• Maj. Gen. Muhammad Asif – Formerly Pakistan’s Defense Attache in Moscow
• Maj. Gen. Javed Iqbal – Presently posted in Bahawalpur
• Maj. Gen. Raheel Sharif – Formerly General Officer Commanding (GOC) Lahore; presently posted in Lahore

Kayani intends to curtail the powers of the DGMI with the hope that the next general to occupy the position will focus on what his title implies — military intelligence. This should bode well for the progress of the war on terror and settling the unrest in Pakistan’s northwest.

FOOTNOTES:

• President Pervez Musharraf had an op-ed published in the Washington Post on February 22nd. Individuals familiar with the op-ed report that it had initially been submitted to the New York Times for publication but was rejected by paper. The Washington Post was the President’s second choice.
• The News International reported that the former head of the ISI’s political cell, Maj. Gen. (retd.) Ehtesham Zamir, acknowledged his role in rigging the 2002 elections that brought Musharraf’s civilian allies to power. Zamir claims that the orders to rig the election came from Musharraf himself. The timing of the announcement places further pressure on an already beseiged Musharraf who now faces an empowered opposition after last week’s parliamentary elections. Interestingly enough, sources close to Zamir report that he is a very close friend of Aitzaz Ahsan. Coincidence? I think not.

(Editor’s Note: We’ve received numerous requests for an analysis on the post-election scenario; we hope to have one up for Insider Brief readers by the end of this week.)

Our sources have confirmed that Gen. Kayani will be replacing Major General Nadeem Ejaz, the Director General of Military Intelligence (DGMI), after the completion of parliamentary elections. Sources cite that Kayani has been presented with an opportune time to rid himself of Nadeem Ejaz as Ejaz is not only unpopular among the Army’s top brass but also because his 3-year tenure as DGMI is nearing an end. Maj. Gen. Ejaz is well known for the high profile role he played in the ouster of former Chief Justice Iftikhar Chaudhry.

Insider Brief sources go on to further state that Gen. Kayani also intends on clipping the wings of the office of the Director General of Military Intelligence, giving the next general less responsibility and power than in the past.

Replacing Nadeem Ejaz will significantly reduce President Musharraf’s influence in the army and Pakistan’s intelligence apparatus. It will also go a long way in furthering Gen. Kayani’s process of removing the military from national politics and re-directing its efforts towards solely national defense.

Kayani’s task is a daunting one as he essentially seeks to re-engineer the Army’s culture which has been shaped by over 60 years of interference in the country’s governance and national affairs. It will be interesting to see how he balances his goals with the outcome and consequences of today’s parliamentary elections. The Army Chief may be forced to step into the fray and play referee if Pakistan’s political leaders — Musharraf included — get out of hand; an act that would highlight not only the difficulty of his objective but also what we stated in our last post: that for the for the near-to-medium term, the Pakistan Army will continue to have a role to play as the guarantor of the Pakistani state.

ELECTION FOOTNOTES:

• Voting in Pakistan’s parliamentary elections has come to an end. Ballot counting has now begun.
• Election turnout was comparatively low due to fear of violence, which killed at least 9 people today in bombings and shootings.
• Based on results that have started trickling in, projected winners for 3 of the provinces currently stand at:
  • Punjab: PML(N), PPP
  • Sindh: PPP, MQM
  • NWFP: ANP, PML(N) [in Hazara populated districts]
• With projections shaping up the way they are, Pakistan looks to be headed towards a broad coalition government which is the best Musharraf can hope for. In a coalition, the national government will likely be locked in gridlock allowing Musharraf to carry on with his policies unchecked. It will also allow his civilian allies — the PML(Q) — to hold some degree of influence. We’ve been projecting this outcome since October.

Kicked off by the late-Benazir Bhutto, “the lost decade” was capped by the then much-welcomed military coup of President Pervez Musharraf. Nine years later, Musharraf’s tenure, which saw not only economic stabilization but stellar growth alongside unprecedented media liberalization, appears to be nearing its end falteringly.

With the much-anticipated parliamentary elections only days away and the military distancing itself from Musharraf, we are presented with a stark comparison between Pakistan’s military and democratic governments that raises key questions.

Why is it that military governments, who have been so successful at providing good economic management, fallen each time to popular opposition? Why is it that popular civilian leaders always return to power only to bring the country to the brink each time?

The two key variables here are policy and leadership.

Military-led governments have been successful managers of the country, their reigns typically leading to gains in the economy and social indicators, but they fail to provide genuine leadership. Their success in developing the country can be attributed to the technocrats they usher in to provide policy expertise in their respective fields. Yet these technocrats are only good at being policy experts, not politicians. Former Prime Minister Shaukat Aziz is a case-in-point. Despite his corruption free background and immense success in reviving Pakistan’s economy, Aziz was incapable of winning a single seat in Pakistan’s parliament without the patronage of the Chaudhries of Gujrat.

On the other hand, democratically elected governments have enjoyed popular support and provided leadership while actively mismanaging the country and overseeing declines in the economy. Their deficiency was and continues to be sound, consistent policies. Brought to power time and time again on the shoulders of empty rhetoric and patronage, Pakistan’s political parties appear to be forever trapped in the inertia of political in fighting; maintaining their stranglehold on government becomes their raison d’etre, resulting in very little progress.

Pakistan’s democratically elected governments have taught us that democracy alone is not the answer.

Democracy with serious, detailed and substantive policy is.

There needs to be an infusion of policy expertise and a serious commitment towards enacting policy, bridging the gap that has divided military and democratic regimes.

This highlights the major need for consensus among all of Pakistan’s ruling elite. Good policy cannot be applied without everyone on board — that includes the political parties and the military. Many die-hard democrats cringe at the mention of the latter, but the cold truth is that for the near- to medium-term, the military is the guarantor of the Pakistani state, as it has been for the last 60+ years.

If Pakistani civil society does not begin to hold its political parties to higher standards, we will continue to witness the re-enactment of history by the same players, at the risk of wearing down an already decrepit stage.

In addition to military action, sources also report that a major facet of the newfound campaign involves choking off Baitullah’s sources of funding and logistics. This will be done in part by assailing the business interests of the Mehsud tribe from which Baitullah hails. By pursuing the tribe’s assets and businesses, primarily focused in more developed areas such as Karachi, Tank, and Dera Ismail, the Army seeks to indirectly pressure the tribe and show them how self destructive it can be supporting Baitullah.

If history has taught us anything about the Pushtun tribes it’s this: money talks. The Army’s strategy should not only prove effective but also go a long way in driving a wedge between jihadist militants and the tribes that support them. As extremist Islam fast becomes the primary vehicle of Pushtun nationalism in Pakistan, making this wedge permanent is a vital objective in ensuring Pakistan’s territorial integrity.

Pakistani intelligence is also increasingly wary of Indian collusion with Afghan intelligence in fomenting instability along Pakistan’s borders. They consistently point to the presence of six Indian consulates in Afghanistan, four of which are not only close to the Afghan-Pakistan “border” and are in areas where few if any Indians reside. Recent news of resurgent militant Sikh activity in India after years of quiet may be warning shots from Pakistan that it too, can return the favor.

… AND RETREATS.
Pakistan’s Chief of Army Staff, Gen. Ashfaq Kayani, is living up to his reputation as a professional soldier. Sources state that the general has initiated the process of making sweeping changes in organization in the Army. On top of having re-instituted the role of Director General of Planning, the head of what amounts to the Army’s think tank, Kayani is systematically withdrawing the Army from the political arena.Told to us by sources months ago, Gen. Kayani’s directive that all officers abstain from interfering in politics under the threat of court martial has become widely reported. Now, sources have stated that the Army Chief has also directed Military Intelligence (MI) to desist from interfering in politics at all levels.

The big question is now this: when’s the ISI’s turn?

ELECTION ENDNOTES:

1. A senior Pakistani official recently conveyed to the Insider Brief how deeply distraught they were at the current state of affairs in Pakistan and at how President Pervez Musharraf was single mindedly focused on ensuring a pliant parliament to maintain his hold on power. Another senior official from within the ranks of the military stated that it was only a matter of “when, not if,” Gen. Ashfaq Kayani withdrew his support for President Musharraf.
2. Sources have reported that Pakistan People’s Party members informed President Musharraf that the will produced by Asif Zardari was indeed fake and that party officials kept quiet for the sake of capturing the “sympathy” vote in February’s upcoming parliamentary elections. They intend on seeking Zardari’s ouster after elections.
3. Media outlets have widely reported the ongoing dialogue between President Musharraf and Shahbaz Sharif, Nawaz Sharif’s chief lieutenant and younger brother, through common acquaintance Brigadier (retired) Niaz Ahmed. Sources close to Ahmed state that parlays between Musharraf and the younger Sharif are over the creation of an alliance to prevent the rise of the PPP in upcoming elections and that the two will be meeting in Ahmed’s home in London. They also state that there is a strong possibility that a deal has been struck between the two seemingly antagonistic forces. If true, it marks a return to “normalcy” in Pakistan’s constellation of forces: the establishment allied with its usual proxy, the Pakistan Muslim League, against the anti-establishment Pakistan People’s Party.