Javed Jabbar is Chairman and Chief Executive of J.J. Media (Pvt.) and Project One (Pvt.).  He has served as President Gen. Pervez Mursharraf’s Minister of Information as well as a former senator and minister in three federal cabinets.  He produced the film Ramchand Pakistani (directed by his daughter, Mehreen Jabbar) and has authored several books, his most recent being Criss-Cross Times: selected writings about conflict and confluence 2001-2009. Jabbar is a member of the Neemrana Initiative, one of India-Pakistan’s most successful Track 2 dialogues.

The following is a transcript of the INSIDER BRIEF’s interview with Javed Jabbar, conducted by Sehr Akbar and Zainab Javed.

Q: Do you believe any progress was made during the Indo-Pak talks last week in Islamabad? Is avoiding touchy subjects such as Kashmir a strategic success or blunder in future relations between the two countries?

Javed Jabbar: Firstly, the fact that the two foreign ministers met represents substantive progress because it vindicates Pakistan’s position for the past two years, (since the Indians suspended the level of contact at the foreign minister level after the November ‘08 Mumbai attack).  It represents an acceptance in India that there is no alternative to dialogue.  So it is progress.  However, progress is also coming back to square one, because in any case we were already talking, (right, India suspended the talk, so it was frozen).  In a way you can say it is one step forward, and at the same time it’s one step back because it takes us to the pre-November ‘08 position, (when by coincidence the foreign minister was in New Delhi on the very day the terrorists carried out their attack in Mumbai.)  Bizarre that the foreign minister of Pakistan was in Delhi and there was this terrorist attack there which they immediately blamed on Pakistan.

So firstly, the meeting in Islamabad is good.  Second, I’m not surprised by the fact that there was no major positive outcome.  It is too early to expect a sudden improvement or major new development.  The very fact that they are now talking and listening to each other face-to-face is a very positive sign.  Third, on Kashmir, I am not expecting anything quick or overnight from the Indians.  It will be a gradual process.  Public opinion in both countries will have to be prepared to accept a compromise of the historical position, with some adjustment, which needs time.  Everyone has various compulsions to think of in both countries, but I’m confident that this meeting will lead to a positive outcome.

Q: What do you see as the solution for Kashmir being?  Military solutions have clearly never worked (four wars have been fought).  Is there any other way to solve the problem?

JJ: There are four steps which are vital to the resolution of the Kashmir dispute.

First element is to try to get an agreement between both Pakistan and India on which areas require a clarification about the status of Kashmir.  For example, is Ladakh a part of Kashmir or is it to be treated as an autonomous region separate from Kashmir?  The northern areas of Pakistan – are they to be treated as something outside Kashmir or are they considered historically to have been a part of Kashmir?  So the first step has to be, let us agree that this is the area we are disputing.  At this time, there is vagueness about it.  The only definition is this line of control — where both sides know this is the line of control, but other than that, there is some vagueness.  So remove the vagueness.

The second step is to gradually reduce the troops on both sides of the line of control instead of having 500,000 Indian troops and 100,000 Pakistani troops.  Reduce them gradually so that you reduce the tension and conflict with local people.  Especially in Indian Kashmir.

Third step should be the delegation of power by the Indian government from Delhi to the government in Srinagar.  Give them more authority, give them more power.  Similarly in Islamabad, we should give more authority and power to the local government of Azad- Kashmir.  At the moment, the government of Pakistan decides many of the appointments that take place.  So give more power to both sides of Kashmir, the local people.

Fourth step then can be, start a dialogue between the elected people in Azad-Kashmir and the elected and political people of Indian Kashmir.  I say elected and political because the Hurriyat conference/leadership of Indian occupied Kashmir has never taken part in the elections that are held within Indian Kashmir.  They boycott them because they say the elections are held under the Indian constitution – which they don’t accept.  So you have to also bring in the Hurriyat leadership, apart from those people like Omar Abdullah (elected CM of Indian Kashmir).  The Hurriyat is not elected and the Indians say the Hurriyat doesn’t represent people, but they do represent some people.  So there should be some dialogue between the elected and political people from both sides of Kashmir.

Once you take those four steps, then public opinions in both sides of Kashmir and in India and Pakistan may be willing to accept a final settlement.  What that final settlement will be, let’s leave it to those two dialogues and to what the governments of India and Pakistan can agree upon.

Q: The India-Pakistan relationship is built on a very fragile thread of trust — what are some measures that can reduce the ‘trust deficit’?

JJ: I believe that the first step towards reducing the trust deficit has to be continuous, uninterrupted, sustained dialogue at all levels.  At the summit level (heads of state and government should meet regularly and frequently), minister level, official level and very importantly, at the military level.  The Chief of Army Staff of Pakistan should meet the Commander in Chief of the Indian army, even if there’s no agreement and they are very angry at each other.  They must meet because the whole point about the current environment of the world is that you listen to and meet each other.  At the UN, you sit in the same hall, where you have people completely opposed of each other’s viewpoint, but you listen to each other.  So it’s very important for dialogue to be conducted on a regular, continual, uninterrupted basis.  That’s the first way to reduce the trust deficit.

I was so far only talking about the official dialogue.  Second, I believe there should also be regular non-official dialogue between people who are not holding offices or in a government capacity, but people who have the capacity to influence public opinion.

The third type of dialogue is media dialogue between the editors and proprietors of various media, especially indigenous language media such as Telugu, Tamil, Bengali, Marathi (not just English media).  These are the languages spoken by the majority of the people of India.  Those should interact with people from Pakistan – Urdu, Sindhi and Pashtu language media, (both electronic and print) – so that there is greater communication.

The next step should be increased trade and commerce.

If we take all these measures, there should be a reduction in the trust deficit and an increase in a sense of mutual confidence.

Q: What do you believe is the existential threat to Pakistan?

JJ: I believe that the greater threat to Pakistan today is our own internal state of being – the conditions in which we live, the mindsets that shape some of our official policies, and the attitudes and practices of some parts of our society.  These need to be reformed, modernized, and brought in tune with the rest of the world because some parts of Pakistani society are still living in medieval times while part is living in current times.  There needs to be a coherence and harmony with the rest of the world.  We can’t be so out of step as to be seen as a freakish country which has some completely mad practices or allows those practices.

In many ways, very good things are happening in Pakistan.  We have a strong judiciary, media and a flourishing civil society.  Many organizations raise their voices when it comes to human rights, freedom of expression and the rights of trade unions, laborers, doctors, teachers, and so on.  We should extend these rights.

In India’s relations with Pakistan, we must never lower our guard with India.  We must remain vigilant, but we must reach out to them with a hand of friendship and ask them to be fair to and not undermine Pakistan by attacking it outside like it does through academia and media in the USA.  We should adopt a policy of mutual respect and dignity.

We must treat our own internal conditions (lack of education, lack of social justice, lack of economic opportunities for the poor). These are the main existential threats to Pakistan.

Q:  Do you think Track II diplomacy was pursued effectively under Musharraf’s regime?

JJ: Track II started in 1992, ironically it was a time when PM Nawaz Sharif was in office for the first time.  It was initiated by an American initiative through the Ford Foundation with an American scholar and former diplomat called Paul Kreisberg.  He brought together a group of Indians and Pakistanis, and they met at a place called Neemrana, New Delhi in Rajasthan.  Neem standing for Naeem, Rana standing for a Hindu named Rana – that’s why the place is called Neemrana.  And the concept was that this group of specialists from different disciplines meets every once every five-six months with the knowledge and approval of both governments, but speaks its own mind.  They are not government officials and not bound by government policy.  And the cardinal rule was do not talk to the media.  Because the moment we start talking to the media and the headline is reported that “Pakistan suggests this solution for Kashmir,” there will be a great negative reaction in India.  So we decided don’t talk to the media.  That is why for the last 18 years we have been able to meet regularly and develop possibilities for solving some of the problems.  This Track II process should continue because on some occasions it helps governments with new ideas that governments can then make into official policy since they’ve already tested those ideas in Track II.

There’s a public track, which is normally also called Track II, but shouldn’t be.  The public track can be called Track III and is media oriented.  You get a group of say film actors from India to visit Pakistan, vise versa, you send some public personalities from Pakistan to go to India.  Sports, culture, all that can be Track III.  Trade can be track IV.  Sports is another track.  So there are different tracks on which you can build relations.  And Track II has a specialized function which should continue.

Q:  In retrospect, were Musharraf’s policies that led to the explosion of private media wise to begin with? Was Pakistan ready or mature enough?

JJ: Without taking away any credit from General Musharraf for enabling media to be free, this character here [Javed Jabbar] had a little something to do with it because well before Musharraf.  I had written the original law in 1996, which was passed as a law called EMRA, Electronic Media Regulatory Authority Ordinance on February 14, 1997.  It was the last law passed by the caretaker government of Farooq Leghari and Malik Meraj Khalid in which I was also a minister.  That law should have been made a permanent law by the second government of Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif, which he didn’t do.  Otherwise we would have had free media about five years earlier than we did. When General Musharraf made the mistake of asking me to be in his cabinet, we revived that law, improved it, and we finally introduced it.  Media freedom came because of General Musharraf’s decision, which was a bold decision and credit should go to him for implementing a law that had already been there but that had not been acted upon.

It is, I think, a tribute to him personally that he allowed this to happen, but it is also a reflection of the basic commitment that the people of Pakistan have to freedom of expression.  People like to listen to different points of view and they have a very open-minded attitude.  People like watching Indian movies.  They may hate India’s policies in Kashmir, but if it comes to enjoying Indian music, they’ll enjoy it. Similarly, Indians also enjoy Pakistani music or something which is done in a good, noncompetitive way by Pakistan.  So, it is a reflection of our society’s open-mindedness and a tribute to the people of Pakistan.

At the same time, media should also recognize the need to build national self-confidence and self-esteem. It should not treat all news as bad news and good news as no news. There is a need to balance the bad news with the good news and bring out the strengths and the beauty of Pakistan.

Hello Shaan,

My appearance on the TV is rather coincidental. Am not a person of great timings, as you put it. If I could make such calculations, my life would have been miserable. I am happy in the lost paradise that I have been living in. Due to the NRO issue I was pushed to speak in support of anti-corruption, despite my belief that no meaningful improvements in this field can come in the foreseeable time. In fact, some time back, I was (forcefully) invited to speak at the forum of PILDAT on the new anti-corruption bill which was then under debate [read:  Gen. Aziz's talking points].  I termed it “munafiqat ki benazir misaal” [epitome of hypocrisy] in my opening remark, on which all politicians present, including PML(N), got furious. They really don’t like generals. Can’t blame them too.

My appearance on TV now, has wandered into the terrorism issue, which, as you know, is also the other serious concern of mine. This is because of my involvement in these issues, while I served the Army and then the Government, and the moral burden I carry from there.  I cannot say where all this anti-terrorism will end, but has certainly landed us in a blood bath. There are the mullahs on one side and US policy pursuits on the other. And the miserable lot of Pakistanis crushed in the middle.

Other than personal attacks on me in the media, I am told that NAB is looking into my ‘deeds’ during my stay as Chairman. To my good luck, I had taken certain measures for changes within NAB, one of which included transparency within the department. We had weekly meetings in a board room attended by the concerned investigators, prosecutors, deputy directors, directors, DGs, Deputy Prosecutor General Accountability, Prosecutor General Accountability and Deputy Chairman NAB. All cases were presented here on Power Point, debated and decision arrived at. I had also passed written instructions that if a case of any relative of any one serving in NAB or any one who is someone in the country is presented it will be announced in the board room. I announced my decision and signed all formal documents for opening/closing cases, etc in that meeting, in presence of everyone. And all this was recorded on close circuit TV for posterity. I didn’t sign any such paper in the privacy of my office. I wonder if these records would also be brought out, in my support. Or if any one serving with me in these assignments would speak up. But I doubt.

I once invited some important people from the media, during my initial days, for sharing my thoughts and problems with them and seeking support from them in my solo fight against the sitting government — got no support. The political environment at the time I joined NAB was quite charged and no one would want to be seen supporting a general. This meeting was also held in the same room and was recorded in camera, as all meetings in this room, post my arrival. All my meetings with people who were under investigation were held in a meeting room which were video recorded and the record is now held with NAB. This was also started by me. I didn’t meet these people in my office, including Malik Riaz of Behria.

On 9the Dec 2006, on the Anti-Corruption Day NAB organized an anti-corruption march on Constitution Avenue in Islamabad. Edhi Saheb [Abdul Sattar Edhi] came to lead it. Our call was “UNITE AGAINST CORRUPTION”. I tried to rally support from the media and the public, but none came, except some school and college children with our request to them. Earlier that day the President was to come for the formal Anti-Corruption Day function but didn’t and the PM came. He openly abused NAB for its misdeeds. Later during tea, when the PM had gone away, the news reporters gathered around me and one of them asked why the PM was so furious with me. I told him, “Why don’t you ask the PM?” to which one of the reporters said, “We know. It is because you are doing POL inquiry against him.” I also have the PM’s remarks video with me.

All those who know me and have served with me for 30 years just sit back and see the muck being thrown at me. I have a history with good and bad, like every one else, but only the bad is shown around. The good might bewilder you. In my initial days at the NAB when I saw some of the cases being pursued, I cautioned my department not to continue to chase the gunahgars [sinners] but to go after the shiateen [devils], after all, Jannat  [heaven] will be fully loaded with gunahgars. And the shiateen here point fingers at the gunahgars so that all appear as one and no distinction remains. And now I am to be counted amongst one of them. After all I have lived 60 years and have had slips and slides on the way.

I have now decided not to respond to any personal allegations and continue my small effort for a better and peaceful Pakistan. If I am to be paraded through the cities with blackened face and it brings only a notch of goodness in the country I have succeeded.

Pray for my guidance from Allah.

Best regards,
SA

We at the Insider Brief have refrained from chiming in on the issue because there has been far too much disinformation and sensationalism out there clouding the actual story and underlying events. As more information has become available to us, we will briefly try to make heads or tails of the situation in Islamabad.

Our sources report that anxiously waiting Pakistan-watchers can likely expect some major news on Monday. The last time our sources told us to expect “major news,” Musharraf shed his uniform; this time may be a little different. We’re hesitant to speculate that Musharraf will resign due to what we’ve been hearing. The level of leaks and “inside news” emerging from Pakistani and American papers alike is unprecedented – and for good reason. Sources further report that a thorough disinformation campaign is being carried out by Pakistani intelligence agencies (“lafafa” journalism anyone?).

We believe that the campaign may be an attempt to focus the attention of Pakistanis and foreign governments towards the prospect of Musharraf’s resignation, away from the idea that he may be planning something altogether different. Based off chatter we’ve picked up on, we believe that any alternate plans being chalked up by Musharraf and the establishment may relate to the repeal of the National Reconciliation Order (NRO) that absolved the likes of Asif Zardari and Nawaz Sharif of their sins, fabricated or otherwise.

Our rationale is based off the fact that Musharraf allowed for the return and political participation of the late Bhutto, and to some degree the Sharifs, with the understanding that they would play by the rules laid out by the establishment. By pursuing Musharraf’s impeachment, they crossed the line in the sand. Now if Musharraf must go, he will pursue mutually assured destruction, bringing the coalition government down with him.

Ultimately, even if Musharraf does go, it’s of little consequence. As president, his constitutional powers are largely ceremonial – for whatever the constitution’s worth.

What’s the Rush, Mr. Zardari?
So why the sudden anxiousness on Zardari’s part to move negotiations forward with Sharif and impeach Musharraf? There are two, contrasting explanations. The first is desperation. After his failed attempt to gain control of the ISI as well as ISI efforts to undermine his government (for the purposes of maintaining a political stalemate), Zardari is now attempting to go after Musharraf. President Musharraf still represents the military’s institutional foothold in politics. The second explanation could be that Zardari has received US approval and backing for his actions after potentially convincing the current administration that Musharraf is what stands in the way of effective anti-Taliban operations in Pakistan. The second explanation is less likely however, as it was the current government that immediately and repeatedly sought to negotiate with the “Pakistani Taliban” from a position of weakness.

Regardless of his reasons, Zardari faces a major hurdle – the Army. Despite stepping down as Army Chief, Insider Brief sources report that the Pakistan Army remains very loyal to the President and is willing to go to bat for his political survivial, especially against the likes of Zardari. This brings us to the crux of this post.

The Coming Storm
The weight of recent events, shifting attitudes, and intense internal and external pressure on Pakistan are such that things can no longer continue as they have been. From our perspective at the Insider Brief, something has to give and it will undoubtedly be in the form of radical, tumultuous change in the near-to-medium term. Consider the following:

• The present civilian government (read: Zardari and co.) has picked a needless fight with the Army over the ISI and lost. It is yet again picking a needless fight against President Musharraf; a fight that will ultimately lead to another confrontation with a pro-Musharraf military.
• Insider Brief sources let slip that if things continue on their current trajectory, the military may be forced to (reluctantly) re-take the driver’s seat.
• Insider Brief sources also report that discontent is growing within the Army against its chief, Gen. Ashfaq Kayani. He is increasingly being perceived as an American lackey from within the ranks.
• Pakistan’s government and military have been unable to effectively roll back a raging Taliban-led insurgency in its northwest. This is moving beyond a crisis of governance into a crisis of existence.
• US and US-allied forces are preparing to conduct larger, more overt military action in Pakistan and have already openly admitted to conducting air strikes on Pakistani territory.
• The CIA publicly identified the ISI as having a hand in the recent bombing of the Indian Embassy in Kabul.
• Sources further indicate that there is a common perception within the Pakistani military that the US is colluding with the Indians to foment trouble in Balochistan and Pakistan’s northwest.
• Intermittent hostilities have broken out between India and Pakistan on the Line of Control in Kashmir after 5 years of peace.
• Public discontent is being compounded by a slowing economy and food and oil inflation.

Pretty picture, right? It depicts how unsustainable the current state of affairs is.

Ultimately, we’re witnessing a web of competing interests intersect and conflict in a big way. At the center of it all is the Pakistani military establishment. It currently finds itself in conflict with the US, India, the Pakistani civilian government, insurgents and perhaps even itself. This is no fault of the military’s — this merely reflects the reality that the military is at the center of the Pakistani state. It is the only institution that is capable of holding Pakistan together as the country tears itself apart.

It would behoove the present elected government to work in lockstep with the military, instead of engaging it and other parties in petty power struggles. The reinstatement of sacked judges or Musharraf’s impeachment will not save Pakistan. That will instead be determined by how Pakistanis and their leaders come together as a nation.

The decision is one that is bold, unprecedented and controversial. The ISI (Inter-Services Intelligence) has traditionally fallen under the purview of the military, with Army officers rotating through the agency for two year stints. Many have labeled the ISI as a “state within a state” for its pervasiveness and ability to influence state matters with near complete autonomy. Today’s decision by Gilani and his cabinet marks a major move by the nascent civilian government in the long standing struggle by Pakistan’s civilian/political forces to bring the military establishment under their control. This news also likely corroborates our last post as the move may be in response to military/intelligence discussions over the ouster of his PPP government.

The military will not accept the cabinet decision lying down. Insider Brief sources further report that many ranking military officials have indicated that there will be a coup if Gilani does not back down from his decision. Such a move would not be unprecedented. Many may remember that the last time a civilian government attempted to meddle in military affairs, it ultimately resulted in the coup that brought President Musharraf to power. Much of the anger in the military is being directed towards Interior Minister Rehman Malik, who is widely believed by Pakistan’s intelligence community to have had some affiliation with the CIA. In the eyes of Pakistan intelligence, Malik’s access may severely compromise ISI operational security.

The government’s move has also placed Pakistan’s Chief of Army Staff (COAS), Gen. Ashfaq Kayani, in an awkward position. Since his appointment to COAS, he has been an advocate of extricating the military from overt interference in government affairs and has made a very public effort to support the new government. As opposed to engaging Kayani in a process to alter the balance of power between Rawalpindi and Islamabad, Gilani’s government has acted brashly and resultantly forced Kayani into a corner. If Kayani does not respond forcefully, he will appear weak and lose credibility with his subordinates. The Army Chief will also likely want to respond — after all, the ISI was under his command.

If there is a coup, it will likely be a politically engineered, “soft coup.” This would include the possibility of President Musharraf dismissing the government through powers granted to him in the constitution. An overt military coup is unlikely as it would trigger sanctions, isolate Pakistan internationally and result in a further weakening of already shaky relationship.

The PPP has taken a risky gamble — Prime Minister Gilani may return to Pakistan only to find himself out of a job.

The replaced brigadiers were removed from their posts prematurely; Zaheer was due to retire in July with Masood due to retire in September. Sources indicate that both men were close associates of the recenty replaced and highly disliked, Major General Nadeem Ejaz, former Director General of Military Intelligence (DGMI). Made with Gen. Ashfaq Kayani’s approval, the removal of Nadeem Ejaz’s associates represents a continued decline in influence for President Pervez Musharraf within the military. As DGMI, Ejaz was instrumental in many of Musharraf’s policy decisions and was a close advisor.

What may be of greater interest is the man whom Brig. Tiwana is replacing, Brig. Masood, is said by sources to have had excellent ties with the MQM and PPP. If true, it highlights the continued drive by Gen. Kayani to disentangle the Pakistan Army and its intelligence apparatus from politics after over 60 years of national involvement. After all, cordial relations with political parties should have no bearing on the selection of a regional MI commander.

Intel Validation
At the end of February, we reported that Gen. Kayani was looking to replace the then-DGMI, Maj. Gen. Nadeem Ejaz. We listed several candidates, one of whom was Major General Muhammad Asif, Pakistan’s former defense attache to Moscow. On April 4th, The News International reported that Maj. Gen. Asif was appointed DGMI.

Editor’s Note: For those of you wondering — I’m back.

Our sources have confirmed that Gen. Kayani will be replacing Major General Nadeem Ejaz, the Director General of Military Intelligence (DGMI), after the completion of parliamentary elections. Sources cite that Kayani has been presented with an opportune time to rid himself of Nadeem Ejaz as Ejaz is not only unpopular among the Army’s top brass but also because his 3-year tenure as DGMI is nearing an end. Maj. Gen. Ejaz is well known for the high profile role he played in the ouster of former Chief Justice Iftikhar Chaudhry.

Insider Brief sources go on to further state that Gen. Kayani also intends on clipping the wings of the office of the Director General of Military Intelligence, giving the next general less responsibility and power than in the past.

Replacing Nadeem Ejaz will significantly reduce President Musharraf’s influence in the army and Pakistan’s intelligence apparatus. It will also go a long way in furthering Gen. Kayani’s process of removing the military from national politics and re-directing its efforts towards solely national defense.

Kayani’s task is a daunting one as he essentially seeks to re-engineer the Army’s culture which has been shaped by over 60 years of interference in the country’s governance and national affairs. It will be interesting to see how he balances his goals with the outcome and consequences of today’s parliamentary elections. The Army Chief may be forced to step into the fray and play referee if Pakistan’s political leaders — Musharraf included — get out of hand; an act that would highlight not only the difficulty of his objective but also what we stated in our last post: that for the for the near-to-medium term, the Pakistan Army will continue to have a role to play as the guarantor of the Pakistani state.

ELECTION FOOTNOTES:

• Voting in Pakistan’s parliamentary elections has come to an end. Ballot counting has now begun.
• Election turnout was comparatively low due to fear of violence, which killed at least 9 people today in bombings and shootings.
• Based on results that have started trickling in, projected winners for 3 of the provinces currently stand at:
  • Punjab: PML(N), PPP
  • Sindh: PPP, MQM
  • NWFP: ANP, PML(N) [in Hazara populated districts]
• With projections shaping up the way they are, Pakistan looks to be headed towards a broad coalition government which is the best Musharraf can hope for. In a coalition, the national government will likely be locked in gridlock allowing Musharraf to carry on with his policies unchecked. It will also allow his civilian allies — the PML(Q) — to hold some degree of influence. We’ve been projecting this outcome since October.

Kicked off by the late-Benazir Bhutto, “the lost decade” was capped by the then much-welcomed military coup of President Pervez Musharraf. Nine years later, Musharraf’s tenure, which saw not only economic stabilization but stellar growth alongside unprecedented media liberalization, appears to be nearing its end falteringly.

With the much-anticipated parliamentary elections only days away and the military distancing itself from Musharraf, we are presented with a stark comparison between Pakistan’s military and democratic governments that raises key questions.

Why is it that military governments, who have been so successful at providing good economic management, fallen each time to popular opposition? Why is it that popular civilian leaders always return to power only to bring the country to the brink each time?

The two key variables here are policy and leadership.

Military-led governments have been successful managers of the country, their reigns typically leading to gains in the economy and social indicators, but they fail to provide genuine leadership. Their success in developing the country can be attributed to the technocrats they usher in to provide policy expertise in their respective fields. Yet these technocrats are only good at being policy experts, not politicians. Former Prime Minister Shaukat Aziz is a case-in-point. Despite his corruption free background and immense success in reviving Pakistan’s economy, Aziz was incapable of winning a single seat in Pakistan’s parliament without the patronage of the Chaudhries of Gujrat.

On the other hand, democratically elected governments have enjoyed popular support and provided leadership while actively mismanaging the country and overseeing declines in the economy. Their deficiency was and continues to be sound, consistent policies. Brought to power time and time again on the shoulders of empty rhetoric and patronage, Pakistan’s political parties appear to be forever trapped in the inertia of political in fighting; maintaining their stranglehold on government becomes their raison d’etre, resulting in very little progress.

Pakistan’s democratically elected governments have taught us that democracy alone is not the answer.

Democracy with serious, detailed and substantive policy is.

There needs to be an infusion of policy expertise and a serious commitment towards enacting policy, bridging the gap that has divided military and democratic regimes.

This highlights the major need for consensus among all of Pakistan’s ruling elite. Good policy cannot be applied without everyone on board — that includes the political parties and the military. Many die-hard democrats cringe at the mention of the latter, but the cold truth is that for the near- to medium-term, the military is the guarantor of the Pakistani state, as it has been for the last 60+ years.

If Pakistani civil society does not begin to hold its political parties to higher standards, we will continue to witness the re-enactment of history by the same players, at the risk of wearing down an already decrepit stage.

In addition to military action, sources also report that a major facet of the newfound campaign involves choking off Baitullah’s sources of funding and logistics. This will be done in part by assailing the business interests of the Mehsud tribe from which Baitullah hails. By pursuing the tribe’s assets and businesses, primarily focused in more developed areas such as Karachi, Tank, and Dera Ismail, the Army seeks to indirectly pressure the tribe and show them how self destructive it can be supporting Baitullah.

If history has taught us anything about the Pushtun tribes it’s this: money talks. The Army’s strategy should not only prove effective but also go a long way in driving a wedge between jihadist militants and the tribes that support them. As extremist Islam fast becomes the primary vehicle of Pushtun nationalism in Pakistan, making this wedge permanent is a vital objective in ensuring Pakistan’s territorial integrity.

Pakistani intelligence is also increasingly wary of Indian collusion with Afghan intelligence in fomenting instability along Pakistan’s borders. They consistently point to the presence of six Indian consulates in Afghanistan, four of which are not only close to the Afghan-Pakistan “border” and are in areas where few if any Indians reside. Recent news of resurgent militant Sikh activity in India after years of quiet may be warning shots from Pakistan that it too, can return the favor.

… AND RETREATS.
Pakistan’s Chief of Army Staff, Gen. Ashfaq Kayani, is living up to his reputation as a professional soldier. Sources state that the general has initiated the process of making sweeping changes in organization in the Army. On top of having re-instituted the role of Director General of Planning, the head of what amounts to the Army’s think tank, Kayani is systematically withdrawing the Army from the political arena.Told to us by sources months ago, Gen. Kayani’s directive that all officers abstain from interfering in politics under the threat of court martial has become widely reported. Now, sources have stated that the Army Chief has also directed Military Intelligence (MI) to desist from interfering in politics at all levels.

The big question is now this: when’s the ISI’s turn?

ELECTION ENDNOTES:

1. A senior Pakistani official recently conveyed to the Insider Brief how deeply distraught they were at the current state of affairs in Pakistan and at how President Pervez Musharraf was single mindedly focused on ensuring a pliant parliament to maintain his hold on power. Another senior official from within the ranks of the military stated that it was only a matter of “when, not if,” Gen. Ashfaq Kayani withdrew his support for President Musharraf.
2. Sources have reported that Pakistan People’s Party members informed President Musharraf that the will produced by Asif Zardari was indeed fake and that party officials kept quiet for the sake of capturing the “sympathy” vote in February’s upcoming parliamentary elections. They intend on seeking Zardari’s ouster after elections.
3. Media outlets have widely reported the ongoing dialogue between President Musharraf and Shahbaz Sharif, Nawaz Sharif’s chief lieutenant and younger brother, through common acquaintance Brigadier (retired) Niaz Ahmed. Sources close to Ahmed state that parlays between Musharraf and the younger Sharif are over the creation of an alliance to prevent the rise of the PPP in upcoming elections and that the two will be meeting in Ahmed’s home in London. They also state that there is a strong possibility that a deal has been struck between the two seemingly antagonistic forces. If true, it marks a return to “normalcy” in Pakistan’s constellation of forces: the establishment allied with its usual proxy, the Pakistan Muslim League, against the anti-establishment Pakistan People’s Party.

MISSION ACCOMPLISHED?
Hillary Clinton is many things, but one thing she is not is unintelligent. Nor are those she surrounds herself with. Her foreign policy team — which includes former Secretary of State Madeleine Albright, Ambassador Richard Holbrooke, and of course, her husband, former President Bill Clinton — is painfully aware of how impractical her proposal for joint oversight is. After all, it was under President Bill Clinton’s watch that Pakistan defiantly tested its nuclear weapons, despite the threat of new sanctions when its economy was teetering on the brink of collapse.

So then why did she issue such an undeniably flawed policy statement?

The answer is right in front of us in the media’s response. Following her third place finish in Iowa at the hands of Senators Barack Obama and John Edwards, Sen. Clinton’s policy appears to be a ploy designed to attract attention to her campaign on the eve of the crucial New Hampshire primary. With a media that thrives on soundbites, it’s a ploy that in the past has proven effective.

NUCLEAR FALLOUT
Not convinced that the proposal is a campaign tactic? Assume for a moment that Clinton is serious in proposing joint US-UK stewardship of Pakistani nuclear weapons. Implications abound, the proposal would risk severe fallout for Pakistan as well as US interests in the region:

Violent and Vocal Reaction in Pakistan. It’s safe to say that any sitting government in Pakistan that would agree to US oversight of the nation’s nuclear weapons would be overthrown either in a military coup or by an overwhelming response from the Pakistani public. President Pervez Musharraf is afraid to openly acknowledge American boots on the ground in Pakistan’s northwest, let alone American oversight of Pakistani nukes. (Just today, Pakistani spokepeople were bristling at alleged deliberations by the Bush administration to give the CIA expanded powers to operate within Pakistan.)

Spike in Anti-Americanism in Pakistan and the Muslim world. Pakistan is currently the world’s only Muslim nuclear weapons state. US supervision of Pakistan’s nukes would be viewed as a continuation of the American “crusade” against Muslims. Pakistanis in general have long been convinced that the US is seeking to destablize their country in the hopes of an excuse to defang its nuclear capabilities. Many average Pakistanis are convinced that the US had a role to play in the assassination of Benazir Bhutto for that very reason. Sen. Clinton’s proposal is a sure fire way of stoking anti-Americanism and bringing Islamists to power in Pakistan.

Disruption of Sino-US relations. China was heavily involved in helping facilitate the funding and technical expertise towards the Pakistani nuclear program. China’s involvement reflects a long-standing strategic relationship between itself and Pakistan. The Chinese will not take pseudo-US control of nuclear weapons in their backyard lying down. The US government should be prepared for a severe reaction from the Chinese govement including aggressive behavior around Taiwan, Central Asia and the support of a military coup in Pakistan.

Loss of Credibility for the Democratic Party in Pakistan. The Pakistani establishment has long favored the Republican Party given the party’s record of, more often than not, engaging Pakistan. Many in Pakistan have not forgotten the treatment meted out to them by President Bill Clinton, particularly during his second term in office. If Hillary Clinton pushes her policy proposal, she would be helping ensure a poor working relationship with the government of Pakistan anytime a Democrat is in office.

The aforementioned are only a handful of the potential (frightening) outcomes from the promotion/imposition of Sen. Clinton’s proposal. It’s unlikely that the likes of Madeleine Albright, Richard Holbrooke, or Hillary Clinton herself would have overlooked these.

LESSONS LEARNT
The buzz generated by Clinton’s statement lasted a heartbeat and as of now, she trails behind Barack Obama by 9 points in New Hampshire. It’s a poignant lesson for all presidential candidates who seek to use controversial statements as a short term means of boosting their respective campaigns. Instead of formulating strong messages backed by well thought out policies, they end up right back where they started while looking, well, unintelligent.

• The government does not intend on imposing martial law at this point in time.  (The possibility however, can not be ruled out.)
• The Pakistan Army has been deployed to 16 of Sindh’s 23 districts.
  • This is surprising, I would have thought that the Rangers, a well equipped and well trained outfit, would have been adequate in combination with the police for internal security.
• The Army has now also been deployed in force to all vital installations.
• Banks and trains have been subjected to looting by criminals taking advantage of the situation. 

The elections in Pakistan are just about two weeks away. Musharraf is fulfilling his promise by my reckoning; or was it the Americans, the Brits, or the lawyers and politicians in Pakistan who deserve the credit? The burning question of the day is will the elections in Pakistan be fair and free? The media in the US and the opposition parties in Pakistan are convinced that they will be opaque and rigged. Scores of international observers are on their way to Pakistan to monitor the elections though they too are convinced they will be rigged, such is the power of suggestion. Now where does this leave Musharraf, between a hard place and a rock? I think so.

Almost every body who is anybody in the US, starting with powerful voices on the Hill, the media, every South Asian think tanker worth his salt and let us not forget the Pakistani American scholar struggling to find a position in the land of opportunity have lambasted Musharraf for everything wrong in Pakistan. Let Ambassador Durrani and his team rave and rant that Musharraf is the best thing that has happened to Pakistan in recent decades, alas the opinion die is cast; Musharraf is a dictator and the elections will be rigged.

The Pakistani media, which expanded exponentially under Musharraf, the whiskey swirling liberals in Islamabad and Lahore and the major political parties with impeccable democratic credentials from the right, the left and the center all warn of the upcoming rigged elections, as they brainwash the representatives of foreign Government and the foreign media of the dictatorial credentials of Musharraf. The Joan of Arc launched by the US is a hot favorite for her liberal credentials. Of course we will turn a blind eye to her dictatorial credentials within her party and her Mr. 10 % who is upping the rate to 15 % because of global warming and the rising price of oil. Another favorite is the Saudi launched democrat who during one of his tenures launched a frontal attack on the Supreme Court and has deep connections with the religious right. Another positive about the Saudi launch is his ambition to become the Amir ul Mohmaneen, the rightful successor of the Zia ul Haq legacy, so help us God.The patient commoner of Pakistan with the wisdom of poverty, has discovered the right formula for obtaining justice in Pakistan and I quote him, “if you have a case in court, you have multiple choices — hire a lawyer, or hire a judge, if the going gets tough better still hire a judge through a lawyer, and in case you have no money lump it.”  It is this wisdom that kept the common citizen from joining the protesting penguins (black suited lawyers); the alternatives to Musharraf did not appeal to them. Nor do they appeal to me.

I honestly believe Musharraf is indeed the best thing that has happened to Pakistan in a long time. He has turned around the sick economy of Pakistan, has improved the lot of the common man, enhanced the status of women, built the civil society, is improving education and is a true liberal. Not a single scandal of corruption against his name. Let me not push my luck but I feel he has done more for democracy than any of his recent predecessors. Yes he has made mistakes, is fighting an unpopular war and his popularity has plummeted. Incidentally his popularity is no worse than that of the Congress in the US. Musharraf at the helm for another five years will be in the best interest of Pakistan and I believe the US too, mark my words.

Part I: AH1 Cobra Attack Helicopter and MEDEVAC

The list of requirements — as to what they are we can’t quite say — are being provided discreetly to avoid the perception that Musharraf is capitulating to or acquiescing to American demands.

The White House appears to be taking a pragmatic (some would say flawed) approach to Pakistan’s elections, allowing for imperfections and potential manipulation in exchange for what in its eyes may be stability and the empowerment of a coalition of “moderates” in Pakistan.

The long, windy march to democracy continues.

The News: Reuters
With Gen. Ashfaq Kayani’s ascendancy to the role of Chief of Army Staff (COAS), Reuters published an article on Nov. 28th titled, “Five Facts on Pakistan’s New Army Chief – Kayani,” in which they cited the Insider Brief.

On the Web: Watandost
In his latest blog post entitled, “Three New Excellent Blogs on Pakistan,” Hassan Abbas of Watandost recommended three Pakistan-focused blogs to his readers, one of which happened to be the Insider Brief. A published author and former Pakistani government official, Abbas is also a Research Fellow at the Belfer Center’s Project on Managing the Atom and International Security Program. His recognition, like that of the PCR Project, means a lot to us.

On the Radio: The John Batchelor Show
Last night, I appeared on the John Batchelor Show to discuss the rise of Gen. Ashfaq Kayani and President Musharraf’s future. You can listen to my conversation with John by using the player below.

Download audio file (wabc-interview-20071202-pakintel.mp3)
(Download file)

John’s show airs on Sundays, WABC 770AM in New York from 7-10pm EST (webcast), and KFI 640AM in Los Angeles from 7-10pm PST (webcast).