The Howie Mandel in all of us is asking, “Deal or no deal?”

It is a question that President Gen. Pervez Musharraf and self-exiled former Prime Minister Benazir Bhutto will have to answer soon if they hope to counter the growing momentum of Nawaz Sharif’s campaign to return not only to Pakistan, but to power.

AN UNLIKELY SCENARIO
A decade ago, no one would have believed, let alone foreseen, the political reality that exists in Pakistan today. We are witnessing a Pakistani military dictator seeking political survival through a power sharing agreement with the anti-establishment Pakistan People’s Party, all the while facing off against a faction of the Pakistan Muslim League, once a favored proxy of the military establishment.

Musharraf and Bhutto have been flirting with a political settlement for at least five years now. As far back as November 2002, we learned of meetings between Musharraf’s close associates and aides debating the release of Asif Zardari – Bhutto’s husband – two years before his actual release. And again, at the end of 2003, we received word that Musharraf was readying to send a personal confidante and childhood friend to visit Bhutto in Dubai and initiate parleys by asking in very plain terms, “What is it that you want?”

In those days, Musharraf was negotiating from a position of strength, when the worst of his worries were troublesome Baloch nationalists. Today, he is fighting for his political life and willing to concede ground to Bhutto and her demands.

THE TERMS
Questions, speculation, commentary and criticism have been swirling around the surprisingly public negotiations between the two camps.

The media has speculated that a power sharing agreement between the two would leave Musharraf in control of national security and foreign policy issues and Bhutto with all remaining national issues. Under such terms, the question then becomes, how different would Bhutto’s tenure really be from the neutered prime ministerships of Shaukat Aziz or Zafarullah Jamali?

Others have theorized that Musharraf will take a hardline stance against all opposition and declare a state of emergency. Such a move would be fatal for Musharraf, likely galvanizing his opposition to the point that he would be forced to step down. We like to believe that Musharraf is smarter than that.

Sources close to the negotiations have stated that a deal between Musharraf and Bhutto is inevitable. They also confirmed much of what has been reported in the media already, that there are currently three major sticking points upon which negotiations still continue:

1. The dropping of all charges against Bhutto
2. Bhutto to be allowed a third term as Prime Minister
3. The repeal of the President’s power to dismiss the government

It’s clear why these are sticking points. Not willing to relegate herself to a behind-the-scenes role, like Sonia Gandhi across the border, Bhutto wants the premiership and visibly so. She also wants to remove the presidential power that brought down her government twice.

In Musharraf’s eyes, the latter two sticking points not only require constitutional amendments, but rolling back presidential power would deny him any leverage over Bhutto. And if good governance remains an issue to him, appearing soft on corruption and allowing for a third term would be counterproductive.

Lastly, the same sources said that Musharraf would not abandon the PML-QA or the Chaudhry cousins as they are his “allies.” We’re unsure of what this implies about the future power sharing arrangement, but it does open up the possibility for a coalition government between the PML-QA and PPP. Whether this is a workable, effective or acceptable solution for any of the involved political parties is questionable. For Musharraf, a diluted coalition government may just be what he is looking for. It would shield him from criticism for being undemocratic, all the while allowing him to carry on his policies unchecked while coalition members bicker among one another.

SHARIF’S RETURN
Regardless of what a future power sharing agreement looks like, Musharraf and Bhutto must agree posthaste. Parliamentary elections are looming and more importantly, Nawaz Sharif is due to arrive in Pakistan in a matter of hours.
Once written off, Sharif is quickly emerging as a dark horse in the coming parliamentary elections having maintained a consistently anti-Musharraf stance, defiantly rejecting all calls to adhere to his exile agreement. Pakistanis and Pakistan watchers alike have been apprehensively awaiting Sharif’s potentially explosive return.

Now aboard a flight to Pakistan, sans his brother Shabhaz, Nawaz’s return is promising to be confrontational. Senior officials indicated to us that surveillance has been established at all major airports and routes to jails have been secured. Using “pressure tactics,” they hope to coerce Sharif into leaving Pakistan on his own accord, thereby avoiding the contempt of court charges associated with deportation. Given the unlikelihood of this outcome, officials are also prepared to arrest Sharif, keep him out of the public eye and jail him.

Whether Sharif or his supporters will go quietly remains to be seen.