SUMMARY
The first two months of 2010 have brought about a sea change on the ground in Afghanistan and Pakistan.  The U.S. has initiated a surge in both drone strikes and troops (40,000 more boots expected on the ground in Afghanistan) in an attempt to reshape the Afghan war.  Pakistan, many analysts have observed, has had a seeming change of heart, allegedly capturing half of the Taliban’s Quetta Shura including the Taliban’s number two, Mullah Abdul Ghani Baradar.  However, the spate of high profile arrests shouldn’t be construed as a change of heart or a capitulation to American pressure.  Pakistan is betting on itself in a complex game to further its interests in the region.

“WE HOLD ALL THE CARDS”
The following (Afghan) Taliban members have been either killed or captured in Pakistan:

• 01/26/10 – Mullah Abdul Salam – Shadow governor of Kunduz province – Captured – Faisalabad, Pakistan
• 01/26/10 – Mullah Mir Muhammad – Shadow governor of Baghlan province – Captured – Faisalabad, Pakistan
• 02/15/10 – Mullah Abdul Ghani Baradar – Second in command of Afghan Taliban – Captured – Karachi, Pakistan
• 02/18/10 – Mohammed Haqqani – Brother of Sirajuddin Haqqani – Killed – North Waziristan, Pakistan
• 02/20/10 – Maulvi Abdul Kabir – Former shadow governor of Nangarhar – Captured – Nowshera, Pakistan
• 03/03/10 – Agha Jan Mohtasim – Son-in-law to Mullah Omar and Taliban commander – Captured – Karachi, Pakistan
  

According to Christian Science Monitor, other Taliban members allegedly also captured by Pakistan include: Mullah Abdul Qayoum Zakir, who oversees the movement’s military affairs, Mullah Muhammad Hassan, Mullah Ahmed Jan Akhunzada, and Mullah Abdul Raouf.

The U.S. is a distant power that has signaled that it’s aiming to withdraw from the war ravaged nation by July 2011.  The Taliban are Pakistan’s strategic hedge in Afghanistan.  So why on earth has Pakistan decided to turn so forcefully against its (former?) proxy?

The answer is that it hasn’t.

The arrests are part of a larger strategy through which Pakistan is seeking to roll back Indian influence in Afghanistan and revitalize its own influence.  With leverage on both sides of the Afghan conflict (i.e., the U.S. and the Taliban), confidence is running high in the Pakistani establishment right now, with high level INSIDER BRIEF sources stating, “we [Pakistan] hold all the cards.”

On the one hand, Pakistan believes it has convinced Americans that U.S. success is highly dependent on Pakistani cooperation.  In return for cooperation, the U.S. has recognized Pakistani concerns vis-a-vis India in Afghanistan.  Pakistani sources report that this was in part exhibited by the marginalization of the Indians at the Afghan conferences in London and Turkey.

On the other hand, Pakistan has been urging the Taliban to moderate themselves and cooperate towards a post-American set-up in Afghanistan (but not one that was independent of Pakistani considerations).  Pakistan has conveyed this through two means: quiet nudging and arrests.  Of course, the latter has been heavily publicized.  Using its superior human intelligence and murky relationships, Pakistan has identified amenable elements for “collection” (read: arrest) for use in a future dispensation in Afghanistan.  The intent is that the remaining hard-line elements (e.g., those aligned with Al Qaeda) will be sidelined and eliminated.  The strategy may explain Pakistani actions to prevent handover of captured Taliban figures to Afghanistan or the U.S.

INTERPRETING RECENT DEVELOPMENTS
On Friday, February 26th, the Lahore High Court (LHC) barred the government from extraditing captured Afghan Taliban leaders (including Mullah Baradar) abroad.  The ruling came on the heels of a Pakistani decision to hand over top Taliban militants over to Afghanistan.  Some may view the LHC ruling in the context of Pakistani judicial activism that has proven to be a thorn in the side of Pakistani anti-terror efforts.  However, the court decision is likely an example of judicial pliability and not independence.  The Zardari administration can now comfortably deflect American and Afghan pressure under the cover of the LHC ruling.  After all, handing over top Taliban militants over to the Afghan would reduce Pakistan’s leverage in the process and possibly lead to the revelation of some embarrassing links between Pakistan and the Taliban.

That Friday also brought a string of Taliban suicide bombings in Kabul that targeted Indians (9 of the 17 killed were Indian and 12 Indians were also injured).  Two rationales appear to be developing for the attack.  The first is that the Taliban are trying to throw a wrench in recently re-initiated Indo-Pak talks.  The second is that the attacks were coordinated by Pakistan’s intelligence agencies, who in the past have been blamed for previous attacks on the Indian embassy in Kabul.  I believe that there exists a third rationale.  Certain factions in the Taliban, under new found pressure by their former sponsors, may be trying to demonstrate their usefulness to Pakistan by targeting the Indians in Afghanistan as a reminder that they can help counter Indian influence in the country.

Pakistan believes it holds all the cards for success in Afghanistan.  However, a number of factors could possibly ruin Pakistan’s hand.  A highly decentralized Afghan Taliban may not be responsive to calls to reconciliation by Taliban leaders captured in Pakistan far from the fighting.  Or U.S. resolve in Afghanistan may not last and an antagonized Taliban may fail to cooperate or even turn on Pakistan after the Americans leave.  The list goes on.

The chips are on the table.  Let’s see how this hand plays out.

Zardari’s Miscalculation
It’s an open secret that Benazir Bhutto’s widower, Asif Ali Zardari, calls the shots in the current government, not Gilani. According to Insider Brief sources, the decision to place the ISI under the Interior Ministry and thereby Interior Minister Rehman Malik, was Zardari’s decision. Sources further state that Zardari miscalculated and did not anticipate the response the decision received. Like a kid with a stick, he prodded too hard only to awaken a nest of (khaki) hornets.

Kayani Intervenes
In our last post, we indicated that Pakistan’s Army Chief, Gen. Ashfaq Kayani, would have to respond forcefully to the government’s decision so as not to appear weak, but also, to defend his turf; the ISI for all practical purposes, answers to the Chief of Army Staff. Insider Brief sources report that the night of the announcement, Kayani personally intervened and ensured that the decision was reversed.

Aftermath
The government’s initial decision should not be contextualized within the framework of US-Pakistani relations. This was not about “reining” in Pakistani intelligence at the behest of the Americans. This was an attempt by Zardari to halt ISI activity against the PPP government in Punjab and gain full control of what is essentially Pakistan’s most powerful “policy” tool. He overplayed his hand against what he perceived was a discredited and demoralized military. Now, he will likely have to face the consequences of increased hostility from the establishment and a possible intensification of the campaign to unseat his government.

With each passing day, a once golden opportunity to turn things around for Pakistan is slipping from the grasp of the Pakistan People’s Party. There’s still time to take a stand, make some bold policy decisions and reverse the atrophy that is nibbling away at the current government. Pakistan can no longer afford more of the same.

The decision is one that is bold, unprecedented and controversial. The ISI (Inter-Services Intelligence) has traditionally fallen under the purview of the military, with Army officers rotating through the agency for two year stints. Many have labeled the ISI as a “state within a state” for its pervasiveness and ability to influence state matters with near complete autonomy. Today’s decision by Gilani and his cabinet marks a major move by the nascent civilian government in the long standing struggle by Pakistan’s civilian/political forces to bring the military establishment under their control. This news also likely corroborates our last post as the move may be in response to military/intelligence discussions over the ouster of his PPP government.

The military will not accept the cabinet decision lying down. Insider Brief sources further report that many ranking military officials have indicated that there will be a coup if Gilani does not back down from his decision. Such a move would not be unprecedented. Many may remember that the last time a civilian government attempted to meddle in military affairs, it ultimately resulted in the coup that brought President Musharraf to power. Much of the anger in the military is being directed towards Interior Minister Rehman Malik, who is widely believed by Pakistan’s intelligence community to have had some affiliation with the CIA. In the eyes of Pakistan intelligence, Malik’s access may severely compromise ISI operational security.

The government’s move has also placed Pakistan’s Chief of Army Staff (COAS), Gen. Ashfaq Kayani, in an awkward position. Since his appointment to COAS, he has been an advocate of extricating the military from overt interference in government affairs and has made a very public effort to support the new government. As opposed to engaging Kayani in a process to alter the balance of power between Rawalpindi and Islamabad, Gilani’s government has acted brashly and resultantly forced Kayani into a corner. If Kayani does not respond forcefully, he will appear weak and lose credibility with his subordinates. The Army Chief will also likely want to respond — after all, the ISI was under his command.

If there is a coup, it will likely be a politically engineered, “soft coup.” This would include the possibility of President Musharraf dismissing the government through powers granted to him in the constitution. An overt military coup is unlikely as it would trigger sanctions, isolate Pakistan internationally and result in a further weakening of already shaky relationship.

The PPP has taken a risky gamble — Prime Minister Gilani may return to Pakistan only to find himself out of a job.