SUMMARY
The first two months of 2010 have brought about a sea change on the ground in Afghanistan and Pakistan.  The U.S. has initiated a surge in both drone strikes and troops (40,000 more boots expected on the ground in Afghanistan) in an attempt to reshape the Afghan war.  Pakistan, many analysts have observed, has had a seeming change of heart, allegedly capturing half of the Taliban’s Quetta Shura including the Taliban’s number two, Mullah Abdul Ghani Baradar.  However, the spate of high profile arrests shouldn’t be construed as a change of heart or a capitulation to American pressure.  Pakistan is betting on itself in a complex game to further its interests in the region.

“WE HOLD ALL THE CARDS”
The following (Afghan) Taliban members have been either killed or captured in Pakistan:

• 01/26/10 – Mullah Abdul Salam – Shadow governor of Kunduz province – Captured – Faisalabad, Pakistan
• 01/26/10 – Mullah Mir Muhammad – Shadow governor of Baghlan province – Captured – Faisalabad, Pakistan
• 02/15/10 – Mullah Abdul Ghani Baradar – Second in command of Afghan Taliban – Captured – Karachi, Pakistan
• 02/18/10 – Mohammed Haqqani – Brother of Sirajuddin Haqqani – Killed – North Waziristan, Pakistan
• 02/20/10 – Maulvi Abdul Kabir – Former shadow governor of Nangarhar – Captured – Nowshera, Pakistan
• 03/03/10 – Agha Jan Mohtasim – Son-in-law to Mullah Omar and Taliban commander – Captured – Karachi, Pakistan
  

According to Christian Science Monitor, other Taliban members allegedly also captured by Pakistan include: Mullah Abdul Qayoum Zakir, who oversees the movement’s military affairs, Mullah Muhammad Hassan, Mullah Ahmed Jan Akhunzada, and Mullah Abdul Raouf.

The U.S. is a distant power that has signaled that it’s aiming to withdraw from the war ravaged nation by July 2011.  The Taliban are Pakistan’s strategic hedge in Afghanistan.  So why on earth has Pakistan decided to turn so forcefully against its (former?) proxy?

The answer is that it hasn’t.

The arrests are part of a larger strategy through which Pakistan is seeking to roll back Indian influence in Afghanistan and revitalize its own influence.  With leverage on both sides of the Afghan conflict (i.e., the U.S. and the Taliban), confidence is running high in the Pakistani establishment right now, with high level INSIDER BRIEF sources stating, “we [Pakistan] hold all the cards.”

On the one hand, Pakistan believes it has convinced Americans that U.S. success is highly dependent on Pakistani cooperation.  In return for cooperation, the U.S. has recognized Pakistani concerns vis-a-vis India in Afghanistan.  Pakistani sources report that this was in part exhibited by the marginalization of the Indians at the Afghan conferences in London and Turkey.

On the other hand, Pakistan has been urging the Taliban to moderate themselves and cooperate towards a post-American set-up in Afghanistan (but not one that was independent of Pakistani considerations).  Pakistan has conveyed this through two means: quiet nudging and arrests.  Of course, the latter has been heavily publicized.  Using its superior human intelligence and murky relationships, Pakistan has identified amenable elements for “collection” (read: arrest) for use in a future dispensation in Afghanistan.  The intent is that the remaining hard-line elements (e.g., those aligned with Al Qaeda) will be sidelined and eliminated.  The strategy may explain Pakistani actions to prevent handover of captured Taliban figures to Afghanistan or the U.S.

INTERPRETING RECENT DEVELOPMENTS
On Friday, February 26th, the Lahore High Court (LHC) barred the government from extraditing captured Afghan Taliban leaders (including Mullah Baradar) abroad.  The ruling came on the heels of a Pakistani decision to hand over top Taliban militants over to Afghanistan.  Some may view the LHC ruling in the context of Pakistani judicial activism that has proven to be a thorn in the side of Pakistani anti-terror efforts.  However, the court decision is likely an example of judicial pliability and not independence.  The Zardari administration can now comfortably deflect American and Afghan pressure under the cover of the LHC ruling.  After all, handing over top Taliban militants over to the Afghan would reduce Pakistan’s leverage in the process and possibly lead to the revelation of some embarrassing links between Pakistan and the Taliban.

That Friday also brought a string of Taliban suicide bombings in Kabul that targeted Indians (9 of the 17 killed were Indian and 12 Indians were also injured).  Two rationales appear to be developing for the attack.  The first is that the Taliban are trying to throw a wrench in recently re-initiated Indo-Pak talks.  The second is that the attacks were coordinated by Pakistan’s intelligence agencies, who in the past have been blamed for previous attacks on the Indian embassy in Kabul.  I believe that there exists a third rationale.  Certain factions in the Taliban, under new found pressure by their former sponsors, may be trying to demonstrate their usefulness to Pakistan by targeting the Indians in Afghanistan as a reminder that they can help counter Indian influence in the country.

Pakistan believes it holds all the cards for success in Afghanistan.  However, a number of factors could possibly ruin Pakistan’s hand.  A highly decentralized Afghan Taliban may not be responsive to calls to reconciliation by Taliban leaders captured in Pakistan far from the fighting.  Or U.S. resolve in Afghanistan may not last and an antagonized Taliban may fail to cooperate or even turn on Pakistan after the Americans leave.  The list goes on.

The chips are on the table.  Let’s see how this hand plays out.

This follows multiple claims from the Taliban that Hakimullah was still alive, in line with the pattern of claims made after the death of their charismatic leader, Baitullah Mehsud in August.  Also allegedly killed in the January 14th strikes in Shaktoi was Qari Hussain, organizer of the TTP’s suicide bombing squads and potential successor to Hakimullah.  With the (possible) deaths of its top leaders, an unprecedented surge in drone strikes, and a Pakistan Army offensive that just took the town of Damadola (Bajaur), the TTP is under intense pressure.

It’s been reported that in the interim, Malik Noor Jamal a/k/a Mullah Toofan (Storm), is now the acting head of the TTP.  Hakimullah Mehsud was able to regroup the Taliban after the loss of Baitullah, and unleash a wave of terror across Pakistan.  Will Jamal be able to do the same?

PROFILE OF MULLAH TOOFAN
Aside from a video of Mullah Toofan flogging men in public, little has been known about him – until now.  Insider Brief sources have disclosed the following details about the acting head of the TTP:

• Name: Noor Jamal
• Name of Father: Rasool Khan
• Tribe: Mamozai
• Religion: Islam (Sunni)
• Age: 42-45 years old
• Education: Religious education
• Profession: Imam of a mosque in Mamozai (Orakzai Agency)
• Address (Present): Dogar Village, Central Kurram Agency
• Address (Permanent): Mamozai, Orakzai Agency
• Marital Status: Married with 2 sons
• Siblings: 2 brothers (one of whom — [name withheld by editor] — is employed in Dubai)
• Brief History: Noor Jamal a/k/a Mullah Toofan has been a low level commander of the TTP in Mamozai, Orakzai Agency, but also a close associate of Hakimullah Mehsud.  As a result of that close relationship, Hakimullah Mehsud appointed Jamal as the Amir of Kurram Agency, in place of Wali-ur-Rehman Mehsud.  Mullah Toofan reportedly participated in the Afghan civil after the withdrawal of Soviet forces.

1. December 8th – Pakistan received the first of seven Saab 2000 Erieye Airborne Warning and Control Systems (AWACS).  The Erieye systems should go a long way in improving the situational awareness of Pakistan’s air force and monitoring of IAF movement deep within Indian territory.  However, the benefits of the AWACS won’t be felt until Pakistan receives more (so that it can maintain constant air presence of the systems) and has more time to develop and “operationalize” tactics associated with the technology.
2. December 7th -  Insider Brief sources reported that Pakistan had successfully test flown a drone based on U.S. technology.  The sources reported that the technology was drawn from a drone shot down in September 2008 and had been secretly shipped to China for study — in line with our expectations from last year — though I’m a little surprised at the gestation period.  Reverse engineering a Predator drone and translating those learnings into a prototype in a little over a year seems ambitious, but may have been enabled by Chinese involvement and the fact that Pakistan already has an established UAV industry.  The new drone likely has greater endurance, altitude, and range — notable limitations for Pakistani UAV technology in the past.  A greater boon would be if the downed Predator drone from last year was a UCAV (capable of firing Hellfire missiles).
3. November 23th – Pakistan inducted its first domestically produced JF-17 fighter.  The plane, co-developed and co-produced with the Chinese, is a major milestone on Pakistan’s path for self-reliance in combat aircraft.  The JF-17, once inducted en masse, will significantly boost Pakistan’s overall capability as we detailed back in 2007.
4. November 11th – Pakistan announced that it would be purchasing J-10 fighters  from China in a preliminary agreement.  The J-10 acquisition is a good move that displays the PAF’s continued fiscal discipline and long-term thinking.  The J-10, considered on par with later block F-16’s that Pakistan’s purchased from the U.S., would help diversify Pakistan’s suppliers of hi-tech aircraft all the while sidestepping the threat of potential U.S. arms embargoes.  With a mix of J-10’s, F-16’s and JF-17’s coupled with Erieye AWACS, Pakistan’s air force will be creating a highly potent and cost effective model for minimum deterrence.  (I note fiscal discipline in that the J-10, though expensive, is not as pricey as other Western options in the market.)

Analysis
Viewed in the context of multiplying reports covering US cross-border incursions and strikes in Pakistan’s northwest, the downed UAV was likely a Predator drone. Whether the drone was a UCAV – unmanned combat aerial vehicle – equipped with Hellfire missiles, is unclear. What is increasingly clear from reports, however, is that the drone and its parts were collected by Pakistani security forces largely in tact. Gaining access to the Predator’s technology should prove to be a boon for Pakistan.

Pakistan’s indigenous UAV technology is by no means rudimentary. Its UAV industry has been growing at a rapid pace over the course of the past decade, driven by both government-funded and private sector programs. In fact, the US Border Guard even purchased the Pakistani-made “Border Eagle” UAV in 2004. But while it has been adept at developing short-to-medium range tactical UAVs, Pakistan’s industry has faced a gap in its ability to develop longer range, long endurance UAVs.

To fill this gap, Pakistan sought to purchase the Predator UAV from the US. The US declined to sell the Predator to Pakistan, despite its utility in monitoring Pakistan’s treacherous border with Afghanistan. Now, Pakistan has access to some of the best American-made UAV technology at the cost of a few dozen shell casings.

It’s worth noting that this wouldn’t be the first time that Pakistan has used access to American technology to further its own indigenous defense programs. In August 1998, near the tail end of the Clinton administration, the US launched Tomahawk cruise missile strikes on terrorist training camps in Afghanistan. At least two of those cruise missiles failed to reach their targets and landed in Pakistani territory – unexploded. Seven years later in August 2005, Pakistan test launched its first cruise missile, the Babur (Hatf-VII). The Babur, a high-speed, low-level terrain following cruise missile, bore a number of similarities to the Tomahawk.

Let’s see what Pakistan is test flying five years from now.

(Editor’s Note: Apologies for my conspicuous absence over the last month or so. I’m afraid my posting will likely be sporadic in the coming months as I’m occupied with multiple projects. In the meanwhile, I’ve got 3 posts in the queue and hope to have them published soon. I’ll be dealing with the Marriott bombing, Pakistan’s armed forces, and relations with the US, keep an eye out.)