the PCR Project, means a lot to us.

On the Radio: The John Batchelor Show
Last night, I appeared on the John Batchelor Show to discuss the rise of Gen. Ashfaq Kayani and President Musharraf’s future. You can listen to my conversation with John by using the player below.

Download audio file (wabc-interview-20071202-pakintel.mp3)
(Download file)

John’s show airs on Sundays, WABC 770AM in New York from 7-10pm EST (webcast), and KFI 640AM in Los Angeles from 7-10pm PST (webcast).

We at the Insider Brief contend that the real, imminent crisis exists in Pakistan’s current inability to tame and integrate the country’s northwestern frontier — also known as the Federally Administered Tribal Areas (FATA) — which stems from a larger crisis in governance that afflicts the rest of the nation. The latest symptoms of this failure include the twin bombings in Rawalpindi and ongoing military operations in Swat, the latter of which seek to rollback Islamist forces that have now expanded their reach from the tribal regions into NWFP proper.

Gordian Knot
The Pushtun tribes and people that occupy the tribal belt that straddles the Afghan and Pakistani border have lived in that region with their way of life in times predating Islam and even Jesus Christ. Every empire and nation that has attempted to enter and impose its rule on those lands has often regretted it — be it Alexander, the Mughals, the British, and now Pakistan. Even the British Empire, despite its vast resources and experience in ruling even the unruliest of places, had an incredibly tenuous hold on the region which for the most part remained largely autonomous

Couple this unmanageable region’s history with a heavy saturation of weapons (there are more guns than people) left over from the Soviet invasion and the throngs of unemployed, well trained and battle hardened jihadist guerillas jointly created by the CIA and ISI during the 1980′s, and you have the ingredients for what the CIA calls blowback. Sprinkle in the fact that every Afghan regime since Pakistan’s inception has challenged the legitimacy of the Durand Line border demarcation that splits these tribal regions down the middle and you have to ask yourself, can Pakistan really claim sovereignty over this region?

It’s a miracle in itself that President Musharraf managed to pour nearly 100,000 soldiers (~ 2 heavy infantry divisions and 2 infantry divisions) into FATA and the surrounding areas, set up check points, and launch military operations without sparking an all out rebellion.

Cutting the Knot … with an AK?
The New York Times reported last Sunday that the Pentagon was considering enlisting the help of tribes in Pakistan’s northwest against Islamist militants. This strategy mirrors the successful American strategy in Iraq’s Anbar province but may not be applicable to Pakistan. Though some tribes view foreign and local Islamist militants as a cancer for the tribal system – destroying the very system that safeguarded them and from whence they came – there are some tribes, like the Mehsuds and Aurakzai, that have been defending the very same militants.

Hypothetically speaking, if the US strategy were to work, it presents a double-edged sword. What happens after the US-armed and financed tribals have rid themselves of the Islamists? They’ll likely turn their guns right back on the US, demanding the US withdraw from the region. It is unlikely that the US will comply.

So then, what is the solution for quelling the violence in FATA, disarming Islamists and bringing the region into the fold? Does it involve a paradigm shift in the way counterinsurgency operations are carried out? Does it involve a Marshall Plan for the region with billions of dollars in developmental spending? Does it mean destroying the tribal system? They say the lifespan of an insurgency is around a decade, sadly, the struggle for the tribal belt is one that has been ongoing for centuries.

At the Insider Brief, we don’t pretend to know the answers to these questions, but we do know what doesn’t work. The solution for the region as a whole doesn’t lie in Predator-fired Hellfire missiles or heavy handed tactics. It doesn’t lie in blanket clemency for militants either. The solution must lie somewhere in the middle. For starters, Pakistan and the US should join hands with the same commitment they did near the end of the Cold War, and spend on poverty alleviation and education, not just military supplies and training for the local populace. One thing must be clear: only when you have a hand in bettering someone’s life can you claim sovereignty over where they live.

As military operations continue in the nation’s northwest, we intend on bringing you new guest posts and exclusive content aimed at developing a fresh perspective of a region that has perplexed many. Stay tuned and stay informed.

Negroponte’s Visit
Undersecretary of State John Negroponte’s visit to Pakistan is probably the week’s biggest event. Having arrived in Pakistan on Friday, Negroponte met with President Gen. Pervez Musharraf, his advisor Tariq Aziz and Vice Chief of Army Staff Gen. Ashfaq Kayani. Wratcheting up pressure on Musharraf, the Bush administration dispatched Negroponte to demand a specified date when Musharraf would end the state of emergency. Negroponte went home dateless on Sunday.

The visit itself is not significant, but the potential American response is. In the eyes of the White House, Musharraf may no longer be the reliable ally he once was. Yes, there have been disagreements between the Bush adminstration and Musharraf from time to time (e.g. the Iran-Pakistan-India gas pipeline), but never on high-profile matters like this. Couple Musharraf’s recalcitrance with the fact that Washington probably doesn’t appreciate how his alleged power grab could compromise the war on terror, and you may have a recipe for an American backed effort to remove Musharraf from power.

To those of you gasping at the thought, just take into account the fact that Negroponte met with Gen. Kayani twice during his visit, which according to many indicates American support for the general. If Musharraf goes, willingly or unwillingly, there’s atleast a fall back option. Kayani is a known Musharraf loyalist and unlikely to engage in any intrigues, but power does have its allure.

Interim Government Announced
The other big news of the week centered around Pres. Musharraf’s appointment of Senate Chairman Mohammadmian Soomro as caretaker prime minister along with the rest of his cabinet that will form the interim government.

Sources had reported over a week ago that Soomro would be appointed interim prime minister but I questioned the veracity of the news and did not report it. After all, Soomro is a known Musharraf loyalist and PML(Q) party member; a caretaker prime minister would need to be neutral for national elections to have any semblance of legitimacy. Surprisingly, not only was Soomro included in the interim government, but so were a whole host of vocal Musharraf supporters.

Musharraf, it appears, was not about to take any chances by having an interim government create a sticky situation for him or voice any opposition to him.

Some eyebrows were raised with the inclusion of Salman Taseer in the interim government given his prior links to the PPP. Taseer is the business magnate behind WorldCall and the Daily Times among other major business ventures. Sources insist that there is no signfiicance, however, Taseer’s involvement and Bhutto’s relative freedom vis-a-vis other opposition leaders may imply that some sort of accomodation is still possible between Musharraf and the PPP.

Skyguard Delivery Halted
On Wednesday, Switzerland indefinitely halted the delivery of Skyguard air defense batteries to Pakistan due to the on-going situation in Pakistan. Intended for the Pakistan Army, the 21 vehicle mounted anti-aircraft systems were excess inventory from the Swiss armed forces. In addition to the Skyguard units already owned and operated by the Pakistan Army, six batteries had already been delivered from the most recent purchase.

The prevention of delivery will not significantly damage Pakistan’s air defense capabilities, but it does raise fears that other left-leaning government may do the same for more vital defense equipment. One prime example is Sweden, with whom Pakistan recently signed a multi-billion dollar deal to purchase seven Erieye Airborne Warning and Control Systems (AWACS).

The Swiss will ultimately relent, however, the damage has been done to their future prospects of arms sales to Pakistan. Pakistan will likely turn to more reliable partners, such as France and China, for purchases and co-development of more advanced air defense systems. The same happened after the United States’ continual embargo of F-16′s that had been paid for by Pakistan; Pakistan, in conjunction with China, ended up developing and producing the JF-17 Thunder, a plane arguably better than earlier block F-16′s.