We at the Insider Brief have refrained from chiming in on the issue because there has been far too much disinformation and sensationalism out there clouding the actual story and underlying events. As more information has become available to us, we will briefly try to make heads or tails of the situation in Islamabad.

Our sources report that anxiously waiting Pakistan-watchers can likely expect some major news on Monday. The last time our sources told us to expect “major news,” Musharraf shed his uniform; this time may be a little different. We’re hesitant to speculate that Musharraf will resign due to what we’ve been hearing. The level of leaks and “inside news” emerging from Pakistani and American papers alike is unprecedented – and for good reason. Sources further report that a thorough disinformation campaign is being carried out by Pakistani intelligence agencies (“lafafa” journalism anyone?).

We believe that the campaign may be an attempt to focus the attention of Pakistanis and foreign governments towards the prospect of Musharraf’s resignation, away from the idea that he may be planning something altogether different. Based off chatter we’ve picked up on, we believe that any alternate plans being chalked up by Musharraf and the establishment may relate to the repeal of the National Reconciliation Order (NRO) that absolved the likes of Asif Zardari and Nawaz Sharif of their sins, fabricated or otherwise.

Our rationale is based off the fact that Musharraf allowed for the return and political participation of the late Bhutto, and to some degree the Sharifs, with the understanding that they would play by the rules laid out by the establishment. By pursuing Musharraf’s impeachment, they crossed the line in the sand. Now if Musharraf must go, he will pursue mutually assured destruction, bringing the coalition government down with him.

Ultimately, even if Musharraf does go, it’s of little consequence. As president, his constitutional powers are largely ceremonial – for whatever the constitution’s worth.

WHAT WE DO KNOW
The tactics and means involved in the attack make us believe with near certainty that they were carried out by Muslim extremists. Suicide bombings have not been the modus operandi for any of Pakistan’s more politically motivated organizations or those of insurgent tribes (e.g. Baloch nationalists).

The investigations being conducted right now are by and large a police affair though intelligence agencies are also heavily involved and coordinating efforts. My sources close to law enforcement investigations have revealed the following findings:

• There was only one suicide bomber. Though multiple severed heads have been found at the killing grounds in Karachi, there was only one “striker sleeve” found. A striker sleeve is the mechanism that the suicide bomber manually pulls to detonate the bomb.
• The bomber was a Muslim extremist. In addition to the mode of attack (suicide bombing), the actual mechanism – manual usage of a striker sleeve – hints to authorities that the bomber was an Islamist. Prior attacks by Muslim extremist groups in Pakistan have used the exact same mechanism.
• No IEDs used. When improvised explosive devices (IEDs) are planted, their explosions leave craters/holes in the ground. None were found at the scene.
• No car bombs used. Initial surveys indicate that there were no car bombs used. Authorities investigating have observed that all cars at the site were blown inward, not outward, the latter of which would indicate a car bomb.
• No grenade used. The media is widely reporting that the initial blast was a grenade. Sources have said that there were no signs of a grenade being used in terms of evidence found at the scene. They do however admit that a great deal of evidence was likely destroyed in the confusion and panic that ensued after the blasts.

Initial findings that no grenades or IEDs were used, leaves a glaring question – what caused the first blast? Details of the actual attack will continue to become available as investigations progress, but an even bigger question remains – who organized and funded the attackers?

WHO DONE IT?
A number of conspiracy theories have been floating around, particularly one in which some say Benazir Bhutto was behind the bombings as a means of boosting her own popularity – this is very unlikely. The consensus among authorities and officials in the government is that the bombing was too close for comfort and that Benazir could have legitimately lost her life in the process.

Bhutto did however announce that she had provided President Musharraf with a letter naming three individuals whom she believes were behind the attack. A well placed source revealed that the three named were:

1. Brig (retd.) Ejaz Shah - Intelligence Bureau (IB) Chief
2. Ijaz-ul-Haq - Religious Affairs Minister and son of the late dictator, Zia-ul-Huq, who hanged Bhutto’s father.
3. The National Accountability Bureau (NAB) official who was heading up the investigation into Bhutto’s alleged corruption scandals

The Ijaz-ul-Haq and the NAB official’s inclusion on the list has led many in the government to brush off Bhutto’s allegations as politically motivated. But the mention of Ejaz Shah is always both interesting and controversial.

A retired army brigadier, Ejaz Shah is head of Pakistan’s Intelligence Bureau (IB) which falls under the purview of the Interior Ministry. He is also known to be a close friend of Musharraf’s who engineered the electoral rise of the Chaudhry cousins who now head up Pakistan’s king’s party, the PML(Q). By taking a swipe at Shah, Bhutto may be looking to weaken the Chaudhries by taking aim at their chief sponsor.

There is a flip side though. Ejaz Shah may have very well felt threatened by the return of Bhutto as it endangered the Chaudhries’ role in power and thereby his influence in government. Recently, one top official told me, “Ejaz Shah is more sincere to the Chaudhries than he is to Musharraf.” For some time now, there have been some very negative undercurrents flowing in the establishment against the unsavory Ejaz Shah.

I had also reported a month ago in “Benazir Makes a Date” that some sources were speculating that the Chaudhries would likely seek to assassinate Bhutto upon her return. Though both Shah and the Chaudhries have a lot to lose with Bhutto’s return, their roles in the Karachi blasts are highly speculative. This information is provided here for you to make your own informed decision. Plus it’s important to keep in mind that this attack boosted Bhutto’s popularity; Ejaz Shah and the Chaudhries would have known this. With the level of influence and resources they have at their command, they would have been able to ensure an attack large enough to effectively eliminate Bhutto.

Many in the establishment are convinced that these attacks were entirely organized, funded and executed by the Taliban/Al-Qaeda nexus. They have the means, motivation and resources to see this sort of operation through from start to finish.

MORE ATTACKS?
Some lower level intelligence sources on the ground have stated that chatter in Islamist and “Taliban” circles indicates that there are more attacks to come. They’ve heard that militants planned on welcoming Benazir Bhutto with a “21 blast salute” of which they say three blasts have already been executed. They claim that there were three blasts in Karachi, not two as has almost been universally reported. This makes us doubt the veracity of these claims but there is always the possibility that the third bomb may have failed to go off.

Bhutto’s return has proven to be explosive in the most literal of senses. The terrorist attack in Karachi is the largest in Pakistan’s history. If there were ever a time for the forces of moderation to band together against extremism – it would be now.

DECEITFUL DEALINGS EXPOSED?
The Jeddah visit proves to be a very interesting development especially when viewed in the context of the “chatter” that we’ve been picking up on from some of our sources. We’ve consistently heard over the last week that President Musharraf, having won his re-election bid with the tacit support of Benazir Bhutto, is abandoning his deal with her. He is allegedly banking on the Supreme Court to strike down the National Reconciliation Ordinance (NRO) which grants Bhutto, among others, amnesty from pending criminal charges. And while the delegitimized Bhutto will not be returning to Pakistan, Nawaz Sharif will. At the time, this scenario was both highly speculative and implausible for many reasons and as a result, we left it unreported.

The first mention of this potential outcome came shortly after Pakistan Muslim League (Q) president, Chaudhry Shujaat Hussain, appeared at a news conference with Prime Minister Shaukat Aziz early last week saying that the NRO was a ploy and that Bhutto had lost at a political game. Though some knowledgeable individuals claimed that Hussain had been told by Musharraf to say what he did, it was far more likely that the comments reflected an attempt to throw a wrench in the Musharraf-Bhutto deal. It was reasoned that the Chaudhry cousins, who campaigned hard for Musharraf during the recent presidential elections, were trying equally hard to maintain their relevancy.

A few days later however, Musharraf made the suggestion during a TV interview that Bhutto delay her return. This, despite an almost immediate rejection of the idea from Bhutto, coupled with news of the Jeddah trip, led us to question whether there was any credence to what we had been hearing.

COMPULSIONS FOR MOHTARMA AND MUSHARRAF
Having re-evaluated our position, the aforementioned scenario forecast by some of our sources still remains improbable, though not as speculative, as the Supreme Court has agreed to review the NRO.

There is one major reason Musharraf cannot abandon a deal with Bhutto – the United States. The US has a high degree of vested interest in seeing the Musharraf-Bhutto deal come to fruition and has spent a great deal of political capital trying to make it happen. If Musharraf hopes to maintain the continued support of the US government — a major prop for his regime — he must remain committed to a power sharing agreement with Bhutto. There have already been some signs a la State Department commentary signaling that the American government may be distancing itself from Musharraf.

Bhutto on the other hand cannot afford to not return to Pakistan on October 18th as we’ve stated in the past. This is Bhutto’s last chance to return to power and redeem herself. If this window of opportunity closes, she will be relegated in history as yet another failed ruler in Pakistan’s long line of over-hyped disappointments. For her credibility to stay in tact, she must return to Pakistan on the 18th regardless of whether or not the Supreme Court strikes down the NRO.

A FRAGMENTED FRAMEWORK
So where does the Jeddah visit fit into all of this? The delegation likely flew to Jeddah to discuss with Nawaz Sharif the terms of his and/or Shahbaz Sharif’s return to Pakistan. Since his deportation back to Saudi Arabia, the Saudis have kept Sharif on a short leash. If he hopes to leave Saudi Arabia, it will have to be with Musharraf’s consent.

One may question what incentive Musharraf has to allow either of the Sharif brothers to return to Pakistan. The truth is that though Musharraf is beholden to the Americans to make a deal with Bhutto, he doesn’t have to guarantee that she or anyone else is all that powerful. By forcing the PPP and PML(Q) into a coalition government all the while re-activating the PML(N) through the return of its leadership, Musharraf would be creating a fractured political environment with multiple, nearly co-equal players. Under the probable guise of national reconciliation, he would effectively be neutralizing the Chaudhry’s, the Sharif’s and Bhutto by playing them off one another. The very fact that the Jeddah visit was made by Army officials and not civilian political operatives makes us believe that the Chaudhry’s were not to have any say in or knowledge of negotiations with Sharif.

On the surface, it may appear as though Musharraf is conceding power to the country’s politicians, but the reality is that he’s ensuring, with the Army’s backing, that he will remain the single most powerful player in Pakistani politics.

How the Supreme Court acts in the coming days is anyone’s guess. One thing is certain though – Musharraf is proving to be a very deft politician.

Nawaz Sharif’s highly anticipated return from exile on September 10th very quickly dissipated into an anti-climactic return to exile.

In the wake of his deportation, Benazir Bhutto has announced that after nearly a decade in self-imposed exile, she herself will be returning to Pakistan on October 18th. The government has responded by saying she is welcome back but will have to face the corruption charges that await her at home.

Will Benazir Bhutto hold firm to her October 18th arrival date or will she back track as she’s done in the past?

INSIGHT INTO THE DEAL
By very publicly declaring a formal date of return, Bhutto has no choice but to return as announced unless she’s willing to take a severe hit to her credibility and popularity. An astute politician, Bhutto wouldn’t risk announcing a return date, let alone a return, unless she knew it was a safe bet. This alone leads us to believe that Bhutto is confident in the progress of any negotiations between herself and Musharraf.

We’re also inclined to believe that the timing of Bhutto’s return indicates that her and Musharraf have already come to some sort of initial accomodation. Musharraf’s term as President officially ends November 15th, but government officials have stated that Musharraf would be seeking re-election sometime between September 15th and October 15th. Not incoincidentally, Bhutto’s arrival steers clear of that period, allowing Musharraf to focus on being re-elected. These facts, coupled with Mushahid Hussain’s comments that Musharraf will “doff” his uniform sometime after re-election, reveal that perhaps Bhutto has good reason to be confident.

However, there remain some major hurdles between herself and the premiership. Sources in my last post mentioned both the two-term limit for Prime Ministers and the remaining corruption charges as major sticking points in negotiations for a power-sharing agreement. The government’s response, that Bhutto will have to face pending charges upon her return, reinforced that these sticking points still exist. It also represented some serious posturing on Musharraf’s part since Bhutto will be unable to contest elections for any parliamentary seat while there are open charges against her. Knowing the speed at which cases are dispensed in Pakistan and with elections looming, Bhutto may be forced to make some major concessions to Musharraf in order to secure a pardon. Whether Musharraf is willing to grant a pardon at all is another question.

But if Musharraf was willing to drop all charges, a third term for Bhutto as Prime Minister would still require amending the constitution, something the PPP itself cannot undertake alone, either now or even after the next round of parliamentary elections. Enter the “King’s Party” – the PML-Q. With the combined voting power of the PPP and the PML-Q, a constitutional amendment suddenly becomes viable. It additionally raises the specter of a coalition government.

My sources had stated that Musharraf was not about to abandon his “allies” in the PML-Q, notably the Chaudhry cousins. I interpreted this to imply that there was a possibility of some sort of watered down coalition government between the PML-Q and PPP. That interpretation is gaining increased traction as Dawn reported today that Musharraf had directed the PML to hold direct talks with the PPP over a post-election power-sharing “formula.” It will be interesting to witness how the dynamic between the Chaudhry’s and Bhutto unfolds, as neither likely wants to work with the other.

With PPP requests for the import of armored transport for Bhutto declined by customs officials, some well connected individuals have omniously speculated that the Chaudhry’s may seek to assassinate Bhutto. We hope that these speculations remain just that – speculations.

Assassination plots, negotiations, and sticking points aside, there remains another major irritant for a final deal – Nawaz Sharif’s failed return.

SHARIF’S MONKEY WRENCH
Hoping to show up Bhutto, Nawaz Sharif elected to return to Pakistan before her, gambling that Musharraf would not risk another confrontation with the Supreme Court of Pakistan by deporting him. He gambled wrong and was deported to Saudi Arabia. In the process, he threw a major wrench in Musharraf’s plans.

First, he created the potential for another show down between Musharraf and the Supreme Court as the latter decides whether the Musharraf government is to be held in contempt of court. Secondly, he made it increasingly difficult for Bhutto to strike a formal accord with Musharraf without damaging her public image. This was exacerbated by the United States’ perceived role in both the deportation of Sharif and the deal between Bhutto and Musharraf.

We don’t think Nawaz Sharif intended for all this to happen – he’s not that smart. Had he planned for all this, he wouldn’t have ended up in Saudi Arabia where his movement and activities are severely limited. The worst Sharif likely expected was that he would end up jailed in Attock Fort after which the courts or public outcry would grant him reprieve.

Had Sharif shown some patience and political maturity (lacking in Pakistan), he would have waited for Bhutto to return or returned with her, making it very difficult for Musharraf to show him the way back to exile without utterly compromising Bhutto’s public standing.

UNHAPPILY EVER AFTER?
Ultimately, we foresee that Musharraf and Bhutto will successfully achieve a power-sharing agreement. We question however, whether the deal will translate into a stable polity, sustainable development, or democracy.