Analysis
At first glance, this was a typical Taliban assassination against an official in the U.S.-backed Afghan government. However, there are two facts to consider. First, this was no ordinary official – this was the brother of President Hamid Karzai. Second, the U.S. is currently engaged in negotiations with the Taliban. The death of Karzai’s brother will undoubtedly complicate those negotiations. Hamid Karzai will be far less likely to come to an accommodation with the Taliban now that they’ve offed his younger brother. Not to mention, Ahmed Wali Karzai was a major asset to his elder brother, who relied on him for maintaining Pashtun support in southern Afghanistan.

So why did the Taliban execute the assassination now? The sleeper agent presumably could have acted at any time, in the recent past or even later on down the road. Why now?

The answer may lie across the border. (Before you start howling conspiracy theory, try to bear with me.)

This past weekend, a frustrated Obama administration announced that it was suspending $800M of military aid to the country. This very public rebuke, following accusations that the murder of Saleem Shahzad was state sanctioned, likely ruffled some feathers in Rawalpindi.

It could be that Pakistan’s military, with its (albeit lessened) influence over the Taliban, prodded the militant group to assassinate Ahmed Wali Karzai. By having him eliminated, Pakistan could have been underhandedly reminding the U.S. that it has the ability to make the U.S.’ life in the region very difficult — and that it may want to reevaluate its recent tact.

Two months ago, Pakistan’s Minister for Minorities, Shahbaz Bhatti, was also gunned down for demanding changes to Pakistan’s draconian blasphemy laws.  People pondered, “Well, why did he leave home without his security detail?  Didn’t he see what they did to Taseer?”

Last month, the Supreme Court acquitted five men accused of publicly gang-raping Mukhtar Mai on the orders of a tribal council.  The media asked, “Well, why did she file an appeal to begin with?  Didn’t she know she’d lose?”

All three cases featured innocent victims suffering cruel injustice.  All three cases featured Pakistani society’s propensity to blame victims.  How do we explain societal victim blaming in Pakistan?

A social worker will tell you that individuals victim blame because it feels too scary to embrace the reality that good people can get hurt, raped, or killed when they’ve done nothing wrong.  It’s a frightening prospect to place all the responsibility on the perpetrator because that means that you, as an individual, are powerless to prevent harm to yourself.  So in order to preserve a sense of self-safety, individuals lay blame on victims.  The victim’s behavior is what led to the harm.  If we don’t act like the victim, then harm won’t come to us.

The individual response ultimately translates to an intentional and conscious distortion of reality.  The individual is choosing to alter his or her perception of reality to put them at ease; so they don’t have to be afraid.

That is why Pakistanis victim blame.

Victim blaming absolves society of reality and in turn, responsibility for the ills that befall others.  What burden does society bear when the victim is to blame?

This refusal to embrace reality and take responsibility also manifests itself in the widespread traction of conspiracy theories in Pakistan.  The Taliban bomb a Pakistani market?  No, no, it must be Indian agents giving the Taliban a bad name.  Baloch insurgency on the rise?  No, no, it must be the Americans trying to sabotage the Chinese in Gwadar.

These types of conspiracy theories, coupled with the reality disconnect of victim blaming, have impaired the ability of society to engage in rational public discourse.  Just pick up a newspaper or flip on a television.  See for yourself.

Pakistan is a nation rife with problems.  Daily life is full of injustices big and small.  Life is cheap.  Crime is growing.  Socio-economic progress is nonexistent.  Misery is casting its net wider and wider with every new natural disaster and act of terror.  It’s not surprising that Pakistani society seeks escape from reality and responsibility.

There are glimmers of hope though, because Pakistani society is of course, also endowed with great strengths.  There was an outpouring of generosity from ordinary Pakistanis for their compatriots ravaged by last year’s floods.  But then again, conspiracies also swirled that India caused the devastating flooding.

The buck needs to stop somewhere.  If Pakistanis don’t begin to take ownership of the problems that afflict their society, they risk being subsumed by a flood of reality from which there may be no recovery.

OPERATION NEPTUNE’S SPEAR
Here’s the picture that’s been painted for us of Operation Neptune’s Spear (formerly identified as Operation Geronimo):

On April 29th, President Barack Obama approved a special forces raid in Abbottabad, Pakistan to kill Osama bin Laden. On the night of May 2nd (late afternoon May 1st US EST), two Black Hawk helicopters departed from Afghanistan (either Bagram or Jalalabad) for Abbottabad, carrying a team of over two dozen special forces operators from the Navy SEAL’s elite detachment, Team 6. According to the Pakistani Foreign Ministry, the helicopters used “advanced equipment”, terrain hugging techniques and “blind spots” in Pakistani radar coverage to evade detection. Once at their target location, the operation commenced, during which time, one of the helicopters crashed due to a malfunction. (Wreckage from the crashed helicopter indicates that the Black Hawks were modified variants with stealth features and radar absorbing paint.)

One of the two Chinook helicopters that were also in Pakistani airspace to provide backup to the Navy SEAL team, arrived at the scene of the operation following the crash one of the Black Hawks. On completion of the operation, which lasted about 40 minutes, the two helicopters flew to the North Arabian Sea where they landed on the USS Carl Vinson – a U.S. aircraft carrier. The Pakistani army chief and the chief of Pakistani intelligence were informed of the mission by their respective U.S. counterparts shortly after the U.S. helicopters were clear of Abbottabad. Allegedly, Pakistani jets were scrambled before then.

AWARE OF ABBOTTABAD?

The operation lasted 40 minutes, was relatively noisy (people were tweeting about it as it happened) and concluded with the explosion of the inoperable Black Hawk. This was followed by the long transit time of at least 4 hours from Abbottabad to the Arabian Sea, which required travel down the length of Pakistan, passing by six major Pakistan Air Force bases. (The distance from Abbottabad to the Pakistani coast is roughly 740 miles as the crow flies. The top speed of a Black Hawk helicopter is 183 mph. Traveling at a top speed over that distance would take just over four hours.)

It appears impossible that the helicopters, especially the Chinook, which was likely not stealth modified, could go undetected by the Pakistanis under the circumstances.

Could the Americans have been jamming Pakistani radar? Unlikely. An individual intimately familiar with USAF electronic warfare operations informed the Insider Brief that jamming a sovereign nation’s radar systems is technically an act of war. We are told that the best the U.S. could have hoped for in a situation like this was to be granted general autonomy in the region’s airspace by Pakistan. This, however, would imply a degree of cooperation from Pakistan.

Two possible scenarios emerge:

1. The Pakistanis were aware of the operation in advance and had authorized it.
2. The Pakistanis did not have advance notice, but detected the incursions and decided not to engage.

The first scenario can be written off. If the operation was authorized, why would the U.S. dispatch stealth helicopters for the mission? Secondly, if Pakistan had advance knowledge of the operation, the response by the Government of Pakistan wouldn’t be as delayed, confounded or mishandled as it has been. The Pakistan Army only just released a statement to the press nearly five days after the raid.

The second scenario is most likely. On both detecting the raiding helicopters and being informed by the Americans, the Pakistanis likely decided against confrontation (e.g., firing on the Black Hawks or forcing them to land). Avoiding confrontation with the U.S. despite violations of sovereignty has been a policy articulated by the Pakistani military in the past. Last month, the chief of Pakistan’s Air Force stated to the media that despite Pakistan’s ability to shoot down CIA operated Predator drones, Pakistan could not risk escalation or conflict with the U.S. given the United State’s vast technological and quantitative superiority.

With what “facts” that we have, it can be safely reasoned that Pakistan did not have advance knowledge of the operation. The U.S. claim that it acted alone and without authorization is likely accurate. However, the biggest question remains: who in Pakistan, if anyone, knew of Osama Bin Laden’s presence in Abbottabad?

–

12:09AM CST / 10:09AM PST: Allegedly, the entire city of Abbottabad was without electricity during the operation.  Though load shedding is common in Pakistan, I’m guessing this was planned.  In which case, there was definitely a good deal of coordination with the ISI.  However, Pakistani military/intelligence involvement will likely be understated to shield Pakistan’s lone viable institution from public backlash.  That’s not to say though, that “Pakistani intelligence sources” won’t be spinning the news the other way for Western media outlets.

11:57PM CST / 9:57AM PST: Pakistan on high alert in the aftermath of the announcement of Bin Laden’s death.  Schools being closed, children being sent home in the city of Lahore.

11:24PM CST / 9:24AM PST: CNN reports more details of the Bin Laden kill op.  US Navy SEALS were brought in via helicopter and the operation lasted 40 minutes.  The SEAL team reportedly practiced the operation in the months leading up to tonight.

10:46PM CST / 8:46AM PST: Obama’s acknowledgment that Pakistan was involved in the operation against Bin Laden is likely leading many Pakistanis to breathe a collective sigh of relief.  However, it’s likely that Pakistan’s hand was forced by aggressive CIA HUMINT operations in-country — not proactive Pakistani efforts to track Bin Laden.  One can only wonder whether the April visit of Pakistan’s intelligence chief, Lt. Gen. Ahmed Shuja Pasha, had anything to do with the Bin Laden operation.

10:40PM CST / 8:40AM PST: Obama stated that US forces launched an operation to take out Bin Laden, who was hiding in a compound in Abbottabad.  After a fire fight, they killed Bin Laden and recovered his body.  Obama further goes on to state that Pakistan’s cooperation was key in killing Bin Laden.

10:31PM CST / 8:31AM PST: Obama is about to speak.  Catch the White House live feed here.

10:26PM CST / 8:26AM PST: CNN correspondents are now reporting that their Pakistani intelligence sources state that Pakistan was involved in the Osama kill operation.  If indeed true, Pakistan has handed the Obama administration a major victory.  The next question is, of course, what the payoff for Pakistan is in return for the death of Bin Laden.

10:18PM CST / 8:18AM PST (Pakistan Standard Time): CNN is reporting that Osama Bin Laden was killed by an American asset in a mansion outside of Islamabad, where he was living with family members.  This news is potentially devastating for US-Pakistan relations as Pakistan has repeatedly denied Bin Laden’s presence in Pakistan.  It appears that US efforts to establish a human intelligence (HUMINT) network in Pakistan have paid off.  It also probably explains Pakistan’s immense insistence of the reduction of the CIA’s presence in Pakistan after the Raymond Davis affair.

Ashley J. Tellis voices his opposition to the recent sale of Chinese nuclear reactors to Pakistan (“Stop the Sino-Pak Nuclear Pact,” op-ed, Aug. 17). As a former State Department official, Mr. Tellis exhibits in his stance the same shortsightedness and double standards that often mar U.S. foreign policy.

By opposing Chinese-made nuclear plants with International Atomic Energy Agency safeguards in Pakistan, the U.S. would be denying a valuable energy source to a key ally whose stability is threatened by a crushing energy deficit. How would Mr. Tellis suggest Pakistan bridge its 4,000-megawatt energy gap, which is expected to grow by another 22% by 2015?

There is also a clear double standard embedded in Mr. Tellis’s criticism. The U.S.-India nuclear pact that Mr. Tellis helped negotiate exempts eight power plants, including Indian “breeder reactors,” from the IAEA-inspected civilian list. (Breeder reactors produce more fissile material than they consume.) The exemption allows India to advance its military nuclear program and only sets back U.S. nuclear nonproliferation efforts.  [According to Mr. Tellis himself, the operation of India’s unsafeguarded plants alone would provide enough weapon-grade plutonium to add more than 2,000 nuclear weapons to India’s arsenal.]

For the U.S. to be taken seriously in South and Southwest Asia, it needs to have clear and consistent policies [towards its allies, foes and] on major international issues [(e.g., non-proliferation)].  [Mr. Tellis’ opinion does not serve that end.]

At the INSIDER BRIEF, we believe that instead of opposing the Sino-Pak nuclear pact, the U.S. should be looking to support the Chinese sale.  Chinese support of Pakistan should be viewed as welcome relief to the United States, which over the last decade, has almost singlehandedly helped stabilize Pakistan.

Pakistan and its seemingly endless crises present an opportunity to draw the U.S. and China together in strategic cooperation.  By approaching each other as partners in bolstering the stability of an ally — through economic support, beating the energy deficit and curbing Islamism — the U.S. and China can work to reduce their trust deficit in South and Central Asia.

SUMMARY
The first two months of 2010 have brought about a sea change on the ground in Afghanistan and Pakistan.  The U.S. has initiated a surge in both drone strikes and troops (40,000 more boots expected on the ground in Afghanistan) in an attempt to reshape the Afghan war.  Pakistan, many analysts have observed, has had a seeming change of heart, allegedly capturing half of the Taliban’s Quetta Shura including the Taliban’s number two, Mullah Abdul Ghani Baradar.  However, the spate of high profile arrests shouldn’t be construed as a change of heart or a capitulation to American pressure.  Pakistan is betting on itself in a complex game to further its interests in the region.

“WE HOLD ALL THE CARDS”
The following (Afghan) Taliban members have been either killed or captured in Pakistan:

• 01/26/10 – Mullah Abdul Salam – Shadow governor of Kunduz province – Captured – Faisalabad, Pakistan
• 01/26/10 – Mullah Mir Muhammad – Shadow governor of Baghlan province – Captured – Faisalabad, Pakistan
• 02/15/10 – Mullah Abdul Ghani Baradar – Second in command of Afghan Taliban – Captured – Karachi, Pakistan
• 02/18/10 – Mohammed Haqqani – Brother of Sirajuddin Haqqani – Killed – North Waziristan, Pakistan
• 02/20/10 – Maulvi Abdul Kabir – Former shadow governor of Nangarhar – Captured – Nowshera, Pakistan
• 03/03/10 – Agha Jan Mohtasim – Son-in-law to Mullah Omar and Taliban commander – Captured – Karachi, Pakistan
  

According to Christian Science Monitor, other Taliban members allegedly also captured by Pakistan include: Mullah Abdul Qayoum Zakir, who oversees the movement’s military affairs, Mullah Muhammad Hassan, Mullah Ahmed Jan Akhunzada, and Mullah Abdul Raouf.

The U.S. is a distant power that has signaled that it’s aiming to withdraw from the war ravaged nation by July 2011.  The Taliban are Pakistan’s strategic hedge in Afghanistan.  So why on earth has Pakistan decided to turn so forcefully against its (former?) proxy?

The answer is that it hasn’t.

The arrests are part of a larger strategy through which Pakistan is seeking to roll back Indian influence in Afghanistan and revitalize its own influence.  With leverage on both sides of the Afghan conflict (i.e., the U.S. and the Taliban), confidence is running high in the Pakistani establishment right now, with high level INSIDER BRIEF sources stating, “we [Pakistan] hold all the cards.”

On the one hand, Pakistan believes it has convinced Americans that U.S. success is highly dependent on Pakistani cooperation.  In return for cooperation, the U.S. has recognized Pakistani concerns vis-a-vis India in Afghanistan.  Pakistani sources report that this was in part exhibited by the marginalization of the Indians at the Afghan conferences in London and Turkey.

On the other hand, Pakistan has been urging the Taliban to moderate themselves and cooperate towards a post-American set-up in Afghanistan (but not one that was independent of Pakistani considerations).  Pakistan has conveyed this through two means: quiet nudging and arrests.  Of course, the latter has been heavily publicized.  Using its superior human intelligence and murky relationships, Pakistan has identified amenable elements for “collection” (read: arrest) for use in a future dispensation in Afghanistan.  The intent is that the remaining hard-line elements (e.g., those aligned with Al Qaeda) will be sidelined and eliminated.  The strategy may explain Pakistani actions to prevent handover of captured Taliban figures to Afghanistan or the U.S.

INTERPRETING RECENT DEVELOPMENTS
On Friday, February 26th, the Lahore High Court (LHC) barred the government from extraditing captured Afghan Taliban leaders (including Mullah Baradar) abroad.  The ruling came on the heels of a Pakistani decision to hand over top Taliban militants over to Afghanistan.  Some may view the LHC ruling in the context of Pakistani judicial activism that has proven to be a thorn in the side of Pakistani anti-terror efforts.  However, the court decision is likely an example of judicial pliability and not independence.  The Zardari administration can now comfortably deflect American and Afghan pressure under the cover of the LHC ruling.  After all, handing over top Taliban militants over to the Afghan would reduce Pakistan’s leverage in the process and possibly lead to the revelation of some embarrassing links between Pakistan and the Taliban.

That Friday also brought a string of Taliban suicide bombings in Kabul that targeted Indians (9 of the 17 killed were Indian and 12 Indians were also injured).  Two rationales appear to be developing for the attack.  The first is that the Taliban are trying to throw a wrench in recently re-initiated Indo-Pak talks.  The second is that the attacks were coordinated by Pakistan’s intelligence agencies, who in the past have been blamed for previous attacks on the Indian embassy in Kabul.  I believe that there exists a third rationale.  Certain factions in the Taliban, under new found pressure by their former sponsors, may be trying to demonstrate their usefulness to Pakistan by targeting the Indians in Afghanistan as a reminder that they can help counter Indian influence in the country.

Pakistan believes it holds all the cards for success in Afghanistan.  However, a number of factors could possibly ruin Pakistan’s hand.  A highly decentralized Afghan Taliban may not be responsive to calls to reconciliation by Taliban leaders captured in Pakistan far from the fighting.  Or U.S. resolve in Afghanistan may not last and an antagonized Taliban may fail to cooperate or even turn on Pakistan after the Americans leave.  The list goes on.

The chips are on the table.  Let’s see how this hand plays out.

This follows multiple claims from the Taliban that Hakimullah was still alive, in line with the pattern of claims made after the death of their charismatic leader, Baitullah Mehsud in August.  Also allegedly killed in the January 14th strikes in Shaktoi was Qari Hussain, organizer of the TTP’s suicide bombing squads and potential successor to Hakimullah.  With the (possible) deaths of its top leaders, an unprecedented surge in drone strikes, and a Pakistan Army offensive that just took the town of Damadola (Bajaur), the TTP is under intense pressure.

It’s been reported that in the interim, Malik Noor Jamal a/k/a Mullah Toofan (Storm), is now the acting head of the TTP.  Hakimullah Mehsud was able to regroup the Taliban after the loss of Baitullah, and unleash a wave of terror across Pakistan.  Will Jamal be able to do the same?

PROFILE OF MULLAH TOOFAN
Aside from a video of Mullah Toofan flogging men in public, little has been known about him – until now.  Insider Brief sources have disclosed the following details about the acting head of the TTP:

• Name: Noor Jamal
• Name of Father: Rasool Khan
• Tribe: Mamozai
• Religion: Islam (Sunni)
• Age: 42-45 years old
• Education: Religious education
• Profession: Imam of a mosque in Mamozai (Orakzai Agency)
• Address (Present): Dogar Village, Central Kurram Agency
• Address (Permanent): Mamozai, Orakzai Agency
• Marital Status: Married with 2 sons
• Siblings: 2 brothers (one of whom — [name withheld by editor] — is employed in Dubai)
• Brief History: Noor Jamal a/k/a Mullah Toofan has been a low level commander of the TTP in Mamozai, Orakzai Agency, but also a close associate of Hakimullah Mehsud.  As a result of that close relationship, Hakimullah Mehsud appointed Jamal as the Amir of Kurram Agency, in place of Wali-ur-Rehman Mehsud.  Mullah Toofan reportedly participated in the Afghan civil after the withdrawal of Soviet forces.

You can also now find the Insider Brief on Twitter.  You’ll find tweets covering a range of topics from notable publications to some of the latest chatter from our exclusive Insider Brief sources.  One of my tweets even found its way into a recent blog post by Canadian rocker/activist Matt Good.  I promise to try and keep it pithy and interesting.  (Once I have a moment to upgrade my WordPress software, I’ll have a live Twitter feed on the I.B. front page too.)

Lastly, as we kick off 2010, I’d like to extend my thanks to all Insider Brief visitors for your readership and continued support.

1. December 8th – Pakistan received the first of seven Saab 2000 Erieye Airborne Warning and Control Systems (AWACS).  The Erieye systems should go a long way in improving the situational awareness of Pakistan’s air force and monitoring of IAF movement deep within Indian territory.  However, the benefits of the AWACS won’t be felt until Pakistan receives more (so that it can maintain constant air presence of the systems) and has more time to develop and “operationalize” tactics associated with the technology.
2. December 7th -  Insider Brief sources reported that Pakistan had successfully test flown a drone based on U.S. technology.  The sources reported that the technology was drawn from a drone shot down in September 2008 and had been secretly shipped to China for study — in line with our expectations from last year — though I’m a little surprised at the gestation period.  Reverse engineering a Predator drone and translating those learnings into a prototype in a little over a year seems ambitious, but may have been enabled by Chinese involvement and the fact that Pakistan already has an established UAV industry.  The new drone likely has greater endurance, altitude, and range — notable limitations for Pakistani UAV technology in the past.  A greater boon would be if the downed Predator drone from last year was a UCAV (capable of firing Hellfire missiles).
3. November 23th – Pakistan inducted its first domestically produced JF-17 fighter.  The plane, co-developed and co-produced with the Chinese, is a major milestone on Pakistan’s path for self-reliance in combat aircraft.  The JF-17, once inducted en masse, will significantly boost Pakistan’s overall capability as we detailed back in 2007.
4. November 11th – Pakistan announced that it would be purchasing J-10 fighters  from China in a preliminary agreement.  The J-10 acquisition is a good move that displays the PAF’s continued fiscal discipline and long-term thinking.  The J-10, considered on par with later block F-16′s that Pakistan’s purchased from the U.S., would help diversify Pakistan’s suppliers of hi-tech aircraft all the while sidestepping the threat of potential U.S. arms embargoes.  With a mix of J-10′s, F-16′s and JF-17′s coupled with Erieye AWACS, Pakistan’s air force will be creating a highly potent and cost effective model for minimum deterrence.  (I note fiscal discipline in that the J-10, though expensive, is not as pricey as other Western options in the market.)

It’s a grim picture that, at first, reaffirmed for me the need for consensus among the country’s elite. At the Insider Brief, we have long called for a single cohesive and comprehensive agenda agreed to by the military, politicians, bureaucracy, business interests, and the media to undo the crisis in governance and set the country back on the path to socio-economic development.

However, the more I’ve thought about it, the more the problem presents itself as one that is rooted in perspective – Pakistan’s elite appear to be out of touch with geopolitical reality.  After all, when the situation is so dire, why is the military-bureaucratic complex hacking away at the PPP-led government? Why does the media remain mired in conspiracy theories? Why are the country’s political parties locked in a cycle of political opportunism? The behavior isn’t rational.

The disconnect with reality appears to stem from two core flaws in the Pakistani perspective:

1.  Failure to understand the limitation of national resources/capabilities.

• Pakistan cannot go it alone. Pakistan’s geography makes the nation strategic, but its geography also acts as an inhibitor. Pakistan does not have the resources to achieve self-sufficiency; Pakistan must trade and seek external investment not just to flourish, but also to survive. That’s why it’s vital that Pakistan not alienate its key sponsors (the U.S., China, Saudi Arabia, etc.) or its regional neighbors (Iran, Afghanistan, etc.).
  • The Kerry-Lugar Bill: When the U.S. tripled non-military aid to Pakistan through the Kerry-Lugar Bill, the Pakistani military did exactly what it shouldn’t have done – it voiced massive opposition to the bill and alienated the U.S.  The military’s opposition is rooted in language tying the aid to civilian control over the military. The military blames President Asif Zardari for the wording and is out for blood.  Being the single most powerful institution in Pakistan and after governing the Pakistan for over half its existence, the Pakistani military must be acting out of sheer pride if it feels that the wording in the Kerry-Lugar Bill will undermine its pre-eminent status in Pakistan overnight.  (People who sought to have that wording placed in the Kerry-Lugar Bill should have also taken this rationale into account. It was a tactical misstep to think that conditional U.S. aid would work to strengthen democratic institutions in Pakistan. The best way to strengthen democracy is to garner overwhelming public support through capable leadership and socio-economic progress.)

• Pakistan cannot seek parity with India – military or otherwise. Since its inception, Pakistan has viewed itself as a strategic equal of India – and to disastrous ends. India is far too large and developing at far too quick a pace for Pakistan to be its peer.  Though it has far to go, India is on the road to becoming a global power. Pakistan is a regional power at best. Militarily, Pakistan has achieved a minimum deterrence through its nuclear capability.  It should reduce the size of its standing military and focus on becoming smaller, more mobile, and technologically advanced.  Rely on force multipliers and redirect funds towards development.

• Pakistan cannot win Kashmir from India. Three wars over the disputed state (Kargil included) have demonstrated that Pakistan cannot wrest Kashmir from India’s control – India’s military is far too superior in terms of quality and quantity. The best Pakistan can hope for is recognition of the status quo or a Musharrafian solution (joint governance of Kashmir).  Again, focus on effectively governing existing Pakistani territory and create a model that demonstrates why Kashmir is better in Pakistani hands.

2.  Failure to understand that the state’s actions have consequences.

• Militant groups, sponsored by Pakistan’s military, have turned on the state. These militant groups are no longer national security assets to leverage against India or to attain “strategic depth” in Afghanistan. They are not the product of a conspiracy hatched by any combination of Indians, Israelis or Americans. The only conspirators here are those who nurtured these groups and now do not want to shoulder the responsibility for the deaths of hundreds of innocent Pakistani civilians.
• Ineffective and inequitable governance results in a loss of sovereignty. Poor and inequitable governance spawned an insurgency in East Pakistan, providing India the opening for the 1971 war and Pakistan’s subsequent dismemberment.  Once again, poor and inequitable governance has spawned not one, but two insurgencies in Pakistan’s west (i.e., Balochistan and the NWFP/FATA).
• Irresponsible behavior with nuclear technology is the biggest threat to Pakistan’s arsenal. Many Pakistanis believe that the U.S. is out to denuclearize Pakistan.  Pakistanis also view it as unfair that the Indians have a civil nuclear deal with the Americans but they don’t.  However, none of this should come as a surprise after Pakistan, through Dr. Abdul Qadeer Khan, proliferated nuclear technology to the likes of Libya, North Korea, and Iran.  Pakistan must demonstrate responsibility and maturity in handling its nuclear capability if it wants cooperation from western powers.

Knowing where the problem lies, the greater question then becomes:  how do we go about changing mindsets? How do we go about awakening a nation from its daze?

The answer?  We talk about it.

Educate.  Encourage mature discourse.  Repeat (as many times as necessary).

Footnote:
I recently had the opportunity to sit down with Pakistan’s Ambassador to the United States, Husain Haqqani, whom I’ve known since he was a professor at Boston University. In discussing U.S.-Pakistan relations and Pakistan’s role in the wider world, it occurred to me that Haqqani is arguably among the best envoys Pakistan has had in Washington in a long time.  He is articulate, well connected, and knows what he’s talking about.  Even if the PPP government falls or if Zardari is ousted, it may not be a bad idea to keep Haqqani around.  Pakistan, I believe, is best served with him as its ambassador.

Successful Strategy
As part of its strategy, the military initially sought to strike Taliban hideouts, training camps, arms caches, tunnels and safe houses.  This was done to destroy their infrastructure and also minimize the degree of fighting taking place in populated, urban areas.  Taking aim at these targets forced the Taliban to fight “outwards” in the mountains and provide more tactical space for army personnel in the Swat Valley itself.

Precision strikes were carried out by the air force while the army launched three brigade-size offensives from three different directions, forcing the Taliban to fight on multiple fronts.  The Special Services Group (commonly referred to as the SSG, Pakistan’s special forces) conducted a large-scale airborne raid on the primary Taliban base in Peochar Valley.

A month into its campaign, Pakistan’s military has wrested control of and secured Mingora, Swat’s largest city.

The military continues to maintain persistent pressure on militants by carrying out raids, laying ambushes, and cordoning off zones for search and destroy operations.  The purpose for all of which is to ensure psychological and tactical ascendancy against the Taliban.

There is also a strong desire on the part of the military to eliminate Taliban leadership in Swat.  Recent rumors that Maulana Fazlullah, leader of the Taliban in Swat, was killed by Pakistani gunships were discredited after the Pakistani government increased its bounty on Fazlullah’s head.  Insider Brief sources within the Pakistani military report that US sources originated the rumors but that chatter on Taliban networks also spoke of Fazlullah’s death.  The chatter was likely a means of diverting the military’s focus on hunting the “Radio Mullah.”

From Swat to South Waziristan
Having taken Mingora, the military has set its sights on Charbagh where action is expected soon.  Other pockets of Taliban resistance still remain in several valleys north and west of Mingora.

Beyond Swat lies South Waziristan, which the military believes to be the center of gravity for the Taliban.  Our sources also report that operations can begin in South Waziristan as early as the first week of June.

It’s worth noting that despite official claims that upwards of 3,000 militants have been killed in Swat, our sources state that the number of dead militants is likely somewhere between 500 and 600.  It’s important to be mindful of this as the military seeks to consolidate the gains it has made in Swat and hold territory.  The number of militants in Swat likely ranged in the thousands at its peak, meaning that many militants were merely pushed back into the mountains or dissolved into the general population.

As internally displaced persons (IDPs) and administrative structures return to Swat, it will be important for the military to maintain much of its strength (two divisions) there.  This ultimately means that more troops will have to be called up for the far more difficult operation that lies ahead in South Waziristan.

Sovereignty in Swat
Over 2.4 million people have been displaced by the fighting, creating what the UN describes as the worst refugee crisis since Rwanda.  With fighting winding down in Swat, these IDPs will begin returning home to widespread destruction (many have started returning home to neighboring Buner).  The resulting discontent has the potential to turn Swat into a breeding ground for the Taliban.

Back in November 2007, we contended that, “only when you have a hand in bettering someone’s life can you claim sovereignty over where they live.”

With US financial support, Pakistan must use the opportunity provided by the devastation in Swat to undertake massive rebuilding and modernization efforts there.  Model villages can be developed similar to the ones built after the massive earthquake that struck northern Pakistan in October 2005.  Administrative structures can be built from the ground up keeping in mind that prior discontent in Swat related to government inefficiencies (particularly in the judicial system).

This can prove to be an important first step in bringing Pakistan’s Wild West into the fold.

Analysis
Insider Brief sources report that the three murdered nationalist leaders — including Baloch — had actually had a hand in the kidnapping of John Solecki alongside several government “bigwigs” and Baloch sardars (local tribal chiefs).  Large sums of money totaling several million dollars were handed over to the kidnappers to secure Solecki’s release.  Infighting ensued between the involved parties over the distribution of the release funds resulting in the deaths of Baloch, Munir and Bugti.

This explanation has a strong degree of credibility (kidnapping for money being a time honored tradition in that part of Pakistan) and helps counter an otherwise inconsistent allegation that Pakistani intelligence was behind the kidnapping and subsequent murder.  State intelligence agencies would most certainly have anticipated that the deaths of these leaders would have resulted in the destabilization we’re witnessing in Balochistan, an already volatile province.  They would not have intentionally mutilated the bodies and left them to be found only to play into the hands of local insurgents.

If true, it would appear that localized greed, not intelligence agencies, can be blamed for the deaths of the three leaders.

We expect to see the further erosion of President Zardari’s government and his already tenuous grip on the country in the coming days and weeks. We also expect the “establishment” to actively strengthen competing factions within the PPP for the eventual replacement of Zardari (e.g. Atizaz Ahsan) as a means of returning stability to the country.

Expect some movement in Punjab; especially keep an eye on its governor, Salman Taseer.