This follows multiple claims from the Taliban that Hakimullah was still alive, in line with the pattern of claims made after the death of their charismatic leader, Baitullah Mehsud in August.  Also allegedly killed in the January 14th strikes in Shaktoi was Qari Hussain, organizer of the TTP’s suicide bombing squads and potential successor to Hakimullah.  With the (possible) deaths of its top leaders, an unprecedented surge in drone strikes, and a Pakistan Army offensive that just took the town of Damadola (Bajaur), the TTP is under intense pressure.

It’s been reported that in the interim, Malik Noor Jamal a/k/a Mullah Toofan (Storm), is now the acting head of the TTP.  Hakimullah Mehsud was able to regroup the Taliban after the loss of Baitullah, and unleash a wave of terror across Pakistan.  Will Jamal be able to do the same?

PROFILE OF MULLAH TOOFAN
Aside from a video of Mullah Toofan flogging men in public, little has been known about him – until now.  Insider Brief sources have disclosed the following details about the acting head of the TTP:

• Name: Noor Jamal
• Name of Father: Rasool Khan
• Tribe: Mamozai
• Religion: Islam (Sunni)
• Age: 42-45 years old
• Education: Religious education
• Profession: Imam of a mosque in Mamozai (Orakzai Agency)
• Address (Present): Dogar Village, Central Kurram Agency
• Address (Permanent): Mamozai, Orakzai Agency
• Marital Status: Married with 2 sons
• Siblings: 2 brothers (one of whom — [name withheld by editor] — is employed in Dubai)
• Brief History: Noor Jamal a/k/a Mullah Toofan has been a low level commander of the TTP in Mamozai, Orakzai Agency, but also a close associate of Hakimullah Mehsud.  As a result of that close relationship, Hakimullah Mehsud appointed Jamal as the Amir of Kurram Agency, in place of Wali-ur-Rehman Mehsud.  Mullah Toofan reportedly participated in the Afghan civil after the withdrawal of Soviet forces.

It’s a grim picture that, at first, reaffirmed for me the need for consensus among the country’s elite. At the Insider Brief, we have long called for a single cohesive and comprehensive agenda agreed to by the military, politicians, bureaucracy, business interests, and the media to undo the crisis in governance and set the country back on the path to socio-economic development.

However, the more I’ve thought about it, the more the problem presents itself as one that is rooted in perspective – Pakistan’s elite appear to be out of touch with geopolitical reality.  After all, when the situation is so dire, why is the military-bureaucratic complex hacking away at the PPP-led government? Why does the media remain mired in conspiracy theories? Why are the country’s political parties locked in a cycle of political opportunism? The behavior isn’t rational.

The disconnect with reality appears to stem from two core flaws in the Pakistani perspective:

1.  Failure to understand the limitation of national resources/capabilities.

• Pakistan cannot go it alone. Pakistan’s geography makes the nation strategic, but its geography also acts as an inhibitor. Pakistan does not have the resources to achieve self-sufficiency; Pakistan must trade and seek external investment not just to flourish, but also to survive. That’s why it’s vital that Pakistan not alienate its key sponsors (the U.S., China, Saudi Arabia, etc.) or its regional neighbors (Iran, Afghanistan, etc.).
  • The Kerry-Lugar Bill: When the U.S. tripled non-military aid to Pakistan through the Kerry-Lugar Bill, the Pakistani military did exactly what it shouldn’t have done – it voiced massive opposition to the bill and alienated the U.S.  The military’s opposition is rooted in language tying the aid to civilian control over the military. The military blames President Asif Zardari for the wording and is out for blood.  Being the single most powerful institution in Pakistan and after governing the Pakistan for over half its existence, the Pakistani military must be acting out of sheer pride if it feels that the wording in the Kerry-Lugar Bill will undermine its pre-eminent status in Pakistan overnight.  (People who sought to have that wording placed in the Kerry-Lugar Bill should have also taken this rationale into account. It was a tactical misstep to think that conditional U.S. aid would work to strengthen democratic institutions in Pakistan. The best way to strengthen democracy is to garner overwhelming public support through capable leadership and socio-economic progress.)

• Pakistan cannot seek parity with India – military or otherwise.  Since its inception, Pakistan has viewed itself as a strategic equal of India – and to disastrous ends. India is far too large and developing at far too quick a pace for Pakistan to be its peer.  Though it has far to go, India is on the road to becoming a global power. Pakistan is a regional power at best. Militarily, Pakistan has achieved a minimum deterrence through its nuclear capability.  It should reduce the size of its standing military and focus on becoming smaller, more mobile, and technologically advanced.  Rely on force multipliers and redirect funds towards development.

• Pakistan cannot win Kashmir from India.  Three wars over the disputed state (Kargil included) have demonstrated that Pakistan cannot wrest Kashmir from India’s control – India’s military is far too superior in terms of quality and quantity. The best Pakistan can hope for is recognition of the status quo or a Musharrafian solution (joint governance of Kashmir).  Again, focus on effectively governing existing Pakistani territory and create a model that demonstrates why Kashmir is better in Pakistani hands.

2.  Failure to understand that the state’s actions have consequences.

• Militant groups, sponsored by Pakistan’s military, have turned on the state. These militant groups are no longer national security assets to leverage against India or to attain “strategic depth” in Afghanistan. They are not the product of a conspiracy hatched by any combination of Indians, Israelis or Americans. The only conspirators here are those who nurtured these groups and now do not want to shoulder the responsibility for the deaths of hundreds of innocent Pakistani civilians.
• Ineffective and inequitable governance results in a loss of sovereignty.  Poor and inequitable governance spawned an insurgency in East Pakistan, providing India the opening for the 1971 war and Pakistan’s subsequent dismemberment.  Once again, poor and inequitable governance has spawned not one, but two insurgencies in Pakistan’s west (i.e., Balochistan and the NWFP/FATA).
• Irresponsible behavior with nuclear technology is the biggest threat to Pakistan’s arsenal.  Many Pakistanis believe that the U.S. is out to denuclearize Pakistan.  Pakistanis also view it as unfair that the Indians have a civil nuclear deal with the Americans but they don’t.  However, none of this should come as a surprise after Pakistan, through Dr. Abdul Qadeer Khan, proliferated nuclear technology to the likes of Libya, North Korea, and Iran.  Pakistan must demonstrate responsibility and maturity in handling its nuclear capability if it wants cooperation from western powers.

Knowing where the problem lies, the greater question then becomes:  how do we go about changing mindsets? How do we go about awakening a nation from its daze?

The answer?  We talk about it.

Educate.  Encourage mature discourse.  Repeat (as many times as necessary).

Footnote:
I recently had the opportunity to sit down with Pakistan’s Ambassador to the United States, Husain Haqqani, whom I’ve known since he was a professor at Boston University. In discussing U.S.-Pakistan relations and Pakistan’s role in the wider world, it occurred to me that Haqqani is arguably among the best envoys Pakistan has had in Washington in a long time.  He is articulate, well connected, and knows what he’s talking about.  Even if the PPP government falls or if Zardari is ousted, it may not be a bad idea to keep Haqqani around.  Pakistan, I believe, is best served with him as its ambassador.

Successful Strategy
As part of its strategy, the military initially sought to strike Taliban hideouts, training camps, arms caches, tunnels and safe houses.  This was done to destroy their infrastructure and also minimize the degree of fighting taking place in populated, urban areas.  Taking aim at these targets forced the Taliban to fight “outwards” in the mountains and provide more tactical space for army personnel in the Swat Valley itself.

Precision strikes were carried out by the air force while the army launched three brigade-size offensives from three different directions, forcing the Taliban to fight on multiple fronts.  The Special Services Group (commonly referred to as the SSG, Pakistan’s special forces) conducted a large-scale airborne raid on the primary Taliban base in Peochar Valley.

A month into its campaign, Pakistan’s military has wrested control of and secured Mingora, Swat’s largest city.

The military continues to maintain persistent pressure on militants by carrying out raids, laying ambushes, and cordoning off zones for search and destroy operations.  The purpose for all of which is to ensure psychological and tactical ascendancy against the Taliban.

There is also a strong desire on the part of the military to eliminate Taliban leadership in Swat.  Recent rumors that Maulana Fazlullah, leader of the Taliban in Swat, was killed by Pakistani gunships were discredited after the Pakistani government increased its bounty on Fazlullah’s head.  Insider Brief sources within the Pakistani military report that US sources originated the rumors but that chatter on Taliban networks also spoke of Fazlullah’s death.  The chatter was likely a means of diverting the military’s focus on hunting the “Radio Mullah.”

From Swat to South Waziristan
Having taken Mingora, the military has set its sights on Charbagh where action is expected soon.  Other pockets of Taliban resistance still remain in several valleys north and west of Mingora.

Beyond Swat lies South Waziristan, which the military believes to be the center of gravity for the Taliban.  Our sources also report that operations can begin in South Waziristan as early as the first week of June.

It’s worth noting that despite official claims that upwards of 3,000 militants have been killed in Swat, our sources state that the number of dead militants is likely somewhere between 500 and 600.  It’s important to be mindful of this as the military seeks to consolidate the gains it has made in Swat and hold territory.  The number of militants in Swat likely ranged in the thousands at its peak, meaning that many militants were merely pushed back into the mountains or dissolved into the general population.

As internally displaced persons (IDPs) and administrative structures return to Swat, it will be important for the military to maintain much of its strength (two divisions) there.  This ultimately means that more troops will have to be called up for the far more difficult operation that lies ahead in South Waziristan.

Sovereignty in Swat
Over 2.4 million people have been displaced by the fighting, creating what the UN describes as the worst refugee crisis since Rwanda.  With fighting winding down in Swat, these IDPs will begin returning home to widespread destruction (many have started returning home to neighboring Buner).  The resulting discontent has the potential to turn Swat into a breeding ground for the Taliban.

Back in November 2007, we contended that, “only when you have a hand in bettering someone’s life can you claim sovereignty over where they live.”

With US financial support, Pakistan must use the opportunity provided by the devastation in Swat to undertake massive rebuilding and modernization efforts there.  Model villages can be developed similar to the ones built after the massive earthquake that struck northern Pakistan in October 2005.  Administrative structures can be built from the ground up keeping in mind that prior discontent in Swat related to government inefficiencies (particularly in the judicial system).

This can prove to be an important first step in bringing Pakistan’s Wild West into the fold.

Analysis
Viewed in the context of multiplying reports covering US cross-border incursions and strikes in Pakistan’s northwest, the downed UAV was likely a Predator drone. Whether the drone was a UCAV – unmanned combat aerial vehicle – equipped with Hellfire missiles, is unclear. What is increasingly clear from reports, however, is that the drone and its parts were collected by Pakistani security forces largely in tact. Gaining access to the Predator’s technology should prove to be a boon for Pakistan.

Pakistan’s indigenous UAV technology is by no means rudimentary. Its UAV industry has been growing at a rapid pace over the course of the past decade, driven by both government-funded and private sector programs. In fact, the US Border Guard even purchased the Pakistani-made “Border Eagle” UAV in 2004. But while it has been adept at developing short-to-medium range tactical UAVs, Pakistan’s industry has faced a gap in its ability to develop longer range, long endurance UAVs.

To fill this gap, Pakistan sought to purchase the Predator UAV from the US. The US declined to sell the Predator to Pakistan, despite its utility in monitoring Pakistan’s treacherous border with Afghanistan. Now, Pakistan has access to some of the best American-made UAV technology at the cost of a few dozen shell casings.

It’s worth noting that this wouldn’t be the first time that Pakistan has used access to American technology to further its own indigenous defense programs. In August 1998, near the tail end of the Clinton administration, the US launched Tomahawk cruise missile strikes on terrorist training camps in Afghanistan. At least two of those cruise missiles failed to reach their targets and landed in Pakistani territory – unexploded. Seven years later in August 2005, Pakistan test launched its first cruise missile, the Babur (Hatf-VII). The Babur, a high-speed, low-level terrain following cruise missile, bore a number of similarities to the Tomahawk.

Let’s see what Pakistan is test flying five years from now.

(Editor’s Note: Apologies for my conspicuous absence over the last month or so. I’m afraid my posting will likely be sporadic in the coming months as I’m occupied with multiple projects. In the meanwhile, I’ve got 3 posts in the queue and hope to have them published soon. I’ll be dealing with the Marriott bombing, Pakistan’s armed forces, and relations with the US, keep an eye out.)

What’s the Rush, Mr. Zardari?
So why the sudden anxiousness on Zardari’s part to move negotiations forward with Sharif and impeach Musharraf? There are two, contrasting explanations. The first is desperation. After his failed attempt to gain control of the ISI as well as ISI efforts to undermine his government (for the purposes of maintaining a political stalemate), Zardari is now attempting to go after Musharraf. President Musharraf still represents the military’s institutional foothold in politics. The second explanation could be that Zardari has received US approval and backing for his actions after potentially convincing the current administration that Musharraf is what stands in the way of effective anti-Taliban operations in Pakistan. The second explanation is less likely however, as it was the current government that immediately and repeatedly sought to negotiate with the “Pakistani Taliban” from a position of weakness.

Regardless of his reasons, Zardari faces a major hurdle – the Army. Despite stepping down as Army Chief, Insider Brief sources report that the Pakistan Army remains very loyal to the President and is willing to go to bat for his political survivial, especially against the likes of Zardari. This brings us to the crux of this post.

The Coming Storm
The weight of recent events, shifting attitudes, and intense internal and external pressure on Pakistan are such that things can no longer continue as they have been. From our perspective at the Insider Brief, something has to give and it will undoubtedly be in the form of radical, tumultuous change in the near-to-medium term. Consider the following:

• The present civilian government (read: Zardari and co.) has picked a needless fight with the Army over the ISI and lost. It is yet again picking a needless fight against President Musharraf; a fight that will ultimately lead to another confrontation with a pro-Musharraf military.
• Insider Brief sources let slip that if things continue on their current trajectory, the military may be forced to (reluctantly) re-take the driver’s seat.
• Insider Brief sources also report that discontent is growing within the Army against its chief, Gen. Ashfaq Kayani. He is increasingly being perceived as an American lackey from within the ranks.
• Pakistan’s government and military have been unable to effectively roll back a raging Taliban-led insurgency in its northwest. This is moving beyond a crisis of governance into a crisis of existence.
• US and US-allied forces are preparing to conduct larger, more overt military action in Pakistan and have already openly admitted to conducting air strikes on Pakistani territory.
• The CIA publicly identified the ISI as having a hand in the recent bombing of the Indian Embassy in Kabul.
• Sources further indicate that there is a common perception within the Pakistani military that the US is colluding with the Indians to foment trouble in Balochistan and Pakistan’s northwest.
• Intermittent hostilities have broken out between India and Pakistan on the Line of Control in Kashmir after 5 years of peace.
• Public discontent is being compounded by a slowing economy and food and oil inflation.

Pretty picture, right? It depicts how unsustainable the current state of affairs is.

Ultimately, we’re witnessing a web of competing interests intersect and conflict in a big way. At the center of it all is the Pakistani military establishment. It currently finds itself in conflict with the US, India, the Pakistani civilian government, insurgents and perhaps even itself. This is no fault of the military’s — this merely reflects the reality that the military is at the center of the Pakistani state. It is the only institution that is capable of holding Pakistan together as the country tears itself apart.

It would behoove the present elected government to work in lockstep with the military, instead of engaging it and other parties in petty power struggles. The reinstatement of sacked judges or Musharraf’s impeachment will not save Pakistan. That will instead be determined by how Pakistanis and their leaders come together as a nation.

Zardari’s Miscalculation
It’s an open secret that Benazir Bhutto’s widower, Asif Ali Zardari, calls the shots in the current government, not Gilani. According to Insider Brief sources, the decision to place the ISI under the Interior Ministry and thereby Interior Minister Rehman Malik, was Zardari’s decision. Sources further state that Zardari miscalculated and did not anticipate the response the decision received. Like a kid with a stick, he prodded too hard only to awaken a nest of (khaki) hornets.

Kayani Intervenes
In our last post, we indicated that Pakistan’s Army Chief, Gen. Ashfaq Kayani, would have to respond forcefully to the government’s decision so as not to appear weak, but also, to defend his turf; the ISI for all practical purposes, answers to the Chief of Army Staff. Insider Brief sources report that the night of the announcement, Kayani personally intervened and ensured that the decision was reversed.

Aftermath
The government’s initial decision should not be contextualized within the framework of US-Pakistani relations. This was not about “reining” in Pakistani intelligence at the behest of the Americans. This was an attempt by Zardari to halt ISI activity against the PPP government in Punjab and gain full control of what is essentially Pakistan’s most powerful “policy” tool. He overplayed his hand against what he perceived was a discredited and demoralized military. Now, he will likely have to face the consequences of increased hostility from the establishment and a possible intensification of the campaign to unseat his government.

With each passing day, a once golden opportunity to turn things around for Pakistan is slipping from the grasp of the Pakistan People’s Party. There’s still time to take a stand, make some bold policy decisions and reverse the atrophy that is nibbling away at the current government. Pakistan can no longer afford more of the same.

The decision is one that is bold, unprecedented and controversial. The ISI (Inter-Services Intelligence) has traditionally fallen under the purview of the military, with Army officers rotating through the agency for two year stints. Many have labeled the ISI as a “state within a state” for its pervasiveness and ability to influence state matters with near complete autonomy. Today’s decision by Gilani and his cabinet marks a major move by the nascent civilian government in the long standing struggle by Pakistan’s civilian/political forces to bring the military establishment under their control. This news also likely corroborates our last post as the move may be in response to military/intelligence discussions over the ouster of his PPP government.

The military will not accept the cabinet decision lying down. Insider Brief sources further report that many ranking military officials have indicated that there will be a coup if Gilani does not back down from his decision. Such a move would not be unprecedented. Many may remember that the last time a civilian government attempted to meddle in military affairs, it ultimately resulted in the coup that brought President Musharraf to power. Much of the anger in the military is being directed towards Interior Minister Rehman Malik, who is widely believed by Pakistan’s intelligence community to have had some affiliation with the CIA. In the eyes of Pakistan intelligence, Malik’s access may severely compromise ISI operational security.

The government’s move has also placed Pakistan’s Chief of Army Staff (COAS), Gen. Ashfaq Kayani, in an awkward position. Since his appointment to COAS, he has been an advocate of extricating the military from overt interference in government affairs and has made a very public effort to support the new government. As opposed to engaging Kayani in a process to alter the balance of power between Rawalpindi and Islamabad, Gilani’s government has acted brashly and resultantly forced Kayani into a corner. If Kayani does not respond forcefully, he will appear weak and lose credibility with his subordinates. The Army Chief will also likely want to respond — after all, the ISI was under his command.

If there is a coup, it will likely be a politically engineered, “soft coup.” This would include the possibility of President Musharraf dismissing the government through powers granted to him in the constitution. An overt military coup is unlikely as it would trigger sanctions, isolate Pakistan internationally and result in a further weakening of already shaky relationship.

The PPP has taken a risky gamble — Prime Minister Gilani may return to Pakistan only to find himself out of a job.

The Why
The news in and of itself should not be surprising, and for multiple reasons. First, the Pakistani military/intelligence establishment has always distrusted and disliked the PPP. Zulfikar Ali Bhutto, Benazir’s father, recognized this and established the Federal Security Force in an attempt to offset the influence of the ISI. The FSF was promptly disbanded after Gen. Zia-ul-Huq’s 1979 coup. On the other hand, Nawaz Sharif is a child of the establishment, promoted and sponsored by Gen. Zia himself.

People may question – what about General Ashfaq Kayani and his stance on political non-interference? The answer and second reason likely lies in the decreasing ability of the military establishment’s inability to control low-to-mid-level personnel as has been demonstrated by the numerous security lapses and leaks that have led to numerous terrorist strikes against sensitive targets.

This brings us to the third reason. Many in Pakistan’s military and intelligence apparatus remain sympathetic to their former proxies as is Nawaz Sharif. Sharif is well liked by Pakistan’s right and religious fundamentalists. His return would likely mark the end to the Pakistan Army’s push in the country’s northwest.

The How
If Pakistani intelligence is truly attempting to engineer Nawaz Sharif’s return, the question is, how do they intend on doing so? The answer may lie in what Insider Brief sources recently intimated to us. In the on going discussions over Zardari, it was mentioned that the last phone call to Benazir Bhutto minutes before her assassination was made by Zardari himself. He reportedly asked Bhutto why she was sitting in the car and not outside as the “people wanted to see her.”

The story could conceivably be true – there’s no doubt that Pakistani intelligence tapped Bhutto and Zardari’s phones – and Zardari did indeed have a lot to gain from her death. But the far likelier explanation could be that Pakistani intelligence is working to build up a story to incriminate or at the very least, implicate Zardari in the court of public opinion.

The other explanation is that these meetings are just indicative of pressure tactics being used by President Musharraf and the “establishment” as they tussle with Zardari and his civilian government over major issues such as the restoration of deposed judges, tackling terrorism and handling Pakistan’s economic issues.

The Lesson
The major take away is that the government must act with surety and decisiveness. A constellation of forces is aligning against the sitting government as it waits idly by, paralyzed by indecision and infighting. If it doesn’t act, the PPP will have passed up a chance to consolidate fresh democratic foundations for Pakistan and the opportunity to tackle issues from a liberal platform.

These closed-door meetings were just warning shots that time is running out.

The replaced brigadiers were removed from their posts prematurely; Zaheer was due to retire in July with Masood due to retire in September. Sources indicate that both men were close associates of the recenty replaced and highly disliked, Major General Nadeem Ejaz, former Director General of Military Intelligence (DGMI). Made with Gen. Ashfaq Kayani’s approval, the removal of Nadeem Ejaz’s associates represents a continued decline in influence for President Pervez Musharraf within the military. As DGMI, Ejaz was instrumental in many of Musharraf’s policy decisions and was a close advisor.

What may be of greater interest is the man whom Brig. Tiwana is replacing, Brig. Masood, is said by sources to have had excellent ties with the MQM and PPP. If true, it highlights the continued drive by Gen. Kayani to disentangle the Pakistan Army and its intelligence apparatus from politics after over 60 years of national involvement. After all, cordial relations with political parties should have no bearing on the selection of a regional MI commander.

Intel Validation
At the end of February, we reported that Gen. Kayani was looking to replace the then-DGMI, Maj. Gen. Nadeem Ejaz. We listed several candidates, one of whom was Major General Muhammad Asif, Pakistan’s former defense attache to Moscow. On April 4th, The News International reported that Maj. Gen. Asif was appointed DGMI.

Editor’s Note: For those of you wondering — I’m back.

• Maj. Gen. Muhammad Asif – Formerly Pakistan’s Defense Attache in Moscow
• Maj. Gen. Javed Iqbal – Presently posted in Bahawalpur
• Maj. Gen. Raheel Sharif – Formerly General Officer Commanding (GOC) Lahore; presently posted in Lahore

Kayani intends to curtail the powers of the DGMI with the hope that the next general to occupy the position will focus on what his title implies — military intelligence. This should bode well for the progress of the war on terror and settling the unrest in Pakistan’s northwest.

FOOTNOTES:

• President Pervez Musharraf had an op-ed published in the Washington Post on February 22nd. Individuals familiar with the op-ed report that it had initially been submitted to the New York Times for publication but was rejected by paper. The Washington Post was the President’s second choice.
• The News International reported that the former head of the ISI’s political cell, Maj. Gen. (retd.) Ehtesham Zamir, acknowledged his role in rigging the 2002 elections that brought Musharraf’s civilian allies to power. Zamir claims that the orders to rig the election came from Musharraf himself. The timing of the announcement places further pressure on an already beseiged Musharraf who now faces an empowered opposition after last week’s parliamentary elections. Interestingly enough, sources close to Zamir report that he is a very close friend of Aitzaz Ahsan. Coincidence? I think not.

(Editor’s Note: We’ve received numerous requests for an analysis on the post-election scenario; we hope to have one up for Insider Brief readers by the end of this week.)

Our sources have confirmed that Gen. Kayani will be replacing Major General Nadeem Ejaz, the Director General of Military Intelligence (DGMI), after the completion of parliamentary elections. Sources cite that Kayani has been presented with an opportune time to rid himself of Nadeem Ejaz as Ejaz is not only unpopular among the Army’s top brass but also because his 3-year tenure as DGMI is nearing an end. Maj. Gen. Ejaz is well known for the high profile role he played in the ouster of former Chief Justice Iftikhar Chaudhry.

Insider Brief sources go on to further state that Gen. Kayani also intends on clipping the wings of the office of the Director General of Military Intelligence, giving the next general less responsibility and power than in the past.

Replacing Nadeem Ejaz will significantly reduce President Musharraf’s influence in the army and Pakistan’s intelligence apparatus. It will also go a long way in furthering Gen. Kayani’s process of removing the military from national politics and re-directing its efforts towards solely national defense.

Kayani’s task is a daunting one as he essentially seeks to re-engineer the Army’s culture which has been shaped by over 60 years of interference in the country’s governance and national affairs. It will be interesting to see how he balances his goals with the outcome and consequences of today’s parliamentary elections. The Army Chief may be forced to step into the fray and play referee if Pakistan’s political leaders — Musharraf included — get out of hand; an act that would highlight not only the difficulty of his objective but also what we stated in our last post: that for the for the near-to-medium term, the Pakistan Army will continue to have a role to play as the guarantor of the Pakistani state.

ELECTION FOOTNOTES:

• Voting in Pakistan’s parliamentary elections has come to an end. Ballot counting has now begun.
• Election turnout was comparatively low due to fear of violence, which killed at least 9 people today in bombings and shootings.
• Based on results that have started trickling in, projected winners for 3 of the provinces currently stand at:
  • Punjab: PML(N), PPP
  • Sindh: PPP, MQM
  • NWFP: ANP, PML(N) [in Hazara populated districts]
• With projections shaping up the way they are, Pakistan looks to be headed towards a broad coalition government which is the best Musharraf can hope for. In a coalition, the national government will likely be locked in gridlock allowing Musharraf to carry on with his policies unchecked. It will also allow his civilian allies — the PML(Q) — to hold some degree of influence. We’ve been projecting this outcome since October.

Kicked off by the late-Benazir Bhutto, “the lost decade” was capped by the then much-welcomed military coup of President Pervez Musharraf. Nine years later, Musharraf’s tenure, which saw not only economic stabilization but stellar growth alongside unprecedented media liberalization, appears to be nearing its end falteringly.

With the much-anticipated parliamentary elections only days away and the military distancing itself from Musharraf, we are presented with a stark comparison between Pakistan’s military and democratic governments that raises key questions.

Why is it that military governments, who have been so successful at providing good economic management, fallen each time to popular opposition? Why is it that popular civilian leaders always return to power only to bring the country to the brink each time?

The two key variables here are policy and leadership.

Military-led governments have been successful managers of the country, their reigns typically leading to gains in the economy and social indicators, but they fail to provide genuine leadership. Their success in developing the country can be attributed to the technocrats they usher in to provide policy expertise in their respective fields. Yet these technocrats are only good at being policy experts, not politicians. Former Prime Minister Shaukat Aziz is a case-in-point. Despite his corruption free background and immense success in reviving Pakistan’s economy, Aziz was incapable of winning a single seat in Pakistan’s parliament without the patronage of the Chaudhries of Gujrat.

On the other hand, democratically elected governments have enjoyed popular support and provided leadership while actively mismanaging the country and overseeing declines in the economy. Their deficiency was and continues to be sound, consistent policies. Brought to power time and time again on the shoulders of empty rhetoric and patronage, Pakistan’s political parties appear to be forever trapped in the inertia of political in fighting; maintaining their stranglehold on government becomes their raison d’etre, resulting in very little progress.

Pakistan’s democratically elected governments have taught us that democracy alone is not the answer.

Democracy with serious, detailed and substantive policy is.

There needs to be an infusion of policy expertise and a serious commitment towards enacting policy, bridging the gap that has divided military and democratic regimes.

This highlights the major need for consensus among all of Pakistan’s ruling elite. Good policy cannot be applied without everyone on board — that includes the political parties and the military. Many die-hard democrats cringe at the mention of the latter, but the cold truth is that for the near- to medium-term, the military is the guarantor of the Pakistani state, as it has been for the last 60+ years.

If Pakistani civil society does not begin to hold its political parties to higher standards, we will continue to witness the re-enactment of history by the same players, at the risk of wearing down an already decrepit stage.

However, sources report that the helicopter was one of the brand new Bell 412 helicopters provided to Pakistan by the United States. They also state that militants in South Waziristan have been using anti-aircraft missiles. Sources narrate further that the helicopter had been visiting a unit in South Waziristan and was on its way back when, within 3 minutes of taking off, it came down.

If militants did indeed manage to shoot down the helicopter, it would mark the first time militants have downed a Pakistani helicopter.

Individuals within the establishment have said that US, Indian, and/or Afghan involvement in the helicopter crash/downing cannot be ruled out. They cite a recent decision by the government of Pakistan to review its strategy in FATA. Downing the helicopter maybe a means of instigating the Pakistan Army to use more force or to get out of the region all together.

More to come.

In addition to military action, sources also report that a major facet of the newfound campaign involves choking off Baitullah’s sources of funding and logistics. This will be done in part by assailing the business interests of the Mehsud tribe from which Baitullah hails. By pursuing the tribe’s assets and businesses, primarily focused in more developed areas such as Karachi, Tank, and Dera Ismail, the Army seeks to indirectly pressure the tribe and show them how self destructive it can be supporting Baitullah.

If history has taught us anything about the Pushtun tribes it’s this: money talks. The Army’s strategy should not only prove effective but also go a long way in driving a wedge between jihadist militants and the tribes that support them. As extremist Islam fast becomes the primary vehicle of Pushtun nationalism in Pakistan, making this wedge permanent is a vital objective in ensuring Pakistan’s territorial integrity.

Pakistani intelligence is also increasingly wary of Indian collusion with Afghan intelligence in fomenting instability along Pakistan’s borders. They consistently point to the presence of six Indian consulates in Afghanistan, four of which are not only close to the Afghan-Pakistan “border” and are in areas where few if any Indians reside. Recent news of resurgent militant Sikh activity in India after years of quiet may be warning shots from Pakistan that it too, can return the favor.

… AND RETREATS.
Pakistan’s Chief of Army Staff, Gen. Ashfaq Kayani, is living up to his reputation as a professional soldier. Sources state that the general has initiated the process of making sweeping changes in organization in the Army. On top of having re-instituted the role of Director General of Planning, the head of what amounts to the Army’s think tank, Kayani is systematically withdrawing the Army from the political arena.Told to us by sources months ago, Gen. Kayani’s directive that all officers abstain from interfering in politics under the threat of court martial has become widely reported. Now, sources have stated that the Army Chief has also directed Military Intelligence (MI) to desist from interfering in politics at all levels.

The big question is now this: when’s the ISI’s turn?

ELECTION ENDNOTES:

1. A senior Pakistani official recently conveyed to the Insider Brief how deeply distraught they were at the current state of affairs in Pakistan and at how President Pervez Musharraf was single mindedly focused on ensuring a pliant parliament to maintain his hold on power. Another senior official from within the ranks of the military stated that it was only a matter of “when, not if,” Gen. Ashfaq Kayani withdrew his support for President Musharraf.
2. Sources have reported that Pakistan People’s Party members informed President Musharraf that the will produced by Asif Zardari was indeed fake and that party officials kept quiet for the sake of capturing the “sympathy” vote in February’s upcoming parliamentary elections. They intend on seeking Zardari’s ouster after elections.
3. Media outlets have widely reported the ongoing dialogue between President Musharraf and Shahbaz Sharif, Nawaz Sharif’s chief lieutenant and younger brother, through common acquaintance Brigadier (retired) Niaz Ahmed. Sources close to Ahmed state that parlays between Musharraf and the younger Sharif are over the creation of an alliance to prevent the rise of the PPP in upcoming elections and that the two will be meeting in Ahmed’s home in London. They also state that there is a strong possibility that a deal has been struck between the two seemingly antagonistic forces. If true, it marks a return to “normalcy” in Pakistan’s constellation of forces: the establishment allied with its usual proxy, the Pakistan Muslim League, against the anti-establishment Pakistan People’s Party.