OPERATION NEPTUNE’S SPEAR
Here’s the picture that’s been painted for us of Operation Neptune’s Spear (formerly identified as Operation Geronimo):

On April 29th, President Barack Obama approved a special forces raid in Abbottabad, Pakistan to kill Osama bin Laden. On the night of May 2nd (late afternoon May 1st US EST), two Black Hawk helicopters departed from Afghanistan (either Bagram or Jalalabad) for Abbottabad, carrying a team of over two dozen special forces operators from the Navy SEAL’s elite detachment, Team 6. According to the Pakistani Foreign Ministry, the helicopters used “advanced equipment”, terrain hugging techniques and “blind spots” in Pakistani radar coverage to evade detection. Once at their target location, the operation commenced, during which time, one of the helicopters crashed due to a malfunction. (Wreckage from the crashed helicopter indicates that the Black Hawks were modified variants with stealth features and radar absorbing paint.)

One of the two Chinook helicopters that were also in Pakistani airspace to provide backup to the Navy SEAL team, arrived at the scene of the operation following the crash one of the Black Hawks. On completion of the operation, which lasted about 40 minutes, the two helicopters flew to the North Arabian Sea where they landed on the USS Carl Vinson – a U.S. aircraft carrier. The Pakistani army chief and the chief of Pakistani intelligence were informed of the mission by their respective U.S. counterparts shortly after the U.S. helicopters were clear of Abbottabad. Allegedly, Pakistani jets were scrambled before then.

AWARE OF ABBOTTABAD?

The operation lasted 40 minutes, was relatively noisy (people were tweeting about it as it happened) and concluded with the explosion of the inoperable Black Hawk. This was followed by the long transit time of at least 4 hours from Abbottabad to the Arabian Sea, which required travel down the length of Pakistan, passing by six major Pakistan Air Force bases. (The distance from Abbottabad to the Pakistani coast is roughly 740 miles as the crow flies. The top speed of a Black Hawk helicopter is 183 mph. Traveling at a top speed over that distance would take just over four hours.)

It appears impossible that the helicopters, especially the Chinook, which was likely not stealth modified, could go undetected by the Pakistanis under the circumstances.

Could the Americans have been jamming Pakistani radar? Unlikely. An individual intimately familiar with USAF electronic warfare operations informed the Insider Brief that jamming a sovereign nation’s radar systems is technically an act of war. We are told that the best the U.S. could have hoped for in a situation like this was to be granted general autonomy in the region’s airspace by Pakistan. This, however, would imply a degree of cooperation from Pakistan.

Two possible scenarios emerge:

1. The Pakistanis were aware of the operation in advance and had authorized it.
2. The Pakistanis did not have advance notice, but detected the incursions and decided not to engage.

The first scenario can be written off. If the operation was authorized, why would the U.S. dispatch stealth helicopters for the mission? Secondly, if Pakistan had advance knowledge of the operation, the response by the Government of Pakistan wouldn’t be as delayed, confounded or mishandled as it has been. The Pakistan Army only just released a statement to the press nearly five days after the raid.

The second scenario is most likely. On both detecting the raiding helicopters and being informed by the Americans, the Pakistanis likely decided against confrontation (e.g., firing on the Black Hawks or forcing them to land). Avoiding confrontation with the U.S. despite violations of sovereignty has been a policy articulated by the Pakistani military in the past. Last month, the chief of Pakistan’s Air Force stated to the media that despite Pakistan’s ability to shoot down CIA operated Predator drones, Pakistan could not risk escalation or conflict with the U.S. given the United State’s vast technological and quantitative superiority.

With what “facts” that we have, it can be safely reasoned that Pakistan did not have advance knowledge of the operation. The U.S. claim that it acted alone and without authorization is likely accurate. However, the biggest question remains: who in Pakistan, if anyone, knew of Osama Bin Laden’s presence in Abbottabad?

What’s the Rush, Mr. Zardari?
So why the sudden anxiousness on Zardari’s part to move negotiations forward with Sharif and impeach Musharraf? There are two, contrasting explanations. The first is desperation. After his failed attempt to gain control of the ISI as well as ISI efforts to undermine his government (for the purposes of maintaining a political stalemate), Zardari is now attempting to go after Musharraf. President Musharraf still represents the military’s institutional foothold in politics. The second explanation could be that Zardari has received US approval and backing for his actions after potentially convincing the current administration that Musharraf is what stands in the way of effective anti-Taliban operations in Pakistan. The second explanation is less likely however, as it was the current government that immediately and repeatedly sought to negotiate with the “Pakistani Taliban” from a position of weakness.

Regardless of his reasons, Zardari faces a major hurdle – the Army. Despite stepping down as Army Chief, Insider Brief sources report that the Pakistan Army remains very loyal to the President and is willing to go to bat for his political survivial, especially against the likes of Zardari. This brings us to the crux of this post.

The Coming Storm
The weight of recent events, shifting attitudes, and intense internal and external pressure on Pakistan are such that things can no longer continue as they have been. From our perspective at the Insider Brief, something has to give and it will undoubtedly be in the form of radical, tumultuous change in the near-to-medium term. Consider the following:

• The present civilian government (read: Zardari and co.) has picked a needless fight with the Army over the ISI and lost. It is yet again picking a needless fight against President Musharraf; a fight that will ultimately lead to another confrontation with a pro-Musharraf military.
• Insider Brief sources let slip that if things continue on their current trajectory, the military may be forced to (reluctantly) re-take the driver’s seat.
• Insider Brief sources also report that discontent is growing within the Army against its chief, Gen. Ashfaq Kayani. He is increasingly being perceived as an American lackey from within the ranks.
• Pakistan’s government and military have been unable to effectively roll back a raging Taliban-led insurgency in its northwest. This is moving beyond a crisis of governance into a crisis of existence.
• US and US-allied forces are preparing to conduct larger, more overt military action in Pakistan and have already openly admitted to conducting air strikes on Pakistani territory.
• The CIA publicly identified the ISI as having a hand in the recent bombing of the Indian Embassy in Kabul.
• Sources further indicate that there is a common perception within the Pakistani military that the US is colluding with the Indians to foment trouble in Balochistan and Pakistan’s northwest.
• Intermittent hostilities have broken out between India and Pakistan on the Line of Control in Kashmir after 5 years of peace.
• Public discontent is being compounded by a slowing economy and food and oil inflation.

Pretty picture, right? It depicts how unsustainable the current state of affairs is.

Ultimately, we’re witnessing a web of competing interests intersect and conflict in a big way. At the center of it all is the Pakistani military establishment. It currently finds itself in conflict with the US, India, the Pakistani civilian government, insurgents and perhaps even itself. This is no fault of the military’s — this merely reflects the reality that the military is at the center of the Pakistani state. It is the only institution that is capable of holding Pakistan together as the country tears itself apart.

It would behoove the present elected government to work in lockstep with the military, instead of engaging it and other parties in petty power struggles. The reinstatement of sacked judges or Musharraf’s impeachment will not save Pakistan. That will instead be determined by how Pakistanis and their leaders come together as a nation.

The News: Reuters
With Gen. Ashfaq Kayani’s ascendancy to the role of Chief of Army Staff (COAS), Reuters published an article on Nov. 28th titled, “Five Facts on Pakistan’s New Army Chief – Kayani,” in which they cited the Insider Brief.

On the Web: Watandost
In his latest blog post entitled, “Three New Excellent Blogs on Pakistan,” Hassan Abbas of Watandost recommended three Pakistan-focused blogs to his readers, one of which happened to be the Insider Brief. A published author and former Pakistani government official, Abbas is also a Research Fellow at the Belfer Center’s Project on Managing the Atom and International Security Program. His recognition, like that of the PCR Project, means a lot to us.

On the Radio: The John Batchelor Show
Last night, I appeared on the John Batchelor Show to discuss the rise of Gen. Ashfaq Kayani and President Musharraf’s future. You can listen to my conversation with John by using the player below.

Download audio file (wabc-interview-20071202-pakintel.mp3)
(Download file)

John’s show airs on Sundays, WABC 770AM in New York from 7-10pm EST (webcast), and KFI 640AM in Los Angeles from 7-10pm PST (webcast).

We at the Insider Brief contend that the real, imminent crisis exists in Pakistan’s current inability to tame and integrate the country’s northwestern frontier — also known as the Federally Administered Tribal Areas (FATA) — which stems from a larger crisis in governance that afflicts the rest of the nation. The latest symptoms of this failure include the twin bombings in Rawalpindi and ongoing military operations in Swat, the latter of which seek to rollback Islamist forces that have now expanded their reach from the tribal regions into NWFP proper.

Gordian Knot
The Pushtun tribes and people that occupy the tribal belt that straddles the Afghan and Pakistani border have lived in that region with their way of life in times predating Islam and even Jesus Christ. Every empire and nation that has attempted to enter and impose its rule on those lands has often regretted it — be it Alexander, the Mughals, the British, and now Pakistan. Even the British Empire, despite its vast resources and experience in ruling even the unruliest of places, had an incredibly tenuous hold on the region which for the most part remained largely autonomous

Couple this unmanageable region’s history with a heavy saturation of weapons (there are more guns than people) left over from the Soviet invasion and the throngs of unemployed, well trained and battle hardened jihadist guerillas jointly created by the CIA and ISI during the 1980′s, and you have the ingredients for what the CIA calls blowback. Sprinkle in the fact that every Afghan regime since Pakistan’s inception has challenged the legitimacy of the Durand Line border demarcation that splits these tribal regions down the middle and you have to ask yourself, can Pakistan really claim sovereignty over this region?

It’s a miracle in itself that President Musharraf managed to pour nearly 100,000 soldiers (~ 2 heavy infantry divisions and 2 infantry divisions) into FATA and the surrounding areas, set up check points, and launch military operations without sparking an all out rebellion.

Cutting the Knot … with an AK?
The New York Times reported last Sunday that the Pentagon was considering enlisting the help of tribes in Pakistan’s northwest against Islamist militants. This strategy mirrors the successful American strategy in Iraq’s Anbar province but may not be applicable to Pakistan. Though some tribes view foreign and local Islamist militants as a cancer for the tribal system – destroying the very system that safeguarded them and from whence they came – there are some tribes, like the Mehsuds and Aurakzai, that have been defending the very same militants.

Hypothetically speaking, if the US strategy were to work, it presents a double-edged sword. What happens after the US-armed and financed tribals have rid themselves of the Islamists? They’ll likely turn their guns right back on the US, demanding the US withdraw from the region. It is unlikely that the US will comply.

So then, what is the solution for quelling the violence in FATA, disarming Islamists and bringing the region into the fold? Does it involve a paradigm shift in the way counterinsurgency operations are carried out? Does it involve a Marshall Plan for the region with billions of dollars in developmental spending? Does it mean destroying the tribal system? They say the lifespan of an insurgency is around a decade, sadly, the struggle for the tribal belt is one that has been ongoing for centuries.

At the Insider Brief, we don’t pretend to know the answers to these questions, but we do know what doesn’t work. The solution for the region as a whole doesn’t lie in Predator-fired Hellfire missiles or heavy handed tactics. It doesn’t lie in blanket clemency for militants either. The solution must lie somewhere in the middle. For starters, Pakistan and the US should join hands with the same commitment they did near the end of the Cold War, and spend on poverty alleviation and education, not just military supplies and training for the local populace. One thing must be clear: only when you have a hand in bettering someone’s life can you claim sovereignty over where they live.

As military operations continue in the nation’s northwest, we intend on bringing you new guest posts and exclusive content aimed at developing a fresh perspective of a region that has perplexed many. Stay tuned and stay informed.