Analysis
At first glance, this was a typical Taliban assassination against an official in the U.S.-backed Afghan government. However, there are two facts to consider. First, this was no ordinary official – this was the brother of President Hamid Karzai. Second, the U.S. is currently engaged in negotiations with the Taliban. The death of Karzai’s brother will undoubtedly complicate those negotiations. Hamid Karzai will be far less likely to come to an accommodation with the Taliban now that they’ve offed his younger brother. Not to mention, Ahmed Wali Karzai was a major asset to his elder brother, who relied on him for maintaining Pashtun support in southern Afghanistan.

So why did the Taliban execute the assassination now? The sleeper agent presumably could have acted at any time, in the recent past or even later on down the road. Why now?

The answer may lie across the border. (Before you start howling conspiracy theory, try to bear with me.)

This past weekend, a frustrated Obama administration announced that it was suspending $800M of military aid to the country. This very public rebuke, following accusations that the murder of Saleem Shahzad was state sanctioned, likely ruffled some feathers in Rawalpindi.

It could be that Pakistan’s military, with its (albeit lessened) influence over the Taliban, prodded the militant group to assassinate Ahmed Wali Karzai. By having him eliminated, Pakistan could have been underhandedly reminding the U.S. that it has the ability to make the U.S.’ life in the region very difficult — and that it may want to reevaluate its recent tact.

OPERATION NEPTUNE’S SPEAR
Here’s the picture that’s been painted for us of Operation Neptune’s Spear (formerly identified as Operation Geronimo):

On April 29th, President Barack Obama approved a special forces raid in Abbottabad, Pakistan to kill Osama bin Laden. On the night of May 2nd (late afternoon May 1st US EST), two Black Hawk helicopters departed from Afghanistan (either Bagram or Jalalabad) for Abbottabad, carrying a team of over two dozen special forces operators from the Navy SEAL’s elite detachment, Team 6. According to the Pakistani Foreign Ministry, the helicopters used “advanced equipment”, terrain hugging techniques and “blind spots” in Pakistani radar coverage to evade detection. Once at their target location, the operation commenced, during which time, one of the helicopters crashed due to a malfunction. (Wreckage from the crashed helicopter indicates that the Black Hawks were modified variants with stealth features and radar absorbing paint.)

One of the two Chinook helicopters that were also in Pakistani airspace to provide backup to the Navy SEAL team, arrived at the scene of the operation following the crash one of the Black Hawks. On completion of the operation, which lasted about 40 minutes, the two helicopters flew to the North Arabian Sea where they landed on the USS Carl Vinson – a U.S. aircraft carrier. The Pakistani army chief and the chief of Pakistani intelligence were informed of the mission by their respective U.S. counterparts shortly after the U.S. helicopters were clear of Abbottabad. Allegedly, Pakistani jets were scrambled before then.

AWARE OF ABBOTTABAD?

The operation lasted 40 minutes, was relatively noisy (people were tweeting about it as it happened) and concluded with the explosion of the inoperable Black Hawk. This was followed by the long transit time of at least 4 hours from Abbottabad to the Arabian Sea, which required travel down the length of Pakistan, passing by six major Pakistan Air Force bases. (The distance from Abbottabad to the Pakistani coast is roughly 740 miles as the crow flies. The top speed of a Black Hawk helicopter is 183 mph. Traveling at a top speed over that distance would take just over four hours.)

It appears impossible that the helicopters, especially the Chinook, which was likely not stealth modified, could go undetected by the Pakistanis under the circumstances.

Could the Americans have been jamming Pakistani radar? Unlikely. An individual intimately familiar with USAF electronic warfare operations informed the Insider Brief that jamming a sovereign nation’s radar systems is technically an act of war. We are told that the best the U.S. could have hoped for in a situation like this was to be granted general autonomy in the region’s airspace by Pakistan. This, however, would imply a degree of cooperation from Pakistan.

Two possible scenarios emerge:

1. The Pakistanis were aware of the operation in advance and had authorized it.
2. The Pakistanis did not have advance notice, but detected the incursions and decided not to engage.

The first scenario can be written off. If the operation was authorized, why would the U.S. dispatch stealth helicopters for the mission? Secondly, if Pakistan had advance knowledge of the operation, the response by the Government of Pakistan wouldn’t be as delayed, confounded or mishandled as it has been. The Pakistan Army only just released a statement to the press nearly five days after the raid.

The second scenario is most likely. On both detecting the raiding helicopters and being informed by the Americans, the Pakistanis likely decided against confrontation (e.g., firing on the Black Hawks or forcing them to land). Avoiding confrontation with the U.S. despite violations of sovereignty has been a policy articulated by the Pakistani military in the past. Last month, the chief of Pakistan’s Air Force stated to the media that despite Pakistan’s ability to shoot down CIA operated Predator drones, Pakistan could not risk escalation or conflict with the U.S. given the United State’s vast technological and quantitative superiority.

With what “facts” that we have, it can be safely reasoned that Pakistan did not have advance knowledge of the operation. The U.S. claim that it acted alone and without authorization is likely accurate. However, the biggest question remains: who in Pakistan, if anyone, knew of Osama Bin Laden’s presence in Abbottabad?

SUMMARY
The first two months of 2010 have brought about a sea change on the ground in Afghanistan and Pakistan.  The U.S. has initiated a surge in both drone strikes and troops (40,000 more boots expected on the ground in Afghanistan) in an attempt to reshape the Afghan war.  Pakistan, many analysts have observed, has had a seeming change of heart, allegedly capturing half of the Taliban’s Quetta Shura including the Taliban’s number two, Mullah Abdul Ghani Baradar.  However, the spate of high profile arrests shouldn’t be construed as a change of heart or a capitulation to American pressure.  Pakistan is betting on itself in a complex game to further its interests in the region.

“WE HOLD ALL THE CARDS”
The following (Afghan) Taliban members have been either killed or captured in Pakistan:

• 01/26/10 – Mullah Abdul Salam – Shadow governor of Kunduz province – Captured – Faisalabad, Pakistan
• 01/26/10 – Mullah Mir Muhammad – Shadow governor of Baghlan province – Captured – Faisalabad, Pakistan
• 02/15/10 – Mullah Abdul Ghani Baradar – Second in command of Afghan Taliban – Captured – Karachi, Pakistan
• 02/18/10 – Mohammed Haqqani – Brother of Sirajuddin Haqqani – Killed – North Waziristan, Pakistan
• 02/20/10 – Maulvi Abdul Kabir – Former shadow governor of Nangarhar – Captured – Nowshera, Pakistan
• 03/03/10 – Agha Jan Mohtasim – Son-in-law to Mullah Omar and Taliban commander – Captured – Karachi, Pakistan
  

According to Christian Science Monitor, other Taliban members allegedly also captured by Pakistan include: Mullah Abdul Qayoum Zakir, who oversees the movement’s military affairs, Mullah Muhammad Hassan, Mullah Ahmed Jan Akhunzada, and Mullah Abdul Raouf.

The U.S. is a distant power that has signaled that it’s aiming to withdraw from the war ravaged nation by July 2011.  The Taliban are Pakistan’s strategic hedge in Afghanistan.  So why on earth has Pakistan decided to turn so forcefully against its (former?) proxy?

The answer is that it hasn’t.

The arrests are part of a larger strategy through which Pakistan is seeking to roll back Indian influence in Afghanistan and revitalize its own influence.  With leverage on both sides of the Afghan conflict (i.e., the U.S. and the Taliban), confidence is running high in the Pakistani establishment right now, with high level INSIDER BRIEF sources stating, “we [Pakistan] hold all the cards.”

On the one hand, Pakistan believes it has convinced Americans that U.S. success is highly dependent on Pakistani cooperation.  In return for cooperation, the U.S. has recognized Pakistani concerns vis-a-vis India in Afghanistan.  Pakistani sources report that this was in part exhibited by the marginalization of the Indians at the Afghan conferences in London and Turkey.

On the other hand, Pakistan has been urging the Taliban to moderate themselves and cooperate towards a post-American set-up in Afghanistan (but not one that was independent of Pakistani considerations).  Pakistan has conveyed this through two means: quiet nudging and arrests.  Of course, the latter has been heavily publicized.  Using its superior human intelligence and murky relationships, Pakistan has identified amenable elements for “collection” (read: arrest) for use in a future dispensation in Afghanistan.  The intent is that the remaining hard-line elements (e.g., those aligned with Al Qaeda) will be sidelined and eliminated.  The strategy may explain Pakistani actions to prevent handover of captured Taliban figures to Afghanistan or the U.S.

INTERPRETING RECENT DEVELOPMENTS
On Friday, February 26th, the Lahore High Court (LHC) barred the government from extraditing captured Afghan Taliban leaders (including Mullah Baradar) abroad.  The ruling came on the heels of a Pakistani decision to hand over top Taliban militants over to Afghanistan.  Some may view the LHC ruling in the context of Pakistani judicial activism that has proven to be a thorn in the side of Pakistani anti-terror efforts.  However, the court decision is likely an example of judicial pliability and not independence.  The Zardari administration can now comfortably deflect American and Afghan pressure under the cover of the LHC ruling.  After all, handing over top Taliban militants over to the Afghan would reduce Pakistan’s leverage in the process and possibly lead to the revelation of some embarrassing links between Pakistan and the Taliban.

That Friday also brought a string of Taliban suicide bombings in Kabul that targeted Indians (9 of the 17 killed were Indian and 12 Indians were also injured).  Two rationales appear to be developing for the attack.  The first is that the Taliban are trying to throw a wrench in recently re-initiated Indo-Pak talks.  The second is that the attacks were coordinated by Pakistan’s intelligence agencies, who in the past have been blamed for previous attacks on the Indian embassy in Kabul.  I believe that there exists a third rationale.  Certain factions in the Taliban, under new found pressure by their former sponsors, may be trying to demonstrate their usefulness to Pakistan by targeting the Indians in Afghanistan as a reminder that they can help counter Indian influence in the country.

Pakistan believes it holds all the cards for success in Afghanistan.  However, a number of factors could possibly ruin Pakistan’s hand.  A highly decentralized Afghan Taliban may not be responsive to calls to reconciliation by Taliban leaders captured in Pakistan far from the fighting.  Or U.S. resolve in Afghanistan may not last and an antagonized Taliban may fail to cooperate or even turn on Pakistan after the Americans leave.  The list goes on.

The chips are on the table.  Let’s see how this hand plays out.

What’s the Rush, Mr. Zardari?
So why the sudden anxiousness on Zardari’s part to move negotiations forward with Sharif and impeach Musharraf? There are two, contrasting explanations. The first is desperation. After his failed attempt to gain control of the ISI as well as ISI efforts to undermine his government (for the purposes of maintaining a political stalemate), Zardari is now attempting to go after Musharraf. President Musharraf still represents the military’s institutional foothold in politics. The second explanation could be that Zardari has received US approval and backing for his actions after potentially convincing the current administration that Musharraf is what stands in the way of effective anti-Taliban operations in Pakistan. The second explanation is less likely however, as it was the current government that immediately and repeatedly sought to negotiate with the “Pakistani Taliban” from a position of weakness.

Regardless of his reasons, Zardari faces a major hurdle – the Army. Despite stepping down as Army Chief, Insider Brief sources report that the Pakistan Army remains very loyal to the President and is willing to go to bat for his political survivial, especially against the likes of Zardari. This brings us to the crux of this post.

The Coming Storm
The weight of recent events, shifting attitudes, and intense internal and external pressure on Pakistan are such that things can no longer continue as they have been. From our perspective at the Insider Brief, something has to give and it will undoubtedly be in the form of radical, tumultuous change in the near-to-medium term. Consider the following:

• The present civilian government (read: Zardari and co.) has picked a needless fight with the Army over the ISI and lost. It is yet again picking a needless fight against President Musharraf; a fight that will ultimately lead to another confrontation with a pro-Musharraf military.
• Insider Brief sources let slip that if things continue on their current trajectory, the military may be forced to (reluctantly) re-take the driver’s seat.
• Insider Brief sources also report that discontent is growing within the Army against its chief, Gen. Ashfaq Kayani. He is increasingly being perceived as an American lackey from within the ranks.
• Pakistan’s government and military have been unable to effectively roll back a raging Taliban-led insurgency in its northwest. This is moving beyond a crisis of governance into a crisis of existence.
• US and US-allied forces are preparing to conduct larger, more overt military action in Pakistan and have already openly admitted to conducting air strikes on Pakistani territory.
• The CIA publicly identified the ISI as having a hand in the recent bombing of the Indian Embassy in Kabul.
• Sources further indicate that there is a common perception within the Pakistani military that the US is colluding with the Indians to foment trouble in Balochistan and Pakistan’s northwest.
• Intermittent hostilities have broken out between India and Pakistan on the Line of Control in Kashmir after 5 years of peace.
• Public discontent is being compounded by a slowing economy and food and oil inflation.

Pretty picture, right? It depicts how unsustainable the current state of affairs is.

Ultimately, we’re witnessing a web of competing interests intersect and conflict in a big way. At the center of it all is the Pakistani military establishment. It currently finds itself in conflict with the US, India, the Pakistani civilian government, insurgents and perhaps even itself. This is no fault of the military’s — this merely reflects the reality that the military is at the center of the Pakistani state. It is the only institution that is capable of holding Pakistan together as the country tears itself apart.

It would behoove the present elected government to work in lockstep with the military, instead of engaging it and other parties in petty power struggles. The reinstatement of sacked judges or Musharraf’s impeachment will not save Pakistan. That will instead be determined by how Pakistanis and their leaders come together as a nation.

Zardari’s Miscalculation
It’s an open secret that Benazir Bhutto’s widower, Asif Ali Zardari, calls the shots in the current government, not Gilani. According to Insider Brief sources, the decision to place the ISI under the Interior Ministry and thereby Interior Minister Rehman Malik, was Zardari’s decision. Sources further state that Zardari miscalculated and did not anticipate the response the decision received. Like a kid with a stick, he prodded too hard only to awaken a nest of (khaki) hornets.

Kayani Intervenes
In our last post, we indicated that Pakistan’s Army Chief, Gen. Ashfaq Kayani, would have to respond forcefully to the government’s decision so as not to appear weak, but also, to defend his turf; the ISI for all practical purposes, answers to the Chief of Army Staff. Insider Brief sources report that the night of the announcement, Kayani personally intervened and ensured that the decision was reversed.

Aftermath
The government’s initial decision should not be contextualized within the framework of US-Pakistani relations. This was not about “reining” in Pakistani intelligence at the behest of the Americans. This was an attempt by Zardari to halt ISI activity against the PPP government in Punjab and gain full control of what is essentially Pakistan’s most powerful “policy” tool. He overplayed his hand against what he perceived was a discredited and demoralized military. Now, he will likely have to face the consequences of increased hostility from the establishment and a possible intensification of the campaign to unseat his government.

With each passing day, a once golden opportunity to turn things around for Pakistan is slipping from the grasp of the Pakistan People’s Party. There’s still time to take a stand, make some bold policy decisions and reverse the atrophy that is nibbling away at the current government. Pakistan can no longer afford more of the same.

The decision is one that is bold, unprecedented and controversial. The ISI (Inter-Services Intelligence) has traditionally fallen under the purview of the military, with Army officers rotating through the agency for two year stints. Many have labeled the ISI as a “state within a state” for its pervasiveness and ability to influence state matters with near complete autonomy. Today’s decision by Gilani and his cabinet marks a major move by the nascent civilian government in the long standing struggle by Pakistan’s civilian/political forces to bring the military establishment under their control. This news also likely corroborates our last post as the move may be in response to military/intelligence discussions over the ouster of his PPP government.

The military will not accept the cabinet decision lying down. Insider Brief sources further report that many ranking military officials have indicated that there will be a coup if Gilani does not back down from his decision. Such a move would not be unprecedented. Many may remember that the last time a civilian government attempted to meddle in military affairs, it ultimately resulted in the coup that brought President Musharraf to power. Much of the anger in the military is being directed towards Interior Minister Rehman Malik, who is widely believed by Pakistan’s intelligence community to have had some affiliation with the CIA. In the eyes of Pakistan intelligence, Malik’s access may severely compromise ISI operational security.

The government’s move has also placed Pakistan’s Chief of Army Staff (COAS), Gen. Ashfaq Kayani, in an awkward position. Since his appointment to COAS, he has been an advocate of extricating the military from overt interference in government affairs and has made a very public effort to support the new government. As opposed to engaging Kayani in a process to alter the balance of power between Rawalpindi and Islamabad, Gilani’s government has acted brashly and resultantly forced Kayani into a corner. If Kayani does not respond forcefully, he will appear weak and lose credibility with his subordinates. The Army Chief will also likely want to respond — after all, the ISI was under his command.

If there is a coup, it will likely be a politically engineered, “soft coup.” This would include the possibility of President Musharraf dismissing the government through powers granted to him in the constitution. An overt military coup is unlikely as it would trigger sanctions, isolate Pakistan internationally and result in a further weakening of already shaky relationship.

The PPP has taken a risky gamble — Prime Minister Gilani may return to Pakistan only to find himself out of a job.

The Why
The news in and of itself should not be surprising, and for multiple reasons. First, the Pakistani military/intelligence establishment has always distrusted and disliked the PPP. Zulfikar Ali Bhutto, Benazir’s father, recognized this and established the Federal Security Force in an attempt to offset the influence of the ISI. The FSF was promptly disbanded after Gen. Zia-ul-Huq’s 1979 coup. On the other hand, Nawaz Sharif is a child of the establishment, promoted and sponsored by Gen. Zia himself.

People may question – what about General Ashfaq Kayani and his stance on political non-interference? The answer and second reason likely lies in the decreasing ability of the military establishment’s inability to control low-to-mid-level personnel as has been demonstrated by the numerous security lapses and leaks that have led to numerous terrorist strikes against sensitive targets.

This brings us to the third reason. Many in Pakistan’s military and intelligence apparatus remain sympathetic to their former proxies as is Nawaz Sharif. Sharif is well liked by Pakistan’s right and religious fundamentalists. His return would likely mark the end to the Pakistan Army’s push in the country’s northwest.

The How
If Pakistani intelligence is truly attempting to engineer Nawaz Sharif’s return, the question is, how do they intend on doing so? The answer may lie in what Insider Brief sources recently intimated to us. In the on going discussions over Zardari, it was mentioned that the last phone call to Benazir Bhutto minutes before her assassination was made by Zardari himself. He reportedly asked Bhutto why she was sitting in the car and not outside as the “people wanted to see her.”

The story could conceivably be true – there’s no doubt that Pakistani intelligence tapped Bhutto and Zardari’s phones – and Zardari did indeed have a lot to gain from her death. But the far likelier explanation could be that Pakistani intelligence is working to build up a story to incriminate or at the very least, implicate Zardari in the court of public opinion.

The other explanation is that these meetings are just indicative of pressure tactics being used by President Musharraf and the “establishment” as they tussle with Zardari and his civilian government over major issues such as the restoration of deposed judges, tackling terrorism and handling Pakistan’s economic issues.

The Lesson
The major take away is that the government must act with surety and decisiveness. A constellation of forces is aligning against the sitting government as it waits idly by, paralyzed by indecision and infighting. If it doesn’t act, the PPP will have passed up a chance to consolidate fresh democratic foundations for Pakistan and the opportunity to tackle issues from a liberal platform.

These closed-door meetings were just warning shots that time is running out.

Today, it did. A suicide bomber detonated himself amidst a 70-member police contingent, minutes before a weekly lawyer’s protest in front of the Lahore High Court. The body count currently stands at 20 officers and 2 civilians dead, with scores wounded.

More Attacks to Follow?
Insider Brief sources further go on to state that Pakistani intelligence was aware of 8 suicide bombers that had entered Lahore to carry out attacks. With this attack, 7 still remain at large. This is despite a major breakthrough in late December (that went unreported) when law enforcement in Sargodha busted a terrorist ring. They recovered 10 tons of explosives and numerous detonators along with a number of terrorists comprising of bomb and suicide jacket makers.

Who Was Targeted?
Accounts vary as to who the bomber intended on attacking. Dawn reports that police were the intended targets wherein the bomber approached police and immediately detonated himself. Individuals familiar with the situation stated that a number of the police officers killed were fresh graduates from the police academy. This wouldn’t be the first attack on security forces or cadets. Suicide bombers in Pakistan have had a history of attacking not only cadets, but seasoned personnel from Pakistan’s military, paramilitary and law enforcement agencies.

CNN, quoting the same or similar sources as Dawn, tells a different story where the bomber approached the site of the impending lawyer’s rally, was stopped by police and then detonated himself. This presents the most interesting angle. A suicide bombing on the police is only tactical in nature. Pakistan’s security forces are rather large in number, and Punjab’s in particular are well funded and well equipped. For jihadists to “waste” scarce resources (e.g. explosives, the bomber, and the device itself) on small scale attacks is not sustainable.

An attack on the lawyer’s rally could potentially be strategic.

The Motives
The average Pakistani currently does not trust the government. Pakistan is rife with speculation, no matter how sensational, that the government (read: President Pervez Musharraf and company) was behind the assassination of Benazir Bhutto.

A sucessful bombing of a lawyer’s rally would immediately have people guessing who was behind the attack. Consider this line of potential reasoning/questions: Jihadists? Too simple an explanation. Was the government behind the attack? Were they looking to intimidate the lawyer’s movement? Were they looking to create an excuse to postpone elections by staging bombings at the onset of Muharram?

In this case, security forces halted the attack, at great cost to themselves, and saved many other lives in the process. Had the bomber succeeded, the government’s credibility would have taken a greater hit in the minds of an increasingly disenchanted and disenfranchised population, looking for excuses to direct their rage at the establishment. The potential outcome could have resulted in another wave of violence, chaos and instability for the Musharraf government — a jihadist’s dream scenario.

Strategies for Security
To counter the growing number of suicide bombers and related instability, the Pakistani goverment must take on a two pronged approach.

First, it must actively direct state resources to target and eliminate both the leadership of jihadist organizations and their bomb making infrastructure. Worthy of study is the Israeli model that has proven incredibly successful over the past decade resulting in a significant decline in suicide bombings within Israel proper.

Aside from having developed superior anti-suicide bomber tactics for security forces (e.g. identifying and eliminating potential suicide bombers), the key to Israeli success has been the targeted assassinations of terrorist leaders and particularly bomb makers. The Israeli’s know full well that making suicide vests and other improvised explosive devices (IEDs) is not a simple task but one that requires immense experience and training. The news is full of “wannabe” bomb makers who regularly blow themselves up as they toy with unstable chemical compounds. Denying terrrorist organizations the ability to produce bombs is the equivalent of taking away an infrantryman’s bullets.

Second, and most importantly, the government of Pakistan must placate its restless population, whose patience has grown thin in light of the present bout of socio-economic deterioration. Countering jihadists is just a stop-gap solution to counter short-term instability and violence. To reinstill stability (if it ever existed) in Pakistan for the long haul, the establishment must find a way to bring all sections of society to the table, create a consensus and instill a sense of participation in government for the populace. The most immediate way to do that is hold free and fair elections; unfortunately, from what our sources tell us, the elections in February will be anything but.

The News: Reuters
With Gen. Ashfaq Kayani’s ascendancy to the role of Chief of Army Staff (COAS), Reuters published an article on Nov. 28th titled, “Five Facts on Pakistan’s New Army Chief – Kayani,” in which they cited the Insider Brief.

On the Web: Watandost
In his latest blog post entitled, “Three New Excellent Blogs on Pakistan,” Hassan Abbas of Watandost recommended three Pakistan-focused blogs to his readers, one of which happened to be the Insider Brief. A published author and former Pakistani government official, Abbas is also a Research Fellow at the Belfer Center’s Project on Managing the Atom and International Security Program. His recognition, like that of the PCR Project, means a lot to us.

On the Radio: The John Batchelor Show
Last night, I appeared on the John Batchelor Show to discuss the rise of Gen. Ashfaq Kayani and President Musharraf’s future. You can listen to my conversation with John by using the player below.

Download audio file (wabc-interview-20071202-pakintel.mp3)
(Download file)

John’s show airs on Sundays, WABC 770AM in New York from 7-10pm EST (webcast), and KFI 640AM in Los Angeles from 7-10pm PST (webcast).

In short: there’s a heck of a lot going on.

When the situation is this fluid, it creates an environment rife with speculation. At the center of all the speculation has been President Musharraf’s relationship with General Kayani. We’d like to clear the air.

Army Reshuffle in March 2008
The Asia Times Online reported that Gen. Ashfaq Kayani was engaging in a major reshuffle of the Pakistan Army, consolidating his hold on power and removing Musharraf loyalists. Many in the news media picked up on this article, reported it and interpreted it as movement by Kayani against Musharraf. However almost immediately after the news came out, DG ISPR Maj. Gen. Waheed Arshad categorically stated that it was false.

One of the first things worth noting is that the Asia Times Online has never been a reliable source of news. Always engaging in some form of sensationalism, its Pakistan correspondent, Syed Saleem Shahzad, has consistently been wrong over the course of the past few years. It is absolutely confounding that respectable news outlets and private intelligence organizations (e.g. Stratfor — whom I have deep respect for, having worked with them in one way or another since 1999) continue to be duped by the Asia Times Online.

That being said, sources report that there is a scheduled reshuffle expected in March 2008 within the army. This reshuffle will likely take into account Pakistan’s post-election scenario, the status of the Musharraf presidency and the progress of military operations in the country’s northwest. In terms of what to expect for a reshuffle of the army’s mid-level officer corps, sources are reporting that Gen. Kayani is looking to replace the ISI provincial heads (Brigadiers) for Sindh and NWFP. Apparently they have been causing some big headaches and potentially may have Islamist leanings.

The Loyalty Question: the Army and Kayani
As speculation has implied, the big question is whether Kayani will stay loyal to Musharraf. We believe he will — for now. Through discussions with our sources, there appears to be a consensus that Gen. Kayani does not have political aspirations of his own. The consensus among our sources also reveals that for the time being, the current grouping of corps commanders remains loyal to Musharraf as well.

Kayani’s decision thus far to not appoint a Vice or Deputy Chief of Army Staff validates the notion that he intends on remaining apolitical. As we’ve stated in the past, a VCOAS/DCOAS is really only appointed when the Chief of Army Staff (COAS) is busy muddling in the country’s governance to the extent that he cannot effectively oversee the army’s day-to-day affairs. (Editor’s Note: VCOAS and DCOAS are the same position, the difference is in the number of stars. A VCOAS is a full 4-star general, while a DCOAS is a full 3-star general.)

So what could sway Kayani’s support away from Musharraf? The two most likely scenarios in which Kayani would withdraw support for Musharraf would involve either:

1. The US government determining that Musharraf is a liability to the war on terror.
2. Kayani determining that Musharraf’s presence in the presidency is either hurting the army’s image or counterproductive towards his goal of transitioning the army out of national affairs.

And though many in Pakistan seek to have the army completely extricate itself from the affairs of governance, at present, it’s not an entirely realistic goal. We argued recently that Musharraf stepping down from the army does not mark a paradigm shift. The Pakistan Army is likely to have a role in governing Pakistan for the near-to-medium term, something that we believe is not sustainable for the army or the nation in the long run. A consensus on a vision for the country’s future must be developed among all of Pakistan’s major power brokers so that the armed forces may finally take on their rightful role as the defenders of Pakistan, not its governors.

Outlook on Musharraf’s Future
We believe that as long as President Musharraf retains the support of Gen. Kayani, he will continue to hold the upper hand on the political scene as the country transitions back to democracy. After all, President Musharraf has no popular support base on which to rely. His constituency was and is the army. Without its support, he’s dead in the water. Working in coordination, Musharraf and Kayani have the potential to be a major force in this transition, setting the agenda for the country’s future. Five years is a long time however, and a lot can happen before then. We have a feeling that regardless of how much support President Musharraf receives from the army, he won’t be completing his second term as president.

Speculation in the media over Kayani’s future role is now hotter than ever, with pundits chiming in from all corners.  Sources have indicated that Taj will not officially be taking over the responsibilities of his new post until next week, and it is then that the decision will be made determining where Kayani will go. At this point in time, it is likely that no one but Pres. Gen. Musharraf knows the real answer, but we certainly have a good idea.

Individuals familiar with the matter stated that in his future role, Kayani would be given oversight of all major intelligence agencies (e.g. the ISI, MI, etc.). Unless Musharraf intends on strengthening the office of the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff (CJCS) and thereby alienate his support base in the army, we can infer that Gen. Kayani will most probably be given the coveted role of Vice Chief of Army Staff (VCOAS); which would immediately translate into Chief of Army Staff (COAS) upon Musharraf’s retirement from the army.

In the meanwhile, Lt. General Tariq Majeed is the growing favorite by many to be the next CJCS.

WHO IS ASHFAQ PARVEZ KAYANI?
The reclusive Gen. Kayani, who often prides himself in how very little others know about him, is about to be thrust into the limelight.

The things that we do know about him reveal him to be a likely favorite of some very important stakeholders, namely President Musharraf, Benazir Bhutto, and the United States.

Kayani is described by many as first and foremost a professional soldier with no political aspirations. In Musharraf’s eyes, this alone, coupled with the fact that he is fiercely loyal the president, makes him the ideal candidate for the next COAS.

An infantryman, he got his start in the famed Baloch Regiment. Kayani also underwent training tours in the United States and still retains links within the US military. He rose to eventually serve Benazir Bhutto as her deputy military secretary during her first stint as prime minister.

His career progressed and he went on to serve as Director General of Military Operations (DGMO). It was during his tenure as DGMO that the intense military standoff of 2001-2002 between Pakistan and India took place. Reportedly, Kayani only slept a few hours a night during that period as he diligently oversaw the army’s mobilization and preparedness on the border.

In September 2003, he was appointed Corps Commander of the powerful X Corps at Rawalpindi. (It was the X Corps that launched the coup of October 1999 that brought Musharraf to power.) As Corps Commander, Kayani was tasked with hunting down the terrorists behind the twin assassination attempts on Musharraf’s life in December 2003. He successfully did so, infiltrating their networks and resultantly was awarded the Hilal-i-Imtiaz or the “Crescent of Excellence,” Pakistan’s second highest civilian award.

Nearly a year later, in October 2004, he was named DG ISI. While occupying the post, Kayani has operated relatively quietly. It was only this year that he appeared on the public’s radar due to his involvement in a number of high profile stories including the president’s negotiations with Benazir Bhutto.

However, nothing is perhaps more telling of Kayani’s apolitical nature than his involvement in President Musharraf’s dismissal of Chief Justice Iftikhar Chaudhry. Kayani was present at the infamous March 2007 meeting that took place between Musharraf and Chief Justice Chaudhry, when the latter was informed that he was suspended. Accounts of that meeting narrated that Kayani was the only one among Musharraf’s aides that did not speak a word. Furthermore, Kayani was also the only one present not to have filed an affidavit against the Chief Justice.

Last but not least, even though he is admittedly not a regular player, Kayani is also president of the Pakistan Golf Federation (PGF). After he’s appointed to his next role in the coming week, the next big question will be: what’s his golf handicap? We’d like to be the first to address that – it’s 18.

MUSHARRAF TO BHUTTO: SHAPE UP
Though not officially ISI chief yet, Nadeem Taj is already tasked with an assignment. Well placed individuals have reported that Taj will be flying to Washington sometime next week to meet with Bhutto, who herself is due to arrive on September 26th. He will be carrying a hardline, Armitagian message with him from Musharraf: “Agree to a deal, or else.”

This news implies a number of things. It first tells us that as of yet, there is no final agreement between Musharraf and Bhutto. It also gives us the impression that Musharraf is anxious to come to an agreement as the time draws near for him to shed his uniform. With the powers of the Presidency and COAS, Musharraf is still negotiating from a position of relative strength. Bhutto may just be biding her time, awaiting for someone with a potential soft spot for her (read: Kayani) to move into the Army House at GHQ. Finally, the meeting’s location – Washington, DC – highlights the continued role that the US is playing in trying to cobble together a coalition of moderate secularists in Pakistan.

The pace of wheeling, dealing, and change is quickening. The situation is as fluid as ever. Stay tuned.

Maj. Gen. Taj is a trustworthy ally of Pres. Gen. Musharraf’s and has been considered by many to be up for a promotion in the coming reshuffle. Taj, once Musharraf’s Military Secretary (MS), has accompanied Musharraf through some of the regime’s most significant events. He was flying with Musharraf on that fateful flight from Sri Lanka on October 12, 1999 when the coup was launched and was also in Musharraf’s car during the assassination attempts of 2003. From MS, he was appointed Director General of Military Intelligence (DGMI) and then moved on to become General Officer Commanding (GOC) Lahore before landing his current role at Kakul.

The question then becomes, what of Gen. Kayani? The media has been rife with speculation about Kayani’s next post, oscillating between Vice Chief of Army Staff (VCOAS) and the largely ceremonial post, Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff (CJCS). Sources have also confirmed that though due to retire in October, Kiyani will most definitely be occupying one of the two aforementioned posts. With Musharraf already having announced through spokespeople that he will be stepping down as Chief of Army Staff (COAS) after being elected President, VCOAS may essentially translate into a direct transition to COAS.

Musharraf’s plans to step out of uniform also indicate that the reshuffle of top Army posts is bound to increase in pace. Word that a new DG ISI is being appointed soon reflects that.

AN EXPOSED JUSTICE
Many are expectantly awaiting another showdown between Pres. Musharraf and the Pakistani Supreme Court, particularly Chief Justice Iftikhar Chaudhry, after Musharraf essentially flipped the top judge the finger and deported Nawaz Sharif. Those waiting for a confrontation won’t have to wait for long – but not because there’s going to be a confrontation.

The same sources privy to government plans have indicated that Chief Justice Chaudhry will likely be leaving office soon (”within a month”) as the government intends on bringing to light Chaudhry’s collaboration with Nawaz Sharif and his role in mitigating Sharif’s return. If presented to the public or courts with even a modicum of credibility, such charges can be damning for Chaudhry, who during and since his campaign to be reinstated, championed the independence of the judiciary.

We’re in for a very interesting ride.