Javed Jabbar is Chairman and Chief Executive of J.J. Media (Pvt.) and Project One (Pvt.).  He has served as President Gen. Pervez Mursharraf’s Minister of Information as well as a former senator and minister in three federal cabinets.  He produced the film Ramchand Pakistani (directed by his daughter, Mehreen Jabbar) and has authored several books, his most recent being Criss-Cross Times: selected writings about conflict and confluence 2001-2009. Jabbar is a member of the Neemrana Initiative, one of India-Pakistan’s most successful Track 2 dialogues.

The following is a transcript of the INSIDER BRIEF’s interview with Javed Jabbar, conducted by Sehr Akbar and Zainab Javed.

Q: Do you believe any progress was made during the Indo-Pak talks last week in Islamabad? Is avoiding touchy subjects such as Kashmir a strategic success or blunder in future relations between the two countries?

Javed Jabbar: Firstly, the fact that the two foreign ministers met represents substantive progress because it vindicates Pakistan’s position for the past two years, (since the Indians suspended the level of contact at the foreign minister level after the November ‘08 Mumbai attack).  It represents an acceptance in India that there is no alternative to dialogue.  So it is progress.  However, progress is also coming back to square one, because in any case we were already talking, (right, India suspended the talk, so it was frozen).  In a way you can say it is one step forward, and at the same time it’s one step back because it takes us to the pre-November ‘08 position, (when by coincidence the foreign minister was in New Delhi on the very day the terrorists carried out their attack in Mumbai.)  Bizarre that the foreign minister of Pakistan was in Delhi and there was this terrorist attack there which they immediately blamed on Pakistan.

So firstly, the meeting in Islamabad is good.  Second, I’m not surprised by the fact that there was no major positive outcome.  It is too early to expect a sudden improvement or major new development.  The very fact that they are now talking and listening to each other face-to-face is a very positive sign.  Third, on Kashmir, I am not expecting anything quick or overnight from the Indians.  It will be a gradual process.  Public opinion in both countries will have to be prepared to accept a compromise of the historical position, with some adjustment, which needs time.  Everyone has various compulsions to think of in both countries, but I’m confident that this meeting will lead to a positive outcome.

Q: What do you see as the solution for Kashmir being?  Military solutions have clearly never worked (four wars have been fought).  Is there any other way to solve the problem?

JJ: There are four steps which are vital to the resolution of the Kashmir dispute.

First element is to try to get an agreement between both Pakistan and India on which areas require a clarification about the status of Kashmir.  For example, is Ladakh a part of Kashmir or is it to be treated as an autonomous region separate from Kashmir?  The northern areas of Pakistan – are they to be treated as something outside Kashmir or are they considered historically to have been a part of Kashmir?  So the first step has to be, let us agree that this is the area we are disputing.  At this time, there is vagueness about it.  The only definition is this line of control — where both sides know this is the line of control, but other than that, there is some vagueness.  So remove the vagueness.

The second step is to gradually reduce the troops on both sides of the line of control instead of having 500,000 Indian troops and 100,000 Pakistani troops.  Reduce them gradually so that you reduce the tension and conflict with local people.  Especially in Indian Kashmir.

Third step should be the delegation of power by the Indian government from Delhi to the government in Srinagar.  Give them more authority, give them more power.  Similarly in Islamabad, we should give more authority and power to the local government of Azad- Kashmir.  At the moment, the government of Pakistan decides many of the appointments that take place.  So give more power to both sides of Kashmir, the local people.

Fourth step then can be, start a dialogue between the elected people in Azad-Kashmir and the elected and political people of Indian Kashmir.  I say elected and political because the Hurriyat conference/leadership of Indian occupied Kashmir has never taken part in the elections that are held within Indian Kashmir.  They boycott them because they say the elections are held under the Indian constitution – which they don’t accept.  So you have to also bring in the Hurriyat leadership, apart from those people like Omar Abdullah (elected CM of Indian Kashmir).  The Hurriyat is not elected and the Indians say the Hurriyat doesn’t represent people, but they do represent some people.  So there should be some dialogue between the elected and political people from both sides of Kashmir.

Once you take those four steps, then public opinions in both sides of Kashmir and in India and Pakistan may be willing to accept a final settlement.  What that final settlement will be, let’s leave it to those two dialogues and to what the governments of India and Pakistan can agree upon.

Q: The India-Pakistan relationship is built on a very fragile thread of trust — what are some measures that can reduce the ‘trust deficit’?

JJ: I believe that the first step towards reducing the trust deficit has to be continuous, uninterrupted, sustained dialogue at all levels.  At the summit level (heads of state and government should meet regularly and frequently), minister level, official level and very importantly, at the military level.  The Chief of Army Staff of Pakistan should meet the Commander in Chief of the Indian army, even if there’s no agreement and they are very angry at each other.  They must meet because the whole point about the current environment of the world is that you listen to and meet each other.  At the UN, you sit in the same hall, where you have people completely opposed of each other’s viewpoint, but you listen to each other.  So it’s very important for dialogue to be conducted on a regular, continual, uninterrupted basis.  That’s the first way to reduce the trust deficit.

I was so far only talking about the official dialogue.  Second, I believe there should also be regular non-official dialogue between people who are not holding offices or in a government capacity, but people who have the capacity to influence public opinion.

The third type of dialogue is media dialogue between the editors and proprietors of various media, especially indigenous language media such as Telugu, Tamil, Bengali, Marathi (not just English media).  These are the languages spoken by the majority of the people of India.  Those should interact with people from Pakistan – Urdu, Sindhi and Pashtu language media, (both electronic and print) – so that there is greater communication.

The next step should be increased trade and commerce.

If we take all these measures, there should be a reduction in the trust deficit and an increase in a sense of mutual confidence.

Q: What do you believe is the existential threat to Pakistan?

JJ: I believe that the greater threat to Pakistan today is our own internal state of being – the conditions in which we live, the mindsets that shape some of our official policies, and the attitudes and practices of some parts of our society.  These need to be reformed, modernized, and brought in tune with the rest of the world because some parts of Pakistani society are still living in medieval times while part is living in current times.  There needs to be a coherence and harmony with the rest of the world.  We can’t be so out of step as to be seen as a freakish country which has some completely mad practices or allows those practices.

In many ways, very good things are happening in Pakistan.  We have a strong judiciary, media and a flourishing civil society.  Many organizations raise their voices when it comes to human rights, freedom of expression and the rights of trade unions, laborers, doctors, teachers, and so on.  We should extend these rights.

In India’s relations with Pakistan, we must never lower our guard with India.  We must remain vigilant, but we must reach out to them with a hand of friendship and ask them to be fair to and not undermine Pakistan by attacking it outside like it does through academia and media in the USA.  We should adopt a policy of mutual respect and dignity.

We must treat our own internal conditions (lack of education, lack of social justice, lack of economic opportunities for the poor). These are the main existential threats to Pakistan.

Q:  Do you think Track II diplomacy was pursued effectively under Musharraf’s regime?

JJ: Track II started in 1992, ironically it was a time when PM Nawaz Sharif was in office for the first time.  It was initiated by an American initiative through the Ford Foundation with an American scholar and former diplomat called Paul Kreisberg.  He brought together a group of Indians and Pakistanis, and they met at a place called Neemrana, New Delhi in Rajasthan.  Neem standing for Naeem, Rana standing for a Hindu named Rana – that’s why the place is called Neemrana.  And the concept was that this group of specialists from different disciplines meets every once every five-six months with the knowledge and approval of both governments, but speaks its own mind.  They are not government officials and not bound by government policy.  And the cardinal rule was do not talk to the media.  Because the moment we start talking to the media and the headline is reported that “Pakistan suggests this solution for Kashmir,” there will be a great negative reaction in India.  So we decided don’t talk to the media.  That is why for the last 18 years we have been able to meet regularly and develop possibilities for solving some of the problems.  This Track II process should continue because on some occasions it helps governments with new ideas that governments can then make into official policy since they’ve already tested those ideas in Track II.

There’s a public track, which is normally also called Track II, but shouldn’t be.  The public track can be called Track III and is media oriented.  You get a group of say film actors from India to visit Pakistan, vise versa, you send some public personalities from Pakistan to go to India.  Sports, culture, all that can be Track III.  Trade can be track IV.  Sports is another track.  So there are different tracks on which you can build relations.  And Track II has a specialized function which should continue.

Q:  In retrospect, were Musharraf’s policies that led to the explosion of private media wise to begin with? Was Pakistan ready or mature enough?

JJ: Without taking away any credit from General Musharraf for enabling media to be free, this character here [Javed Jabbar] had a little something to do with it because well before Musharraf.  I had written the original law in 1996, which was passed as a law called EMRA, Electronic Media Regulatory Authority Ordinance on February 14, 1997.  It was the last law passed by the caretaker government of Farooq Leghari and Malik Meraj Khalid in which I was also a minister.  That law should have been made a permanent law by the second government of Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif, which he didn’t do.  Otherwise we would have had free media about five years earlier than we did. When General Musharraf made the mistake of asking me to be in his cabinet, we revived that law, improved it, and we finally introduced it.  Media freedom came because of General Musharraf’s decision, which was a bold decision and credit should go to him for implementing a law that had already been there but that had not been acted upon.

It is, I think, a tribute to him personally that he allowed this to happen, but it is also a reflection of the basic commitment that the people of Pakistan have to freedom of expression.  People like to listen to different points of view and they have a very open-minded attitude.  People like watching Indian movies.  They may hate India’s policies in Kashmir, but if it comes to enjoying Indian music, they’ll enjoy it. Similarly, Indians also enjoy Pakistani music or something which is done in a good, noncompetitive way by Pakistan.  So, it is a reflection of our society’s open-mindedness and a tribute to the people of Pakistan.

At the same time, media should also recognize the need to build national self-confidence and self-esteem. It should not treat all news as bad news and good news as no news. There is a need to balance the bad news with the good news and bring out the strengths and the beauty of Pakistan.

We at the Insider Brief have refrained from chiming in on the issue because there has been far too much disinformation and sensationalism out there clouding the actual story and underlying events. As more information has become available to us, we will briefly try to make heads or tails of the situation in Islamabad.

Our sources report that anxiously waiting Pakistan-watchers can likely expect some major news on Monday. The last time our sources told us to expect “major news,” Musharraf shed his uniform; this time may be a little different. We’re hesitant to speculate that Musharraf will resign due to what we’ve been hearing. The level of leaks and “inside news” emerging from Pakistani and American papers alike is unprecedented – and for good reason. Sources further report that a thorough disinformation campaign is being carried out by Pakistani intelligence agencies (“lafafa” journalism anyone?).

We believe that the campaign may be an attempt to focus the attention of Pakistanis and foreign governments towards the prospect of Musharraf’s resignation, away from the idea that he may be planning something altogether different. Based off chatter we’ve picked up on, we believe that any alternate plans being chalked up by Musharraf and the establishment may relate to the repeal of the National Reconciliation Order (NRO) that absolved the likes of Asif Zardari and Nawaz Sharif of their sins, fabricated or otherwise.

Our rationale is based off the fact that Musharraf allowed for the return and political participation of the late Bhutto, and to some degree the Sharifs, with the understanding that they would play by the rules laid out by the establishment. By pursuing Musharraf’s impeachment, they crossed the line in the sand. Now if Musharraf must go, he will pursue mutually assured destruction, bringing the coalition government down with him.

Ultimately, even if Musharraf does go, it’s of little consequence. As president, his constitutional powers are largely ceremonial – for whatever the constitution’s worth.

What’s the Rush, Mr. Zardari?
So why the sudden anxiousness on Zardari’s part to move negotiations forward with Sharif and impeach Musharraf? There are two, contrasting explanations. The first is desperation. After his failed attempt to gain control of the ISI as well as ISI efforts to undermine his government (for the purposes of maintaining a political stalemate), Zardari is now attempting to go after Musharraf. President Musharraf still represents the military’s institutional foothold in politics. The second explanation could be that Zardari has received US approval and backing for his actions after potentially convincing the current administration that Musharraf is what stands in the way of effective anti-Taliban operations in Pakistan. The second explanation is less likely however, as it was the current government that immediately and repeatedly sought to negotiate with the “Pakistani Taliban” from a position of weakness.

Regardless of his reasons, Zardari faces a major hurdle – the Army. Despite stepping down as Army Chief, Insider Brief sources report that the Pakistan Army remains very loyal to the President and is willing to go to bat for his political survivial, especially against the likes of Zardari. This brings us to the crux of this post.

The Coming Storm
The weight of recent events, shifting attitudes, and intense internal and external pressure on Pakistan are such that things can no longer continue as they have been. From our perspective at the Insider Brief, something has to give and it will undoubtedly be in the form of radical, tumultuous change in the near-to-medium term. Consider the following:

• The present civilian government (read: Zardari and co.) has picked a needless fight with the Army over the ISI and lost. It is yet again picking a needless fight against President Musharraf; a fight that will ultimately lead to another confrontation with a pro-Musharraf military.
• Insider Brief sources let slip that if things continue on their current trajectory, the military may be forced to (reluctantly) re-take the driver’s seat.
• Insider Brief sources also report that discontent is growing within the Army against its chief, Gen. Ashfaq Kayani. He is increasingly being perceived as an American lackey from within the ranks.
• Pakistan’s government and military have been unable to effectively roll back a raging Taliban-led insurgency in its northwest. This is moving beyond a crisis of governance into a crisis of existence.
• US and US-allied forces are preparing to conduct larger, more overt military action in Pakistan and have already openly admitted to conducting air strikes on Pakistani territory.
• The CIA publicly identified the ISI as having a hand in the recent bombing of the Indian Embassy in Kabul.
• Sources further indicate that there is a common perception within the Pakistani military that the US is colluding with the Indians to foment trouble in Balochistan and Pakistan’s northwest.
• Intermittent hostilities have broken out between India and Pakistan on the Line of Control in Kashmir after 5 years of peace.
• Public discontent is being compounded by a slowing economy and food and oil inflation.

Pretty picture, right? It depicts how unsustainable the current state of affairs is.

Ultimately, we’re witnessing a web of competing interests intersect and conflict in a big way. At the center of it all is the Pakistani military establishment. It currently finds itself in conflict with the US, India, the Pakistani civilian government, insurgents and perhaps even itself. This is no fault of the military’s — this merely reflects the reality that the military is at the center of the Pakistani state. It is the only institution that is capable of holding Pakistan together as the country tears itself apart.

It would behoove the present elected government to work in lockstep with the military, instead of engaging it and other parties in petty power struggles. The reinstatement of sacked judges or Musharraf’s impeachment will not save Pakistan. That will instead be determined by how Pakistanis and their leaders come together as a nation.

The decision is one that is bold, unprecedented and controversial. The ISI (Inter-Services Intelligence) has traditionally fallen under the purview of the military, with Army officers rotating through the agency for two year stints. Many have labeled the ISI as a “state within a state” for its pervasiveness and ability to influence state matters with near complete autonomy. Today’s decision by Gilani and his cabinet marks a major move by the nascent civilian government in the long standing struggle by Pakistan’s civilian/political forces to bring the military establishment under their control. This news also likely corroborates our last post as the move may be in response to military/intelligence discussions over the ouster of his PPP government.

The military will not accept the cabinet decision lying down. Insider Brief sources further report that many ranking military officials have indicated that there will be a coup if Gilani does not back down from his decision. Such a move would not be unprecedented. Many may remember that the last time a civilian government attempted to meddle in military affairs, it ultimately resulted in the coup that brought President Musharraf to power. Much of the anger in the military is being directed towards Interior Minister Rehman Malik, who is widely believed by Pakistan’s intelligence community to have had some affiliation with the CIA. In the eyes of Pakistan intelligence, Malik’s access may severely compromise ISI operational security.

The government’s move has also placed Pakistan’s Chief of Army Staff (COAS), Gen. Ashfaq Kayani, in an awkward position. Since his appointment to COAS, he has been an advocate of extricating the military from overt interference in government affairs and has made a very public effort to support the new government. As opposed to engaging Kayani in a process to alter the balance of power between Rawalpindi and Islamabad, Gilani’s government has acted brashly and resultantly forced Kayani into a corner. If Kayani does not respond forcefully, he will appear weak and lose credibility with his subordinates. The Army Chief will also likely want to respond — after all, the ISI was under his command.

If there is a coup, it will likely be a politically engineered, “soft coup.” This would include the possibility of President Musharraf dismissing the government through powers granted to him in the constitution. An overt military coup is unlikely as it would trigger sanctions, isolate Pakistan internationally and result in a further weakening of already shaky relationship.

The PPP has taken a risky gamble — Prime Minister Gilani may return to Pakistan only to find himself out of a job.

The Why
The news in and of itself should not be surprising, and for multiple reasons. First, the Pakistani military/intelligence establishment has always distrusted and disliked the PPP. Zulfikar Ali Bhutto, Benazir’s father, recognized this and established the Federal Security Force in an attempt to offset the influence of the ISI. The FSF was promptly disbanded after Gen. Zia-ul-Huq’s 1979 coup. On the other hand, Nawaz Sharif is a child of the establishment, promoted and sponsored by Gen. Zia himself.

People may question – what about General Ashfaq Kayani and his stance on political non-interference? The answer and second reason likely lies in the decreasing ability of the military establishment’s inability to control low-to-mid-level personnel as has been demonstrated by the numerous security lapses and leaks that have led to numerous terrorist strikes against sensitive targets.

This brings us to the third reason. Many in Pakistan’s military and intelligence apparatus remain sympathetic to their former proxies as is Nawaz Sharif. Sharif is well liked by Pakistan’s right and religious fundamentalists. His return would likely mark the end to the Pakistan Army’s push in the country’s northwest.

The How
If Pakistani intelligence is truly attempting to engineer Nawaz Sharif’s return, the question is, how do they intend on doing so? The answer may lie in what Insider Brief sources recently intimated to us. In the on going discussions over Zardari, it was mentioned that the last phone call to Benazir Bhutto minutes before her assassination was made by Zardari himself. He reportedly asked Bhutto why she was sitting in the car and not outside as the “people wanted to see her.”

The story could conceivably be true – there’s no doubt that Pakistani intelligence tapped Bhutto and Zardari’s phones – and Zardari did indeed have a lot to gain from her death. But the far likelier explanation could be that Pakistani intelligence is working to build up a story to incriminate or at the very least, implicate Zardari in the court of public opinion.

The other explanation is that these meetings are just indicative of pressure tactics being used by President Musharraf and the “establishment” as they tussle with Zardari and his civilian government over major issues such as the restoration of deposed judges, tackling terrorism and handling Pakistan’s economic issues.

The Lesson
The major take away is that the government must act with surety and decisiveness. A constellation of forces is aligning against the sitting government as it waits idly by, paralyzed by indecision and infighting. If it doesn’t act, the PPP will have passed up a chance to consolidate fresh democratic foundations for Pakistan and the opportunity to tackle issues from a liberal platform.

These closed-door meetings were just warning shots that time is running out.

Kicked off by the late-Benazir Bhutto, “the lost decade” was capped by the then much-welcomed military coup of President Pervez Musharraf. Nine years later, Musharraf’s tenure, which saw not only economic stabilization but stellar growth alongside unprecedented media liberalization, appears to be nearing its end falteringly.

With the much-anticipated parliamentary elections only days away and the military distancing itself from Musharraf, we are presented with a stark comparison between Pakistan’s military and democratic governments that raises key questions.

Why is it that military governments, who have been so successful at providing good economic management, fallen each time to popular opposition? Why is it that popular civilian leaders always return to power only to bring the country to the brink each time?

The two key variables here are policy and leadership.

Military-led governments have been successful managers of the country, their reigns typically leading to gains in the economy and social indicators, but they fail to provide genuine leadership. Their success in developing the country can be attributed to the technocrats they usher in to provide policy expertise in their respective fields. Yet these technocrats are only good at being policy experts, not politicians. Former Prime Minister Shaukat Aziz is a case-in-point. Despite his corruption free background and immense success in reviving Pakistan’s economy, Aziz was incapable of winning a single seat in Pakistan’s parliament without the patronage of the Chaudhries of Gujrat.

On the other hand, democratically elected governments have enjoyed popular support and provided leadership while actively mismanaging the country and overseeing declines in the economy. Their deficiency was and continues to be sound, consistent policies. Brought to power time and time again on the shoulders of empty rhetoric and patronage, Pakistan’s political parties appear to be forever trapped in the inertia of political in fighting; maintaining their stranglehold on government becomes their raison d’etre, resulting in very little progress.

Pakistan’s democratically elected governments have taught us that democracy alone is not the answer.

Democracy with serious, detailed and substantive policy is.

There needs to be an infusion of policy expertise and a serious commitment towards enacting policy, bridging the gap that has divided military and democratic regimes.

This highlights the major need for consensus among all of Pakistan’s ruling elite. Good policy cannot be applied without everyone on board — that includes the political parties and the military. Many die-hard democrats cringe at the mention of the latter, but the cold truth is that for the near- to medium-term, the military is the guarantor of the Pakistani state, as it has been for the last 60+ years.

If Pakistani civil society does not begin to hold its political parties to higher standards, we will continue to witness the re-enactment of history by the same players, at the risk of wearing down an already decrepit stage.

In addition to military action, sources also report that a major facet of the newfound campaign involves choking off Baitullah’s sources of funding and logistics. This will be done in part by assailing the business interests of the Mehsud tribe from which Baitullah hails. By pursuing the tribe’s assets and businesses, primarily focused in more developed areas such as Karachi, Tank, and Dera Ismail, the Army seeks to indirectly pressure the tribe and show them how self destructive it can be supporting Baitullah.

If history has taught us anything about the Pushtun tribes it’s this: money talks. The Army’s strategy should not only prove effective but also go a long way in driving a wedge between jihadist militants and the tribes that support them. As extremist Islam fast becomes the primary vehicle of Pushtun nationalism in Pakistan, making this wedge permanent is a vital objective in ensuring Pakistan’s territorial integrity.

Pakistani intelligence is also increasingly wary of Indian collusion with Afghan intelligence in fomenting instability along Pakistan’s borders. They consistently point to the presence of six Indian consulates in Afghanistan, four of which are not only close to the Afghan-Pakistan “border” and are in areas where few if any Indians reside. Recent news of resurgent militant Sikh activity in India after years of quiet may be warning shots from Pakistan that it too, can return the favor.

… AND RETREATS.
Pakistan’s Chief of Army Staff, Gen. Ashfaq Kayani, is living up to his reputation as a professional soldier. Sources state that the general has initiated the process of making sweeping changes in organization in the Army. On top of having re-instituted the role of Director General of Planning, the head of what amounts to the Army’s think tank, Kayani is systematically withdrawing the Army from the political arena.Told to us by sources months ago, Gen. Kayani’s directive that all officers abstain from interfering in politics under the threat of court martial has become widely reported. Now, sources have stated that the Army Chief has also directed Military Intelligence (MI) to desist from interfering in politics at all levels.

The big question is now this: when’s the ISI’s turn?

ELECTION ENDNOTES:

1. A senior Pakistani official recently conveyed to the Insider Brief how deeply distraught they were at the current state of affairs in Pakistan and at how President Pervez Musharraf was single mindedly focused on ensuring a pliant parliament to maintain his hold on power. Another senior official from within the ranks of the military stated that it was only a matter of “when, not if,” Gen. Ashfaq Kayani withdrew his support for President Musharraf.
2. Sources have reported that Pakistan People’s Party members informed President Musharraf that the will produced by Asif Zardari was indeed fake and that party officials kept quiet for the sake of capturing the “sympathy” vote in February’s upcoming parliamentary elections. They intend on seeking Zardari’s ouster after elections.
3. Media outlets have widely reported the ongoing dialogue between President Musharraf and Shahbaz Sharif, Nawaz Sharif’s chief lieutenant and younger brother, through common acquaintance Brigadier (retired) Niaz Ahmed. Sources close to Ahmed state that parlays between Musharraf and the younger Sharif are over the creation of an alliance to prevent the rise of the PPP in upcoming elections and that the two will be meeting in Ahmed’s home in London. They also state that there is a strong possibility that a deal has been struck between the two seemingly antagonistic forces. If true, it marks a return to “normalcy” in Pakistan’s constellation of forces: the establishment allied with its usual proxy, the Pakistan Muslim League, against the anti-establishment Pakistan People’s Party.

The elections in Pakistan are just about two weeks away. Musharraf is fulfilling his promise by my reckoning; or was it the Americans, the Brits, or the lawyers and politicians in Pakistan who deserve the credit? The burning question of the day is will the elections in Pakistan be fair and free? The media in the US and the opposition parties in Pakistan are convinced that they will be opaque and rigged. Scores of international observers are on their way to Pakistan to monitor the elections though they too are convinced they will be rigged, such is the power of suggestion. Now where does this leave Musharraf, between a hard place and a rock? I think so.

Almost every body who is anybody in the US, starting with powerful voices on the Hill, the media, every South Asian think tanker worth his salt and let us not forget the Pakistani American scholar struggling to find a position in the land of opportunity have lambasted Musharraf for everything wrong in Pakistan. Let Ambassador Durrani and his team rave and rant that Musharraf is the best thing that has happened to Pakistan in recent decades, alas the opinion die is cast; Musharraf is a dictator and the elections will be rigged.

The Pakistani media, which expanded exponentially under Musharraf, the whiskey swirling liberals in Islamabad and Lahore and the major political parties with impeccable democratic credentials from the right, the left and the center all warn of the upcoming rigged elections, as they brainwash the representatives of foreign Government and the foreign media of the dictatorial credentials of Musharraf. The Joan of Arc launched by the US is a hot favorite for her liberal credentials. Of course we will turn a blind eye to her dictatorial credentials within her party and her Mr. 10 % who is upping the rate to 15 % because of global warming and the rising price of oil. Another favorite is the Saudi launched democrat who during one of his tenures launched a frontal attack on the Supreme Court and has deep connections with the religious right. Another positive about the Saudi launch is his ambition to become the Amir ul Mohmaneen, the rightful successor of the Zia ul Haq legacy, so help us God.The patient commoner of Pakistan with the wisdom of poverty, has discovered the right formula for obtaining justice in Pakistan and I quote him, “if you have a case in court, you have multiple choices — hire a lawyer, or hire a judge, if the going gets tough better still hire a judge through a lawyer, and in case you have no money lump it.”  It is this wisdom that kept the common citizen from joining the protesting penguins (black suited lawyers); the alternatives to Musharraf did not appeal to them. Nor do they appeal to me.

I honestly believe Musharraf is indeed the best thing that has happened to Pakistan in a long time. He has turned around the sick economy of Pakistan, has improved the lot of the common man, enhanced the status of women, built the civil society, is improving education and is a true liberal. Not a single scandal of corruption against his name. Let me not push my luck but I feel he has done more for democracy than any of his recent predecessors. Yes he has made mistakes, is fighting an unpopular war and his popularity has plummeted. Incidentally his popularity is no worse than that of the Congress in the US. Musharraf at the helm for another five years will be in the best interest of Pakistan and I believe the US too, mark my words.

The News: Reuters
With Gen. Ashfaq Kayani’s ascendancy to the role of Chief of Army Staff (COAS), Reuters published an article on Nov. 28th titled, “Five Facts on Pakistan’s New Army Chief – Kayani,” in which they cited the Insider Brief.

On the Web: Watandost
In his latest blog post entitled, “Three New Excellent Blogs on Pakistan,” Hassan Abbas of Watandost recommended three Pakistan-focused blogs to his readers, one of which happened to be the Insider Brief. A published author and former Pakistani government official, Abbas is also a Research Fellow at the Belfer Center’s Project on Managing the Atom and International Security Program. His recognition, like that of the PCR Project, means a lot to us.

On the Radio: The John Batchelor Show
Last night, I appeared on the John Batchelor Show to discuss the rise of Gen. Ashfaq Kayani and President Musharraf’s future. You can listen to my conversation with John by using the player below.

Download audio file (wabc-interview-20071202-pakintel.mp3)
(Download file)

John’s show airs on Sundays, WABC 770AM in New York from 7-10pm EST (webcast), and KFI 640AM in Los Angeles from 7-10pm PST (webcast).

Transition Continues as Planned
Effectively having dealt with former Chief Justice Iftikhar Chaudhry, Musharraf’s transition appears to be continuing as planned. The newly revamped Supreme Court has paved the way for Musharraf’s second term as president and now that Nawaz Sharif has returned to Pakistan, the stage is set for the January parliamentary elections. The only remaining unresolved issue is the present state of emergency that is in effect which will likely go soon. Many IB readers will recall that our sources had stated back on November 3rd that Musharraf would remove his uniform, elections would be held, and that the emergency would be short lived.

Taking stock of the present situation — isn’t this what everyone wanted? A civilian Musharraf as president with elections being held in which all major parties are participating? Not to sound like a military regime apologist, the question begs to be asked: was Iftikhar Chaudhry acting in the greater good of the country by sparking a confrontation with President Musharraf? In attempting to push Musharraf out of the public realm entirely, instead of seeking a phased transition, can it be argued that Chaudhry can be blamed for the current state of emergency and curbs on the media?

We’ll leave that for our readers to answer.

A Paradigm in Twilight?
When Musharraf retires from the army this Wednesday, many will begin to question if this is the beginning of the end for the military’s involvement in government. The answer: not by a long shot. We had stated in a prior post that the army is at the center of the Pakistani state and that it will be involved in the country’s governance for decades to come if not in perpetuity. Whether this is right or wrong is not the question — it’s a ground reality.

Heard ad nauseam, the military is Pakistan’s single most organized, popular and powerful institution. It is the only grouping of Pakistan’s major stakeholders that can universally impose its will on the country and bring everyone else into line. As long as Pakistan’s ruling elites — the military, political parties, feudal lords, and business barons — remain at loggerheads with one another over the direction of the nation, the military will remain in the driver’s seat.

Out with the New, In with the Old
Sources also report that President Musharraf has grown weary of the Chaudhry cousins (Parvez Elahi and Shujaat Hussain) and intends on bringing in the Sharif brothers (Nawaz and Shahbaz) to dilute their influence. I doubt Musharraf will entirely rid himself of the Chaudhries — he will need some civilian allies — but instead he will likely marginalize them to the point that they are forced to share power with the likes of Benazir Bhutto and the Sharifs. This is in line with our analysis from September stating that Musharraf wanted a diluted coalition government in place; it would shield him from criticism for being undemocratic, all the while allowing him to carry on his policies unchecked while coalition members would bicker among one another.

Resentment within the Army
We had reported earlier that there was resentment in the Pakistan Army over operations in Swat. Now, we are being told that there is broad resentment among the army’s mid-to-low ranking officers over Musharraf’s handling of Benazir Bhutto and Nawaz Sharif. They are particularly upset that Nawaz Sharif is being allowed to return, after they helped show him the door nearly a decade ago. The discontent over Musharraf’s policies has not spread to senior army leadership, which remains on board, likely understanding the compromises he needs to make in light of international (read: US) pressure. It also doesn’t hurt that they’re all hand picked Musharraf loyalists. Ultimately, this is bad news for Musharraf. The army is his constituency and power base. If his support continues to erode, he could soon find himself out of a job.

Intel Validation
We revealed exactly two weeks ago that the Bush administration, specifically Deputy Secretary of State John Negroponte, had advance knowledge of President Musharraf’s plans of imposing a state of emergency in Pakistan. Today, the Wall Street Journal reported just that — that American diplomats had prior knowledge of the impending emergency.

DECEITFUL DEALINGS EXPOSED?
The Jeddah visit proves to be a very interesting development especially when viewed in the context of the “chatter” that we’ve been picking up on from some of our sources. We’ve consistently heard over the last week that President Musharraf, having won his re-election bid with the tacit support of Benazir Bhutto, is abandoning his deal with her. He is allegedly banking on the Supreme Court to strike down the National Reconciliation Ordinance (NRO) which grants Bhutto, among others, amnesty from pending criminal charges. And while the delegitimized Bhutto will not be returning to Pakistan, Nawaz Sharif will. At the time, this scenario was both highly speculative and implausible for many reasons and as a result, we left it unreported.

The first mention of this potential outcome came shortly after Pakistan Muslim League (Q) president, Chaudhry Shujaat Hussain, appeared at a news conference with Prime Minister Shaukat Aziz early last week saying that the NRO was a ploy and that Bhutto had lost at a political game. Though some knowledgeable individuals claimed that Hussain had been told by Musharraf to say what he did, it was far more likely that the comments reflected an attempt to throw a wrench in the Musharraf-Bhutto deal. It was reasoned that the Chaudhry cousins, who campaigned hard for Musharraf during the recent presidential elections, were trying equally hard to maintain their relevancy.

A few days later however, Musharraf made the suggestion during a TV interview that Bhutto delay her return. This, despite an almost immediate rejection of the idea from Bhutto, coupled with news of the Jeddah trip, led us to question whether there was any credence to what we had been hearing.

COMPULSIONS FOR MOHTARMA AND MUSHARRAF
Having re-evaluated our position, the aforementioned scenario forecast by some of our sources still remains improbable, though not as speculative, as the Supreme Court has agreed to review the NRO.

There is one major reason Musharraf cannot abandon a deal with Bhutto – the United States. The US has a high degree of vested interest in seeing the Musharraf-Bhutto deal come to fruition and has spent a great deal of political capital trying to make it happen. If Musharraf hopes to maintain the continued support of the US government — a major prop for his regime — he must remain committed to a power sharing agreement with Bhutto. There have already been some signs a la State Department commentary signaling that the American government may be distancing itself from Musharraf.

Bhutto on the other hand cannot afford to not return to Pakistan on October 18th as we’ve stated in the past. This is Bhutto’s last chance to return to power and redeem herself. If this window of opportunity closes, she will be relegated in history as yet another failed ruler in Pakistan’s long line of over-hyped disappointments. For her credibility to stay in tact, she must return to Pakistan on the 18th regardless of whether or not the Supreme Court strikes down the NRO.

A FRAGMENTED FRAMEWORK
So where does the Jeddah visit fit into all of this? The delegation likely flew to Jeddah to discuss with Nawaz Sharif the terms of his and/or Shahbaz Sharif’s return to Pakistan. Since his deportation back to Saudi Arabia, the Saudis have kept Sharif on a short leash. If he hopes to leave Saudi Arabia, it will have to be with Musharraf’s consent.

One may question what incentive Musharraf has to allow either of the Sharif brothers to return to Pakistan. The truth is that though Musharraf is beholden to the Americans to make a deal with Bhutto, he doesn’t have to guarantee that she or anyone else is all that powerful. By forcing the PPP and PML(Q) into a coalition government all the while re-activating the PML(N) through the return of its leadership, Musharraf would be creating a fractured political environment with multiple, nearly co-equal players. Under the probable guise of national reconciliation, he would effectively be neutralizing the Chaudhry’s, the Sharif’s and Bhutto by playing them off one another. The very fact that the Jeddah visit was made by Army officials and not civilian political operatives makes us believe that the Chaudhry’s were not to have any say in or knowledge of negotiations with Sharif.

On the surface, it may appear as though Musharraf is conceding power to the country’s politicians, but the reality is that he’s ensuring, with the Army’s backing, that he will remain the single most powerful player in Pakistani politics.

How the Supreme Court acts in the coming days is anyone’s guess. One thing is certain though – Musharraf is proving to be a very deft politician.

Following the Musharraf government’s re-deportation of Nawaz Sharif, sources informed me that the Supreme Court was no longer willing to confront Musharraf and that its justices had accepted that Musharraf had a specific game plan laid out for his transition to a civilian presidency and civil-military power-sharing agreement.

That understanding came to light today with the Supreme Court ruling that Musharraf was an eligible candidate for presidential elections, despite being in uniform. Whether that consensus is a result of the government’s threats to out Chief Justice Iftikhar Chaudhry’s links to Nawaz Sharif remains unclear.

Nawaz Sharif’s highly anticipated return from exile on September 10th very quickly dissipated into an anti-climactic return to exile.

In the wake of his deportation, Benazir Bhutto has announced that after nearly a decade in self-imposed exile, she herself will be returning to Pakistan on October 18th. The government has responded by saying she is welcome back but will have to face the corruption charges that await her at home.

Will Benazir Bhutto hold firm to her October 18th arrival date or will she back track as she’s done in the past?

INSIGHT INTO THE DEAL
By very publicly declaring a formal date of return, Bhutto has no choice but to return as announced unless she’s willing to take a severe hit to her credibility and popularity. An astute politician, Bhutto wouldn’t risk announcing a return date, let alone a return, unless she knew it was a safe bet. This alone leads us to believe that Bhutto is confident in the progress of any negotiations between herself and Musharraf.

We’re also inclined to believe that the timing of Bhutto’s return indicates that her and Musharraf have already come to some sort of initial accomodation. Musharraf’s term as President officially ends November 15th, but government officials have stated that Musharraf would be seeking re-election sometime between September 15th and October 15th. Not incoincidentally, Bhutto’s arrival steers clear of that period, allowing Musharraf to focus on being re-elected. These facts, coupled with Mushahid Hussain’s comments that Musharraf will “doff” his uniform sometime after re-election, reveal that perhaps Bhutto has good reason to be confident.

However, there remain some major hurdles between herself and the premiership. Sources in my last post mentioned both the two-term limit for Prime Ministers and the remaining corruption charges as major sticking points in negotiations for a power-sharing agreement. The government’s response, that Bhutto will have to face pending charges upon her return, reinforced that these sticking points still exist. It also represented some serious posturing on Musharraf’s part since Bhutto will be unable to contest elections for any parliamentary seat while there are open charges against her. Knowing the speed at which cases are dispensed in Pakistan and with elections looming, Bhutto may be forced to make some major concessions to Musharraf in order to secure a pardon. Whether Musharraf is willing to grant a pardon at all is another question.

But if Musharraf was willing to drop all charges, a third term for Bhutto as Prime Minister would still require amending the constitution, something the PPP itself cannot undertake alone, either now or even after the next round of parliamentary elections. Enter the “King’s Party” – the PML-Q. With the combined voting power of the PPP and the PML-Q, a constitutional amendment suddenly becomes viable. It additionally raises the specter of a coalition government.

My sources had stated that Musharraf was not about to abandon his “allies” in the PML-Q, notably the Chaudhry cousins. I interpreted this to imply that there was a possibility of some sort of watered down coalition government between the PML-Q and PPP. That interpretation is gaining increased traction as Dawn reported today that Musharraf had directed the PML to hold direct talks with the PPP over a post-election power-sharing “formula.” It will be interesting to witness how the dynamic between the Chaudhry’s and Bhutto unfolds, as neither likely wants to work with the other.

With PPP requests for the import of armored transport for Bhutto declined by customs officials, some well connected individuals have omniously speculated that the Chaudhry’s may seek to assassinate Bhutto. We hope that these speculations remain just that – speculations.

Assassination plots, negotiations, and sticking points aside, there remains another major irritant for a final deal – Nawaz Sharif’s failed return.

SHARIF’S MONKEY WRENCH
Hoping to show up Bhutto, Nawaz Sharif elected to return to Pakistan before her, gambling that Musharraf would not risk another confrontation with the Supreme Court of Pakistan by deporting him. He gambled wrong and was deported to Saudi Arabia. In the process, he threw a major wrench in Musharraf’s plans.

First, he created the potential for another show down between Musharraf and the Supreme Court as the latter decides whether the Musharraf government is to be held in contempt of court. Secondly, he made it increasingly difficult for Bhutto to strike a formal accord with Musharraf without damaging her public image. This was exacerbated by the United States’ perceived role in both the deportation of Sharif and the deal between Bhutto and Musharraf.

We don’t think Nawaz Sharif intended for all this to happen – he’s not that smart. Had he planned for all this, he wouldn’t have ended up in Saudi Arabia where his movement and activities are severely limited. The worst Sharif likely expected was that he would end up jailed in Attock Fort after which the courts or public outcry would grant him reprieve.

Had Sharif shown some patience and political maturity (lacking in Pakistan), he would have waited for Bhutto to return or returned with her, making it very difficult for Musharraf to show him the way back to exile without utterly compromising Bhutto’s public standing.

UNHAPPILY EVER AFTER?
Ultimately, we foresee that Musharraf and Bhutto will successfully achieve a power-sharing agreement. We question however, whether the deal will translate into a stable polity, sustainable development, or democracy.

It is a question that President Gen. Pervez Musharraf and self-exiled former Prime Minister Benazir Bhutto will have to answer soon if they hope to counter the growing momentum of Nawaz Sharif’s campaign to return not only to Pakistan, but to power.

AN UNLIKELY SCENARIO
A decade ago, no one would have believed, let alone foreseen, the political reality that exists in Pakistan today. We are witnessing a Pakistani military dictator seeking political survival through a power sharing agreement with the anti-establishment Pakistan People’s Party, all the while facing off against a faction of the Pakistan Muslim League, once a favored proxy of the military establishment.

Musharraf and Bhutto have been flirting with a political settlement for at least five years now. As far back as November 2002, we learned of meetings between Musharraf’s close associates and aides debating the release of Asif Zardari – Bhutto’s husband – two years before his actual release. And again, at the end of 2003, we received word that Musharraf was readying to send a personal confidante and childhood friend to visit Bhutto in Dubai and initiate parleys by asking in very plain terms, “What is it that you want?”

In those days, Musharraf was negotiating from a position of strength, when the worst of his worries were troublesome Baloch nationalists. Today, he is fighting for his political life and willing to concede ground to Bhutto and her demands.

THE TERMS
Questions, speculation, commentary and criticism have been swirling around the surprisingly public negotiations between the two camps.

The media has speculated that a power sharing agreement between the two would leave Musharraf in control of national security and foreign policy issues and Bhutto with all remaining national issues. Under such terms, the question then becomes, how different would Bhutto’s tenure really be from the neutered prime ministerships of Shaukat Aziz or Zafarullah Jamali?

Others have theorized that Musharraf will take a hardline stance against all opposition and declare a state of emergency. Such a move would be fatal for Musharraf, likely galvanizing his opposition to the point that he would be forced to step down. We like to believe that Musharraf is smarter than that.

Sources close to the negotiations have stated that a deal between Musharraf and Bhutto is inevitable. They also confirmed much of what has been reported in the media already, that there are currently three major sticking points upon which negotiations still continue:

1. The dropping of all charges against Bhutto
2. Bhutto to be allowed a third term as Prime Minister
3. The repeal of the President’s power to dismiss the government

It’s clear why these are sticking points. Not willing to relegate herself to a behind-the-scenes role, like Sonia Gandhi across the border, Bhutto wants the premiership and visibly so. She also wants to remove the presidential power that brought down her government twice.

In Musharraf’s eyes, the latter two sticking points not only require constitutional amendments, but rolling back presidential power would deny him any leverage over Bhutto. And if good governance remains an issue to him, appearing soft on corruption and allowing for a third term would be counterproductive.

Lastly, the same sources said that Musharraf would not abandon the PML-QA or the Chaudhry cousins as they are his “allies.” We’re unsure of what this implies about the future power sharing arrangement, but it does open up the possibility for a coalition government between the PML-QA and PPP. Whether this is a workable, effective or acceptable solution for any of the involved political parties is questionable. For Musharraf, a diluted coalition government may just be what he is looking for. It would shield him from criticism for being undemocratic, all the while allowing him to carry on his policies unchecked while coalition members bicker among one another.

SHARIF’S RETURN
Regardless of what a future power sharing agreement looks like, Musharraf and Bhutto must agree posthaste. Parliamentary elections are looming and more importantly, Nawaz Sharif is due to arrive in Pakistan in a matter of hours.
Once written off, Sharif is quickly emerging as a dark horse in the coming parliamentary elections having maintained a consistently anti-Musharraf stance, defiantly rejecting all calls to adhere to his exile agreement. Pakistanis and Pakistan watchers alike have been apprehensively awaiting Sharif’s potentially explosive return.

Now aboard a flight to Pakistan, sans his brother Shabhaz, Nawaz’s return is promising to be confrontational. Senior officials indicated to us that surveillance has been established at all major airports and routes to jails have been secured. Using “pressure tactics,” they hope to coerce Sharif into leaving Pakistan on his own accord, thereby avoiding the contempt of court charges associated with deportation. Given the unlikelihood of this outcome, officials are also prepared to arrest Sharif, keep him out of the public eye and jail him.

Whether Sharif or his supporters will go quietly remains to be seen.