OPERATION NEPTUNE’S SPEAR
Here’s the picture that’s been painted for us of Operation Neptune’s Spear (formerly identified as Operation Geronimo):

On April 29th, President Barack Obama approved a special forces raid in Abbottabad, Pakistan to kill Osama bin Laden. On the night of May 2nd (late afternoon May 1st US EST), two Black Hawk helicopters departed from Afghanistan (either Bagram or Jalalabad) for Abbottabad, carrying a team of over two dozen special forces operators from the Navy SEAL’s elite detachment, Team 6. According to the Pakistani Foreign Ministry, the helicopters used “advanced equipment”, terrain hugging techniques and “blind spots” in Pakistani radar coverage to evade detection. Once at their target location, the operation commenced, during which time, one of the helicopters crashed due to a malfunction. (Wreckage from the crashed helicopter indicates that the Black Hawks were modified variants with stealth features and radar absorbing paint.)

One of the two Chinook helicopters that were also in Pakistani airspace to provide backup to the Navy SEAL team, arrived at the scene of the operation following the crash one of the Black Hawks. On completion of the operation, which lasted about 40 minutes, the two helicopters flew to the North Arabian Sea where they landed on the USS Carl Vinson – a U.S. aircraft carrier. The Pakistani army chief and the chief of Pakistani intelligence were informed of the mission by their respective U.S. counterparts shortly after the U.S. helicopters were clear of Abbottabad. Allegedly, Pakistani jets were scrambled before then.

AWARE OF ABBOTTABAD?

The operation lasted 40 minutes, was relatively noisy (people were tweeting about it as it happened) and concluded with the explosion of the inoperable Black Hawk. This was followed by the long transit time of at least 4 hours from Abbottabad to the Arabian Sea, which required travel down the length of Pakistan, passing by six major Pakistan Air Force bases. (The distance from Abbottabad to the Pakistani coast is roughly 740 miles as the crow flies. The top speed of a Black Hawk helicopter is 183 mph. Traveling at a top speed over that distance would take just over four hours.)

It appears impossible that the helicopters, especially the Chinook, which was likely not stealth modified, could go undetected by the Pakistanis under the circumstances.

Could the Americans have been jamming Pakistani radar? Unlikely. An individual intimately familiar with USAF electronic warfare operations informed the Insider Brief that jamming a sovereign nation’s radar systems is technically an act of war. We are told that the best the U.S. could have hoped for in a situation like this was to be granted general autonomy in the region’s airspace by Pakistan. This, however, would imply a degree of cooperation from Pakistan.

Two possible scenarios emerge:

1. The Pakistanis were aware of the operation in advance and had authorized it.
2. The Pakistanis did not have advance notice, but detected the incursions and decided not to engage.

The first scenario can be written off. If the operation was authorized, why would the U.S. dispatch stealth helicopters for the mission? Secondly, if Pakistan had advance knowledge of the operation, the response by the Government of Pakistan wouldn’t be as delayed, confounded or mishandled as it has been. The Pakistan Army only just released a statement to the press nearly five days after the raid.

The second scenario is most likely. On both detecting the raiding helicopters and being informed by the Americans, the Pakistanis likely decided against confrontation (e.g., firing on the Black Hawks or forcing them to land). Avoiding confrontation with the U.S. despite violations of sovereignty has been a policy articulated by the Pakistani military in the past. Last month, the chief of Pakistan’s Air Force stated to the media that despite Pakistan’s ability to shoot down CIA operated Predator drones, Pakistan could not risk escalation or conflict with the U.S. given the United State’s vast technological and quantitative superiority.

With what “facts” that we have, it can be safely reasoned that Pakistan did not have advance knowledge of the operation. The U.S. claim that it acted alone and without authorization is likely accurate. However, the biggest question remains: who in Pakistan, if anyone, knew of Osama Bin Laden’s presence in Abbottabad?

In short: there’s a heck of a lot going on.

When the situation is this fluid, it creates an environment rife with speculation. At the center of all the speculation has been President Musharraf’s relationship with General Kayani. We’d like to clear the air.

Army Reshuffle in March 2008
The Asia Times Online reported that Gen. Ashfaq Kayani was engaging in a major reshuffle of the Pakistan Army, consolidating his hold on power and removing Musharraf loyalists. Many in the news media picked up on this article, reported it and interpreted it as movement by Kayani against Musharraf. However almost immediately after the news came out, DG ISPR Maj. Gen. Waheed Arshad categorically stated that it was false.

One of the first things worth noting is that the Asia Times Online has never been a reliable source of news. Always engaging in some form of sensationalism, its Pakistan correspondent, Syed Saleem Shahzad, has consistently been wrong over the course of the past few years. It is absolutely confounding that respectable news outlets and private intelligence organizations (e.g. Stratfor — whom I have deep respect for, having worked with them in one way or another since 1999) continue to be duped by the Asia Times Online.

That being said, sources report that there is a scheduled reshuffle expected in March 2008 within the army. This reshuffle will likely take into account Pakistan’s post-election scenario, the status of the Musharraf presidency and the progress of military operations in the country’s northwest. In terms of what to expect for a reshuffle of the army’s mid-level officer corps, sources are reporting that Gen. Kayani is looking to replace the ISI provincial heads (Brigadiers) for Sindh and NWFP. Apparently they have been causing some big headaches and potentially may have Islamist leanings.

The Loyalty Question: the Army and Kayani
As speculation has implied, the big question is whether Kayani will stay loyal to Musharraf. We believe he will — for now. Through discussions with our sources, there appears to be a consensus that Gen. Kayani does not have political aspirations of his own. The consensus among our sources also reveals that for the time being, the current grouping of corps commanders remains loyal to Musharraf as well.

Kayani’s decision thus far to not appoint a Vice or Deputy Chief of Army Staff validates the notion that he intends on remaining apolitical. As we’ve stated in the past, a VCOAS/DCOAS is really only appointed when the Chief of Army Staff (COAS) is busy muddling in the country’s governance to the extent that he cannot effectively oversee the army’s day-to-day affairs. (Editor’s Note: VCOAS and DCOAS are the same position, the difference is in the number of stars. A VCOAS is a full 4-star general, while a DCOAS is a full 3-star general.)

So what could sway Kayani’s support away from Musharraf? The two most likely scenarios in which Kayani would withdraw support for Musharraf would involve either:

1. The US government determining that Musharraf is a liability to the war on terror.
2. Kayani determining that Musharraf’s presence in the presidency is either hurting the army’s image or counterproductive towards his goal of transitioning the army out of national affairs.

And though many in Pakistan seek to have the army completely extricate itself from the affairs of governance, at present, it’s not an entirely realistic goal. We argued recently that Musharraf stepping down from the army does not mark a paradigm shift. The Pakistan Army is likely to have a role in governing Pakistan for the near-to-medium term, something that we believe is not sustainable for the army or the nation in the long run. A consensus on a vision for the country’s future must be developed among all of Pakistan’s major power brokers so that the armed forces may finally take on their rightful role as the defenders of Pakistan, not its governors.

Outlook on Musharraf’s Future
We believe that as long as President Musharraf retains the support of Gen. Kayani, he will continue to hold the upper hand on the political scene as the country transitions back to democracy. After all, President Musharraf has no popular support base on which to rely. His constituency was and is the army. Without its support, he’s dead in the water. Working in coordination, Musharraf and Kayani have the potential to be a major force in this transition, setting the agenda for the country’s future. Five years is a long time however, and a lot can happen before then. We have a feeling that regardless of how much support President Musharraf receives from the army, he won’t be completing his second term as president.

As part of our continued commitment to bringing our readers exclusive content and multimedia, we have video footage of the retreat ceremony below.

According to sources, Kayani will not be appointing a deputy within the army (read: Vice Chief of Army Staff). The role of VCOAS is not a standard one. In the past, it has been created when the military has been actively engaged in governing the nation, when the COAS could not focus all his energies on the army.

For those of you who are hungry for more information about Kayani, check out our profile of him from September, which includes more exclusive photos of the reclusive general (we even reveal his golf handicap): Gen. Kayani Profile.

Today’s Itinerary:

• 10:00am PST – Changeover Ceremony
• 11:30am PST – Corps Commander Conference
• 6:00pm PST – Retreat Ceremony
• 7:00pm PST – Farewell Dinner for Gen. Pervez Musharraf