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	<title>The Insider Brief &#187; Mehsud</title>
	<atom:link href="http://www.pakintel.com/category/mehsud/feed/" rel="self" type="application/rss+xml" />
	<link>http://www.pakintel.com</link>
	<description>An insider&#039;s view to Pakistan through critical intelligence, analysis and commentary.</description>
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		<title>Assessing the Success in Swat</title>
		<link>http://www.pakintel.com/2009/05/31/assessing-the-success-in-swat/</link>
		<comments>http://www.pakintel.com/2009/05/31/assessing-the-success-in-swat/#comments</comments>
		<pubDate>Sun, 31 May 2009 16:55:52 +0000</pubDate>
		<dc:creator>Shaan Akbar</dc:creator>
				<category><![CDATA[AH1 Cobra]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Baitullah Mehsud]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[FATA]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Maulana Fazlullah]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Mehsud]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Pakistan Air Force]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Pakistan Army]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Swat]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Taliban]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[War on Terror]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Waziristan]]></category>

		<guid isPermaLink="false">http://www.pakintel.com/2009/05/31/assessing-the-success-in-swat/</guid>
		<description><![CDATA[Summary
Despite widespread skepticism of the Pakistani military’s will and ability to fight the Taliban, the second Swat campaign appears to be on the road to a successful conclusion with the expulsion of the Taliban from the once scenic valley.  Backed by civilian support, Pakistan’s military leadership looks to have plotted and executed a well thought [...]]]></description>
			<content:encoded><![CDATA[<p><a rel="lightbox" href="http://farm4.static.flickr.com/3367/3582264626_d05bdbbed1_o.jpg" title="Success at what cost?"><img vspace="5" align="left" width="240" src="http://farm4.static.flickr.com/3367/3582264626_7e0d24b89b_m.jpg" hspace="10" height="140" /></a><strong>Summary</strong><br />
Despite widespread skepticism of the Pakistani military’s will and ability to fight the Taliban, the second Swat campaign appears to be on the road to a successful conclusion with the expulsion of the Taliban from the once scenic valley.  Backed by civilian support, Pakistan’s military leadership looks to have plotted and executed a well thought out and integrated strategy for the campaign.  The gains in Swat can prove to be short lived, however, if the same thoughtful approach isn’t pursued after combat operations conclude.</p>
<p><strong>Successful Strategy</strong><br />
As part of its strategy, the military initially sought to strike Taliban hideouts, training camps, arms caches, tunnels and safe houses.  This was done to destroy their infrastructure and also minimize the degree of fighting taking place in populated, urban areas.  Taking aim at these targets forced the Taliban to fight &#8220;outwards&#8221; in the mountains and provide more tactical space for army personnel in the Swat Valley itself.</p>
<p>Precision strikes were carried out by the air force while the army launched three brigade-size offensives from three different directions, forcing the Taliban to fight on multiple fronts.  The Special Services Group (commonly referred to as the SSG, Pakistan&#8217;s special forces) <a target="_blank" href="http://www.dawn.com/wps/wcm/connect/dawn-content-library/dawn/the-newspaper/front-page/commandos-dropped-into-fazlullah-den-359">conducted a large-scale airborne raid</a> on the primary Taliban base in Peochar Valley.</p>
<p>A month into its campaign, Pakistan&#8217;s military has <a target="_blank" href="http://www.nytimes.com/2009/05/31/world/asia/31pstan.html?emc=tnt&amp;tntemail0=y">wrested control of and secured Mingora</a>, Swat&#8217;s largest city.</p>
<p>The military continues to maintain persistent pressure on militants by carrying out raids, laying ambushes, and cordoning off zones for search and destroy operations.  The purpose for all of which is to ensure psychological and tactical ascendancy against the Taliban.</p>
<p>There is also a strong desire on the part of the military to eliminate Taliban leadership in Swat.  Recent rumors that Maulana Fazlullah, leader of the Taliban in Swat, was killed by Pakistani gunships were discredited after the <a target="_blank" href="http://www.longwarjournal.org/archives/2009/05/pakistan_boosts_boun.php">Pakistani government increased its bounty on Fazlullah’s head</a>.  Insider Brief sources within the Pakistani military report that US sources originated the rumors but that chatter on Taliban networks also spoke of Fazlullah’s death.  The chatter was likely a means of diverting the military’s focus on hunting the “Radio Mullah.”</p>
<p><strong>From Swat to South Waziristan</strong><br />
Having taken Mingora, the military has set its sights on Charbagh where action is expected soon.  Other pockets of Taliban resistance still remain in several valleys north and west of Mingora.</p>
<p>Beyond Swat lies South Waziristan, which the military believes to be the center of gravity for the Taliban.  Our sources also report that operations can begin in South Waziristan as early as the first week of June.</p>
<p>It&#8217;s worth noting that despite official claims that upwards of <a target="_blank" href="http://timesofindia.indiatimes.com/World/Pakistan/About-3000-terrorists-in-Swat-Valley-would-be-killed-Zardari/articleshow/4504965.cms">3,000 militants have been killed in Swat</a>, our sources state that the number of dead militants is likely somewhere between 500 and 600.  It’s important to be mindful of this as the military seeks to consolidate the gains it has made in Swat and hold territory.  The number of militants in Swat likely ranged in the thousands at its peak, meaning that many militants were merely pushed back into the mountains or dissolved into the general population.</p>
<p>As internally displaced persons (IDPs) and administrative structures return to Swat, it will be important for the military to maintain much of its strength (two divisions) there.  This ultimately means that more troops will have to be called up for the far more difficult operation that lies ahead in South Waziristan.</p>
<p><a rel="lightbox" href="http://farm4.static.flickr.com/3657/3581453229_9b783a965e_o.jpg" title="A new generation of Taliban?"><img vspace="5" align="right" width="240" src="http://farm4.static.flickr.com/3657/3581453229_ae3848777f_m.jpg" hspace="10" height="128" /></a><strong>Sovereignty in Swat</strong><br />
Over 2.4 million people have been displaced by the fighting, creating what the UN describes as the worst refugee crisis since Rwanda.  With fighting winding down in Swat, these IDPs will begin returning home to widespread destruction (many have started returning home to neighboring Buner).  The resulting discontent has the potential to turn Swat into a breeding ground for the Taliban.</p>
<p><a target="_blank" href="http://www.pakintel.com/2007/11/26/the-real-crisis-taming-the-tribal-belt/">Back in November 2007</a>, we contended that, “only when you have a hand in bettering someone’s life can you claim sovereignty over where they live.”</p>
<p>With US financial support, Pakistan must use the opportunity provided by the devastation in Swat to undertake massive rebuilding and modernization efforts there.  Model villages can be developed similar to the ones built after the massive earthquake that struck northern Pakistan in October 2005.  Administrative structures can be built from the ground up keeping in mind that prior discontent in Swat related to government inefficiencies (particularly in the judicial system).</p>
<p>This can prove to be an important first step in bringing Pakistan’s Wild West into the fold.</p>
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		<item>
		<title>Islamabad Intrigues:  The Army Edition</title>
		<link>http://www.pakintel.com/2008/01/25/islamabad-intrigues-the-army-edition/</link>
		<comments>http://www.pakintel.com/2008/01/25/islamabad-intrigues-the-army-edition/#comments</comments>
		<pubDate>Fri, 25 Jan 2008 05:33:12 +0000</pubDate>
		<dc:creator>Shaan Akbar</dc:creator>
				<category><![CDATA[Afghanistan]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Ashfaq Kayani]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Ashfaq Kiyani]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Asif Zardari]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Attack on Benazir Bhutto]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Baitullah Mehsud]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Benazir Bhutto]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Benazir Bhutto Assassination]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Chief of Army Staff]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Elections - February 2008]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[FATA]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Maulana Fazlullah]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Mehsud]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Military Intelligence]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Nawaz Sharif]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Pakistan Army]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Pakistan People's Party]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Pervez Musharraf]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Shahbaz Sharif]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Swat]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Taliban]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[War on Terror]]></category>

		<guid isPermaLink="false">http://www.pakintel.com/2008/01/25/islamabad-intrigues-the-army-edition/</guid>
		<description><![CDATA[THE ARMY ADVANCES &#8230;
Hot off its relative success in sweeping Swat of militants led by Maulana Fazlullah, sources report that the Pakistan Army has set its sights on Baitullah Mehsud, the purported mastermind behind the assassination of Benazir Bhutto.
In addition to military action, sources also report that a major facet of the newfound campaign involves [...]]]></description>
			<content:encoded><![CDATA[<p><a href="http://farm3.static.flickr.com/2301/2224735862_84b4e19e6f_o.jpg" title="The Army Takes Aim" target="_blank" rel="lightbox"><img src="http://farm3.static.flickr.com/2301/2224735862_86edff797b_m.jpg" align="left" hspace="10" vspace="5" /></a><strong>THE ARMY ADVANCES &#8230;</strong><br />
Hot off its relative success in sweeping Swat of militants led by Maulana Fazlullah, sources report that the Pakistan Army has set its sights on Baitullah Mehsud, the purported mastermind behind the assassination of Benazir Bhutto.</p>
<p>In addition to military action, <strong>sources also report that a major facet of the newfound campaign involves choking off Baitullah&#8217;s sources of funding and logistics</strong>. This will be done in part by assailing the business interests of the Mehsud tribe from which Baitullah hails. By pursuing the tribe&#8217;s assets and businesses, primarily focused in more developed areas such as Karachi, Tank, and Dera Ismail, the Army seeks to indirectly pressure the tribe and show them how self destructive it can be supporting Baitullah.</p>
<p>If history has taught us anything about the Pushtun tribes it&#8217;s this: money talks. The Army&#8217;s strategy should not only prove effective but also go a long way in driving a wedge between jihadist militants and the tribes that support them. As extremist Islam fast becomes the primary vehicle of Pushtun nationalism in Pakistan, making this wedge permanent is a vital objective in ensuring Pakistan&#8217;s territorial integrity.</p>
<p>Pakistani intelligence is also increasingly wary of Indian collusion with Afghan intelligence in fomenting instability along Pakistan&#8217;s borders. They consistently point to the presence of six Indian consulates in Afghanistan, four of which are not only close to the Afghan-Pakistan &#8220;border&#8221; and are in areas where few if any Indians reside. Recent news of resurgent militant Sikh activity in India after years of quiet may be warning shots from Pakistan that it too, can return the favor.</p>
<p><strong>&#8230; AND RETREATS.</strong><br />
Pakistan&#8217;s Chief of Army Staff, Gen. Ashfaq Kayani, is living up to his reputation as a professional soldier. Sources state that the general has initiated the process of making sweeping changes in organization in the Army. On top of having re-instituted the role of Director General of Planning, the head of what amounts to the Army&#8217;s think tank, Kayani is systematically withdrawing the Army from the political arena.Told to us by sources months ago, Gen. Kayani&#8217;s directive that all officers abstain from interfering in politics under the threat of court martial has become widely reported. Now, <strong>sources have stated that the Army Chief has also directed Military Intelligence (MI) to desist from interfering in politics at all levels</strong>.</p>
<p>The big question is now this: when&#8217;s the ISI&#8217;s turn?</p>
<p><strong>ELECTION ENDNOTES:</strong></p>
<ol>
<li>A senior Pakistani official recently conveyed to the Insider Brief how deeply distraught they were at the current state of affairs in Pakistan and at how President Pervez Musharraf was single mindedly focused on ensuring a pliant parliament to maintain his hold on power. Another senior official from within the ranks of the military stated that it was only a matter of &#8220;when, not if,&#8221; Gen. Ashfaq Kayani withdrew his support for President Musharraf.</li>
<li>Sources have reported that Pakistan People&#8217;s Party members informed President Musharraf that the will produced by Asif Zardari was indeed fake and that party officials kept quiet for the sake of capturing the &#8220;sympathy&#8221; vote in February&#8217;s upcoming parliamentary elections. They intend on seeking Zardari&#8217;s ouster after elections.</li>
<li>Media outlets have widely reported the ongoing dialogue between President Musharraf and Shahbaz Sharif, Nawaz Sharif&#8217;s chief lieutenant and younger brother, through common acquaintance Brigadier (retired) Niaz Ahmed. Sources close to Ahmed state that parlays between Musharraf and the younger Sharif are over the creation of an alliance to prevent the rise of the PPP in upcoming elections and that the <strong>two will be meeting in Ahmed&#8217;s home in London</strong>. They also state that there is a strong possibility that a deal has been struck between the two seemingly antagonistic forces. If true, it marks a return to &#8220;normalcy&#8221; in Pakistan&#8217;s constellation of forces: the establishment allied with its usual proxy, the Pakistan Muslim League, against the anti-establishment Pakistan People&#8217;s Party.</li>
</ol>
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		<title>The Real Crisis:  Taming the Tribal Belt</title>
		<link>http://www.pakintel.com/2007/11/26/the-real-crisis-taming-the-tribal-belt/</link>
		<comments>http://www.pakintel.com/2007/11/26/the-real-crisis-taming-the-tribal-belt/#comments</comments>
		<pubDate>Mon, 26 Nov 2007 22:29:32 +0000</pubDate>
		<dc:creator>Shaan Akbar</dc:creator>
				<category><![CDATA[Afghanistan]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Aurakzai]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[CIA]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Central Intelligence Agency]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[FATA]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Frontier Corps]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Mehsud]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[NATO]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Pakistan Army]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Relations with United States]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Swat]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Taliban]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[War on Terror]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Waziristan]]></category>

		<guid isPermaLink="false">http://www.pakintel.com/2007/11/26/the-real-crisis-taming-the-tribal-belt/</guid>
		<description><![CDATA[Casuistic Crisis
The world is fixated on the &#8220;crisis&#8221; in Pakistan spawned by Pres. Gen. Pervez Musharraf&#8217;s imposition of emergency rule.  The media is bombarding us with news that the regime is unstable, the nation is &#8220;plunging into chaos&#8221; and that the country&#8217;s nuclear weapons are at risk &#8212; frankly, nothing could be further from [...]]]></description>
			<content:encoded><![CDATA[<p><a href="http://farm3.static.flickr.com/2369/2067106000_6d6c74ba85_o.jpg" title="Clear and Present Danger" target="_blank" rel="lightbox"><img src="http://farm3.static.flickr.com/2369/2067106000_34bc183297_m.jpg" align="right" height="170" hspace="10" vspace="5" width="240" /></a><strong>Casuistic Crisis</strong><br />
The world is fixated on the &#8220;crisis&#8221; in Pakistan spawned by Pres. Gen. Pervez Musharraf&#8217;s imposition of emergency rule.  The media is bombarding us with news that the regime is unstable, the nation is &#8220;plunging into chaos&#8221; and that the country&#8217;s nuclear weapons are at risk &#8212; frankly, nothing could be further from the truth.  Despite the international outcry, domestic opposition to Musharraf has been nominal; hardly enough to topple his government let alone the current military regime (there is a distinction).</p>
<p>We at the Insider Brief contend that the real, imminent crisis exists in Pakistan&#8217;s current inability to tame and integrate the country&#8217;s northwestern frontier &#8212; also known as the Federally Administered Tribal Areas (FATA) &#8212; which stems from a larger crisis in governance that afflicts the rest of the nation.  The latest symptoms of this failure include the twin bombings in Rawalpindi and ongoing military operations in Swat, the latter of which seek to rollback Islamist forces that have now expanded their reach from the tribal regions into NWFP proper.</p>
<p><strong>Gordian Knot</strong><br />
The Pushtun tribes and people that occupy the tribal belt that straddles the Afghan and Pakistani border have lived in that region with their way of life in times predating Islam and even Jesus Christ.  Every empire and nation that has attempted to enter and impose its rule on those lands has often regretted it &#8212; be it Alexander, the Mughals, the British, and now Pakistan.  Even the British Empire, despite its vast resources and experience in ruling even the unruliest of places, had an incredibly tenuous hold on the region which for the most part remained largely autonomous</p>
<p>Couple this unmanageable region&#8217;s history with a heavy saturation of weapons (there are more guns than people) left over from the Soviet invasion and the throngs of unemployed, well trained and battle hardened jihadist guerillas jointly created by the CIA and ISI during the 1980&#8217;s, and you have the ingredients for what the CIA calls blowback.  Sprinkle in the fact that every Afghan regime since Pakistan&#8217;s inception has challenged the legitimacy of the Durand Line border demarcation that splits these tribal regions down the middle and you have to ask yourself, can Pakistan really claim sovereignty over this region?</p>
<p>It&#8217;s a miracle in itself that President Musharraf managed to pour nearly 100,000 soldiers (~ 2 heavy infantry divisions and 2 infantry divisions) into FATA and the surrounding areas, set up check points, and launch military operations without sparking an all out rebellion.</p>
<p><strong>Cutting the Knot &#8230; with an AK?</strong><br />
<a href="http://www.nytimes.com/2007/11/19/washington/19cnd-policy.html?_r=2&amp;hp=&amp;oref=slogin&amp;adxnnlx=1195438294-8bOxAS4b0bVm9X75t5%20Hfg&amp;pagewanted=all&amp;oref=slogin" target="_blank" title="Looking Beyond the Emergency">The New York Times reported</a> last Sunday that the Pentagon was considering enlisting the help of tribes in Pakistan&#8217;s northwest against Islamist militants.  This strategy mirrors the successful American strategy in Iraq&#8217;s Anbar province but may not be applicable to Pakistan.  Though some tribes view foreign and local Islamist militants as a cancer for the tribal system &#8211; destroying the very system that safeguarded them and from whence they came &#8211; there are some tribes, like the Mehsuds and Aurakzai, that have been defending the very same militants.</p>
<p>Hypothetically speaking, if the US strategy were to work, it presents a double-edged sword.  What happens after the US-armed and financed tribals have rid themselves of the Islamists?  They&#8217;ll likely turn their guns right back on the US, demanding the US withdraw from the region.  It is unlikely that the US will comply.</p>
<p>So then, what is the solution for quelling the violence in FATA, disarming Islamists and bringing the region into the fold?  Does it involve a paradigm shift in the way counterinsurgency operations are carried out?  Does it involve a Marshall Plan for the region with billions of dollars in developmental spending?  Does it mean destroying the tribal system?  They say the lifespan of an insurgency is around a decade, sadly, the struggle for the tribal belt is one that has been ongoing for centuries.</p>
<p>At the Insider Brief, we don&#8217;t pretend to know the answers to these questions, but we do know what doesn&#8217;t work.  The solution for the region as a whole doesn&#8217;t lie in Predator-fired Hellfire missiles or heavy handed tactics.  It doesn&#8217;t lie in blanket clemency for militants either.  The solution must lie somewhere in the middle. For starters, Pakistan and the US should join hands with the same commitment they did near the end of the Cold War, and spend on poverty alleviation and education, not just military supplies and training for the local populace.  One thing must be clear:  <strong>only when you have a hand in bettering someone&#8217;s life can you claim sovereignty over where they live.</strong></p>
<p>As military operations continue in the nation&#8217;s northwest, we intend on bringing you new guest posts and exclusive content aimed at developing a fresh perspective of a region that has perplexed many.  Stay tuned and stay informed.</p>
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