The Intel
Insider Brief sources report that Pakistani intelligence officials have recently been engaged in a spate of closed-door meetings. The topic of discussion? The ouster of Asif Ali Zardari and the Pakistan People’s Party (PPP) from power and the engineered return of Nawaz Sharif.

The Why
The news in and of itself should not be surprising, and for multiple reasons. First, the Pakistani military/intelligence establishment has always distrusted and disliked the PPP. Zulfikar Ali Bhutto, Benazir’s father, recognized this and established the Federal Security Force in an attempt to offset the influence of the ISI. The FSF was promptly disbanded after Gen. Zia-ul-Huq’s 1979 coup. On the other hand, Nawaz Sharif is a child of the establishment, promoted and sponsored by Gen. Zia himself.

People may question – what about General Ashfaq Kayani and his stance on political non-interference? The answer and second reason likely lies in the decreasing ability of the military establishment’s inability to control low-to-mid-level personnel as has been demonstrated by the numerous security lapses and leaks that have led to numerous terrorist strikes against sensitive targets.

This brings us to the third reason. Many in Pakistan’s military and intelligence apparatus remain sympathetic to their former proxies as is Nawaz Sharif. Sharif is well liked by Pakistan’s right and religious fundamentalists. His return would likely mark the end to the Pakistan Army’s push in the country’s northwest.

The How
If Pakistani intelligence is truly attempting to engineer Nawaz Sharif’s return, the question is, how do they intend on doing so? The answer may lie in what Insider Brief sources recently intimated to us. In the on going discussions over Zardari, it was mentioned that the last phone call to Benazir Bhutto minutes before her assassination was made by Zardari himself. He reportedly asked Bhutto why she was sitting in the car and not outside as the “people wanted to see her.”

The story could conceivably be true – there’s no doubt that Pakistani intelligence tapped Bhutto and Zardari’s phones – and Zardari did indeed have a lot to gain from her death. But the far likelier explanation could be that Pakistani intelligence is working to build up a story to incriminate or at the very least, implicate Zardari in the court of public opinion.

The other explanation is that these meetings are just indicative of pressure tactics being used by President Musharraf and the “establishment” as they tussle with Zardari and his civilian government over major issues such as the restoration of deposed judges, tackling terrorism and handling Pakistan’s economic issues.

The Lesson
The major take away is that the government must act with surety and decisiveness. A constellation of forces is aligning against the sitting government as it waits idly by, paralyzed by indecision and infighting. If it doesn’t act, the PPP will have passed up a chance to consolidate fresh democratic foundations for Pakistan and the opportunity to tackle issues from a liberal platform.

These closed-door meetings were just warning shots that time is running out.

We at the Insider Brief would like to thank all of our readers for your patience during our brief hiatus. To make up for our absence, we’ll be introducing some new features and guest contributors in the coming weeks. In the meanwhile, expect some new posts as we attempt to make sense of the events unfolding in Pakistan.

Radio: The John Batchelor Show
Earlier tonight, I appeared on the John Batchelor Show to discuss the continued volatility in Pakistan’s northwest, the assassination attempt on Hamid Karzai, as well as Senator Barack Obama new conciliatory tone towards Pakistan.

John’s show airs on Sundays, WABC 770AM in New York from 7-10pm EST (webcast), and KFI 640AM in Los Angeles from 7-10pm PST (webcast).

Ejecting Ejaz’s Men
This past week saw a shakeup in Pakistan’s regional Military Intelligence (MI) organization with the naming of new MI chiefs for Punjab and Sindh. Brigadier Zaheer, Punjab’s commander, was replaced by Brig. Mumtaz Iqbal while Brig. Masood, Sindh’s commander, was replaced by Brig. Azam Tiwana.

The replaced brigadiers were removed from their posts prematurely; Zaheer was due to retire in July with Masood due to retire in September. Sources indicate that both men were close associates of the recenty replaced and highly disliked, Major General Nadeem Ejaz, former Director General of Military Intelligence (DGMI). Made with Gen. Ashfaq Kayani’s approval, the removal of Nadeem Ejaz’s associates represents a continued decline in influence for President Pervez Musharraf within the military. As DGMI, Ejaz was instrumental in many of Musharraf’s policy decisions and was a close advisor.

What may be of greater interest is the man whom Brig. Tiwana is replacing, Brig. Masood, is said by sources to have had excellent ties with the MQM and PPP. If true, it highlights the continued drive by Gen. Kayani to disentangle the Pakistan Army and its intelligence apparatus from politics after over 60 years of national involvement. After all, cordial relations with political parties should have no bearing on the selection of a regional MI commander.

Intel Validation
At the end of February, we reported that Gen. Kayani was looking to replace the then-DGMI, Maj. Gen. Nadeem Ejaz. We listed several candidates, one of whom was Major General Muhammad Asif, Pakistan’s former defense attache to Moscow. On April 4th, The News International reported that Maj. Gen. Asif was appointed DGMI.

Editor’s Note: For those of you wondering — I’m back.

As we had reported last week, Gen. Ashfaq Kayani, the Chief of Army Staff, is looking to replace the present Director General of Military Intelligence (DGMI), Maj. Gen. Nadeem Ejaz. Our sources now expect to see a new DGMI in place towards the end of this month. Potential candidates for the job post include (but are not limited to):

• Maj. Gen. Muhammad Asif - Formerly Pakistan’s Defense Attache in Moscow
• Maj. Gen. Javed Iqbal - Presently posted in Bahawalpur
• Maj. Gen. Raheel Sharif - Formerly General Officer Commanding (GOC) Lahore; presently posted in Lahore

Kayani intends to curtail the powers of the DGMI with the hope that the next general to occupy the position will focus on what his title implies — military intelligence. This should bode well for the progress of the war on terror and settling the unrest in Pakistan’s northwest.

FOOTNOTES:

• President Pervez Musharraf had an op-ed published in the Washington Post on February 22nd. Individuals familiar with the op-ed report that it had initially been submitted to the New York Times for publication but was rejected by paper. The Washington Post was the President’s second choice.
• The News International reported that the former head of the ISI’s political cell, Maj. Gen. (retd.) Ehtesham Zamir, acknowledged his role in rigging the 2002 elections that brought Musharraf’s civilian allies to power. Zamir claims that the orders to rig the election came from Musharraf himself. The timing of the announcement places further pressure on an already beseiged Musharraf who now faces an empowered opposition after last week’s parliamentary elections. Interestingly enough, sources close to Zamir report that he is a very close friend of Aitzaz Ahsan. Coincidence? I think not.

(Editor’s Note: We’ve received numerous requests for an analysis on the post-election scenario; we hope to have one up for Insider Brief readers by the end of this week.)

Today, my post “Democracy is Not the Answer,” was published in the Opinion section of The News International, Pakistan’s second largest English language newspaper.  You can find the published article here.

The Daily Telegraph reported that the head of one of Pakistan’s intelligence agencies, appointed by President Pervez Musharraf, would be replaced by Gen. Ashfaq Kayani as part of his drive to withdraw the Pakistan Army from national politics.

Our sources have confirmed that Gen. Kayani will be replacing Major General Nadeem Ejaz, the Director General of Military Intelligence (DGMI), after the completion of parliamentary elections. Sources cite that Kayani has been presented with an opportune time to rid himself of Nadeem Ejaz as Ejaz is not only unpopular among the Army’s top brass but also because his 3-year tenure as DGMI is nearing an end. Maj. Gen. Ejaz is well known for the high profile role he played in the ouster of former Chief Justice Iftikhar Chaudhry.

Insider Brief sources go on to further state that Gen. Kayani also intends on clipping the wings of the office of the Director General of Military Intelligence, giving the next general less responsibility and power than in the past.

Replacing Nadeem Ejaz will significantly reduce President Musharraf’s influence in the army and Pakistan’s intelligence apparatus. It will also go a long way in furthering Gen. Kayani’s process of removing the military from national politics and re-directing its efforts towards solely national defense.

Kayani’s task is a daunting one as he essentially seeks to re-engineer the Army’s culture which has been shaped by over 60 years of interference in the country’s governance and national affairs. It will be interesting to see how he balances his goals with the outcome and consequences of today’s parliamentary elections. The Army Chief may be forced to step into the fray and play referee if Pakistan’s political leaders — Musharraf included — get out of hand; an act that would highlight not only the difficulty of his objective but also what we stated in our last post: that for the for the near-to-medium term, the Pakistan Army will continue to have a role to play as the guarantor of the Pakistani state.

ELECTION FOOTNOTES:

• Voting in Pakistan’s parliamentary elections has come to an end. Ballot counting has now begun.
• Election turnout was comparatively low due to fear of violence, which killed at least 9 people today in bombings and shootings.
• Based on results that have started trickling in, projected winners for 3 of the provinces currently stand at:
  • Punjab: PML(N), PPP
  • Sindh: PPP, MQM
  • NWFP: ANP, PML(N) [in Hazara populated districts]
• With projections shaping up the way they are, Pakistan looks to be headed towards a broad coalition government which is the best Musharraf can hope for. In a coalition, the national government will likely be locked in gridlock allowing Musharraf to carry on with his policies unchecked. It will also allow his civilian allies — the PML(Q) — to hold some degree of influence. We’ve been projecting this outcome since October.

Pundits and Pakistan-watchers alike continue to swear that democracy is the long awaited panacea that will cure all of Pakistan’s ills — be it rampant jihadism, lagging social indicators, or the crisis in governance. Their memories have proven to be short, having forgotten the 1990’s, a period that was marked by corruption, extreme abuses of power and severe economic mismanagement at the hands of democratically elected governments.

Kicked off by the late-Benazir Bhutto, “the lost decade” was capped by the then much-welcomed military coup of President Pervez Musharraf. Nine years later, Musharraf’s tenure, which saw not only economic stabilization but stellar growth alongside unprecedented media liberalization, appears to be nearing its end falteringly.

With the much-anticipated parliamentary elections only days away and the military distancing itself from Musharraf, we are presented with a stark comparison between Pakistan’s military and democratic governments that raises key questions.

Why is it that military governments, who have been so successful at providing good economic management, fallen each time to popular opposition? Why is it that popular civilian leaders always return to power only to bring the country to the brink each time?

The two key variables here are policy and leadership.

Military-led governments have been successful managers of the country, their reigns typically leading to gains in the economy and social indicators, but they fail to provide genuine leadership. Their success in developing the country can be attributed to the technocrats they usher in to provide policy expertise in their respective fields. Yet these technocrats are only good at being policy experts, not politicians. Former Prime Minister Shaukat Aziz is a case-in-point. Despite his corruption free background and immense success in reviving Pakistan’s economy, Aziz was incapable of winning a single seat in Pakistan’s parliament without the patronage of the Chaudhries of Gujrat.

On the other hand, democratically elected governments have enjoyed popular support and provided leadership while actively mismanaging the country and overseeing declines in the economy. Their deficiency was and continues to be sound, consistent policies. Brought to power time and time again on the shoulders of empty rhetoric and patronage, Pakistan’s political parties appear to be forever trapped in the inertia of political in fighting; maintaining their stranglehold on government becomes their raison d’etre, resulting in very little progress.

Pakistan’s democratically elected governments have taught us that democracy alone is not the answer.

Democracy with serious, detailed and substantive policy is.

There needs to be an infusion of policy expertise and a serious commitment towards enacting policy, bridging the gap that has divided military and democratic regimes.

This highlights the major need for consensus among all of Pakistan’s ruling elite. Good policy cannot be applied without everyone on board — that includes the political parties and the military. Many die-hard democrats cringe at the mention of the latter, but the cold truth is that for the near- to medium-term, the military is the guarantor of the Pakistani state, as it has been for the last 60+ years.

If Pakistani civil society does not begin to hold its political parties to higher standards, we will continue to witness the re-enactment of history by the same players, at the risk of wearing down an already decrepit stage.

A military helicopter went down in South Waziristan today. All eight on board were killed including Major General Javed Sultan, the recently promoted commanding officer of Kohat garrison as well as two brigadiers. The official explanation from Islamabad is that the crash was due to “technical reasons.”

However, sources report that the helicopter was one of the brand new Bell 412 helicopters provided to Pakistan by the United States. They also state that militants in South Waziristan have been using anti-aircraft missiles. Sources narrate further that the helicopter had been visiting a unit in South Waziristan and was on its way back when, within 3 minutes of taking off, it came down.

If militants did indeed manage to shoot down the helicopter, it would mark the first time militants have downed a Pakistani helicopter.

Individuals within the establishment have said that US, Indian, and/or Afghan involvement in the helicopter crash/downing cannot be ruled out. They cite a recent decision by the government of Pakistan to review its strategy in FATA. Downing the helicopter maybe a means of instigating the Pakistan Army to use more force or to get out of the region all together.

More to come.

THE ARMY ADVANCES …
Hot off its relative success in sweeping Swat of militants led by Maulana Fazlullah, sources report that the Pakistan Army has set its sights on Baitullah Mehsud, the purported mastermind behind the assassination of Benazir Bhutto.

In addition to military action, sources also report that a major facet of the newfound campaign involves choking off Baitullah’s sources of funding and logistics. This will be done in part by assailing the business interests of the Mehsud tribe from which Baitullah hails. By pursuing the tribe’s assets and businesses, primarily focused in more developed areas such as Karachi, Tank, and Dera Ismail, the Army seeks to indirectly pressure the tribe and show them how self destructive it can be supporting Baitullah.

If history has taught us anything about the Pushtun tribes it’s this: money talks. The Army’s strategy should not only prove effective but also go a long way in driving a wedge between jihadist militants and the tribes that support them. As extremist Islam fast becomes the primary vehicle of Pushtun nationalism in Pakistan, making this wedge permanent is a vital objective in ensuring Pakistan’s territorial integrity.

Pakistani intelligence is also increasingly wary of Indian collusion with Afghan intelligence in fomenting instability along Pakistan’s borders. They consistently point to the presence of six Indian consulates in Afghanistan, four of which are not only close to the Afghan-Pakistan “border” and are in areas where few if any Indians reside. Recent news of resurgent militant Sikh activity in India after years of quiet may be warning shots from Pakistan that it too, can return the favor.

… AND RETREATS.
Pakistan’s Chief of Army Staff, Gen. Ashfaq Kayani, is living up to his reputation as a professional soldier. Sources state that the general has initiated the process of making sweeping changes in organization in the Army. On top of having re-instituted the role of Director General of Planning, the head of what amounts to the Army’s think tank, Kayani is systematically withdrawing the Army from the political arena.Told to us by sources months ago, Gen. Kayani’s directive that all officers abstain from interfering in politics under the threat of court martial has become widely reported. Now, sources have stated that the Army Chief has also directed Military Intelligence (MI) to desist from interfering in politics at all levels.

The big question is now this: when’s the ISI’s turn?

ELECTION ENDNOTES:

1. A senior Pakistani official recently conveyed to the Insider Brief how deeply distraught they were at the current state of affairs in Pakistan and at how President Pervez Musharraf was single mindedly focused on ensuring a pliant parliament to maintain his hold on power. Another senior official from within the ranks of the military stated that it was only a matter of “when, not if,” Gen. Ashfaq Kayani withdrew his support for President Musharraf.
2. Sources have reported that Pakistan People’s Party members informed President Musharraf that the will produced by Asif Zardari was indeed fake and that party officials kept quiet for the sake of capturing the “sympathy” vote in February’s upcoming parliamentary elections. They intend on seeking Zardari’s ouster after elections.
3. Media outlets have widely reported the ongoing dialogue between President Musharraf and Shahbaz Sharif, Nawaz Sharif’s chief lieutenant and younger brother, through common acquaintance Brigadier (retired) Niaz Ahmed. Sources close to Ahmed state that parlays between Musharraf and the younger Sharif are over the creation of an alliance to prevent the rise of the PPP in upcoming elections and that the two will be meeting in Ahmed’s home in London. They also state that there is a strong possibility that a deal has been struck between the two seemingly antagonistic forces. If true, it marks a return to “normalcy” in Pakistan’s constellation of forces: the establishment allied with its usual proxy, the Pakistan Muslim League, against the anti-establishment Pakistan People’s Party.

Around Christmas, sources had reported that Pakistani intelligence had indications that the violence afflicting the rest of the country — Karachi, Peshawar, Quetta, Rawalpindi — was making its way to Lahore.

Today, it did. A suicide bomber detonated himself amidst a 70-member police contingent, minutes before a weekly lawyer’s protest in front of the Lahore High Court. The body count currently stands at 20 officers and 2 civilians dead, with scores wounded.

More Attacks to Follow?
Insider Brief sources further go on to state that Pakistani intelligence was aware of 8 suicide bombers that had entered Lahore to carry out attacks. With this attack, 7 still remain at large. This is despite a major breakthrough in late December (that went unreported) when law enforcement in Sargodha busted a terrorist ring. They recovered 10 tons of explosives and numerous detonators along with a number of terrorists comprising of bomb and suicide jacket makers.

Who Was Targeted?
Accounts vary as to who the bomber intended on attacking. Dawn reports that police were the intended targets wherein the bomber approached police and immediately detonated himself. Individuals familiar with the situation stated that a number of the police officers killed were fresh graduates from the police academy. This wouldn’t be the first attack on security forces or cadets. Suicide bombers in Pakistan have had a history of attacking not only cadets, but seasoned personnel from Pakistan’s military, paramilitary and law enforcement agencies.

CNN, quoting the same or similar sources as Dawn, tells a different story where the bomber approached the site of the impending lawyer’s rally, was stopped by police and then detonated himself. This presents the most interesting angle. A suicide bombing on the police is only tactical in nature. Pakistan’s security forces are rather large in number, and Punjab’s in particular are well funded and well equipped. For jihadists to “waste” scarce resources (e.g. explosives, the bomber, and the device itself) on small scale attacks is not sustainable.

An attack on the lawyer’s rally could potentially be strategic.

The Motives
The average Pakistani currently does not trust the government. Pakistan is rife with speculation, no matter how sensational, that the government (read: President Pervez Musharraf and company) was behind the assassination of Benazir Bhutto.

A sucessful bombing of a lawyer’s rally would immediately have people guessing who was behind the attack. Consider this line of potential reasoning/questions: Jihadists? Too simple an explanation. Was the government behind the attack? Were they looking to intimidate the lawyer’s movement? Were they looking to create an excuse to postpone elections by staging bombings at the onset of Muharram?

In this case, security forces halted the attack, at great cost to themselves, and saved many other lives in the process. Had the bomber succeeded, the government’s credibility would have taken a greater hit in the minds of an increasingly disenchanted and disenfranchised population, looking for excuses to direct their rage at the establishment. The potential outcome could have resulted in another wave of violence, chaos and instability for the Musharraf government — a jihadist’s dream scenario.

Strategies for Security
To counter the growing number of suicide bombers and related instability, the Pakistani goverment must take on a two pronged approach.

First, it must actively direct state resources to target and eliminate both the leadership of jihadist organizations and their bomb making infrastructure. Worthy of study is the Israeli model that has proven incredibly successful over the past decade resulting in a significant decline in suicide bombings within Israel proper.

Aside from having developed superior anti-suicide bomber tactics for security forces (e.g. identifying and eliminating potential suicide bombers), the key to Israeli success has been the targeted assassinations of terrorist leaders and particularly bomb makers. The Israeli’s know full well that making suicide vests and other improvised explosive devices (IEDs) is not a simple task but one that requires immense experience and training. The news is full of “wannabe” bomb makers who regularly blow themselves up as they toy with unstable chemical compounds. Denying terrrorist organizations the ability to produce bombs is the equivalent of taking away an infrantryman’s bullets.

Second, and most importantly, the government of Pakistan must placate its restless population, whose patience has grown thin in light of the present bout of socio-economic deterioration. Countering jihadists is just a stop-gap solution to counter short-term instability and violence. To reinstill stability (if it ever existed) in Pakistan for the long haul, the establishment must find a way to bring all sections of society to the table, create a consensus and instill a sense of participation in government for the populace. The most immediate way to do that is hold free and fair elections; unfortunately, from what our sources tell us, the elections in February will be anything but.

Sources report that Major General Athar Abbas has been appointed the new Director General of Inter-Services Public Relations (ISPR). Abbas’ predecessor, Major General Waheed Arshad, is moving on to become the Director General of Planning in the Chief of Army Staff (COAS) Secratariat, reporting directly to Gen. Ashfaq Kayani, Pakistan’s recently appointed army chief.

Late Saturday night during a Democratic Party debate, presidential hopeful Senator Hillary Clinton stated that if elected president, she would propose joint US-British oversight of Pakistani nuclear weapons. Within hours, media outlets from New Hampshire to New Delhi had all picked up on the story, with headlines screaming, “Clinton Proposes Oversight of Pak Nukes.”

MISSION ACCOMPLISHED?
Hillary Clinton is many things, but one thing she is not is unintelligent. Nor are those she surrounds herself with. Her foreign policy team — which includes former Secretary of State Madeleine Albright, Ambassador Richard Holbrooke, and of course, her husband, former President Bill Clinton — is painfully aware of how impractical her proposal for joint oversight is. After all, it was under President Bill Clinton’s watch that Pakistan defiantly tested its nuclear weapons, despite the threat of new sanctions when its economy was teetering on the brink of collapse.

So then why did she issue such an undeniably flawed policy statement?

The answer is right in front of us in the media’s response. Following her third place finish in Iowa at the hands of Senators Barack Obama and John Edwards, Sen. Clinton’s policy appears to be a ploy designed to attract attention to her campaign on the eve of the crucial New Hampshire primary. With a media that thrives on soundbites, it’s a ploy that in the past has proven effective.

NUCLEAR FALLOUT
Not convinced that the proposal is a campaign tactic? Assume for a moment that Clinton is serious in proposing joint US-UK stewardship of Pakistani nuclear weapons. Implications abound, the proposal would risk severe fallout for Pakistan as well as US interests in the region:

Violent and Vocal Reaction in Pakistan. It’s safe to say that any sitting government in Pakistan that would agree to US oversight of the nation’s nuclear weapons would be overthrown either in a military coup or by an overwhelming response from the Pakistani public. President Pervez Musharraf is afraid to openly acknowledge American boots on the ground in Pakistan’s northwest, let alone American oversight of Pakistani nukes. (Just today, Pakistani spokepeople were bristling at alleged deliberations by the Bush administration to give the CIA expanded powers to operate within Pakistan.)

Spike in Anti-Americanism in Pakistan and the Muslim world. Pakistan is currently the world’s only Muslim nuclear weapons state. US supervision of Pakistan’s nukes would be viewed as a continuation of the American “crusade” against Muslims. Pakistanis in general have long been convinced that the US is seeking to destablize their country in the hopes of an excuse to defang its nuclear capabilities. Many average Pakistanis are convinced that the US had a role to play in the assassination of Benazir Bhutto for that very reason. Sen. Clinton’s proposal is a sure fire way of stoking anti-Americanism and bringing Islamists to power in Pakistan.

Disruption of Sino-US relations. China was heavily involved in helping facilitate the funding and technical expertise towards the Pakistani nuclear program. China’s involvement reflects a long-standing strategic relationship between itself and Pakistan. The Chinese will not take pseudo-US control of nuclear weapons in their backyard lying down. The US government should be prepared for a severe reaction from the Chinese govement including aggressive behavior around Taiwan, Central Asia and the support of a military coup in Pakistan.

Loss of Credibility for the Democratic Party in Pakistan. The Pakistani establishment has long favored the Republican Party given the party’s record of, more often than not, engaging Pakistan. Many in Pakistan have not forgotten the treatment meted out to them by President Bill Clinton, particularly during his second term in office. If Hillary Clinton pushes her policy proposal, she would be helping ensure a poor working relationship with the government of Pakistan anytime a Democrat is in office.

The aforementioned are only a handful of the potential (frightening) outcomes from the promotion/imposition of Sen. Clinton’s proposal. It’s unlikely that the likes of Madeleine Albright, Richard Holbrooke, or Hillary Clinton herself would have overlooked these.

LESSONS LEARNT
The buzz generated by Clinton’s statement lasted a heartbeat and as of now, she trails behind Barack Obama by 9 points in New Hampshire. It’s a poignant lesson for all presidential candidates who seek to use controversial statements as a short term means of boosting their respective campaigns. Instead of formulating strong messages backed by well thought out policies, they end up right back where they started while looking, well, unintelligent.

Sources are indicating that Senator Barack Obama has requested to meet with Pakistani officials to discuss (read: learn about) the political situation in Pakistan and specifically, all matters pertaining to the Bhutto assassination.

Obama has taken some rather hardline stances in the past when it has come to Pakistan. He’s stated in the past that:

• the US should unilaterally send troops into Pakistan if there is actionable intelligence re: high value terrorist targets. (He later revisited this statement.)
• US Vice President, Dick Cheney, who currently manages US policy towards Pakistan, should visit Pakistan and ask President Musharraf to step down.
• Pakistan has many problems — including an anti-democratic president and an Islamist extremist movement that operates freely between Afghanistan and Pakistan.

Without having made substantive statements with regard to Pakistan since his botched comment over invading Pakistan (see above), it’s clear that Obama doesn’t have a detailed Pakistan policy the way Senator Joe Biden did. In fact, now that Sen. Biden has quit his election bid for president, there are few, if any remaining candidates, with legitimate Pakistan related policies. For instance, Senator Hillary Clinton’s latest proposal that Pakistan share oversight of its nuclear weapons with the US and Great Britain is ludicrous — not legitimate policy.

There is an opening here for the Pakistani foreign ministry.

With a stunning win at the Iowa Caucuses and real potential for a win in New Hampshire only days away, Barack Obama’s chances for the White House continue to grow. It’s in the interest of the Pakistani foreign office, particularly the Pakistan Embassy, to be as accessible and as engaged as possible with US presidential candidates, particularly those such as Obama, in the hopes of shaping future US foreign policy towards Pakistan for the next half decade.

Campaign donations wouldn’t hurt either.

From the Insider Brief to all our readers:  happy new year!  May the coming year bring better tidings for Pakistan and its people.  Here’s to new hopes, new beginnings and a new year.

Benazir Bhutto has been assassinated. Bilawal and Asif Zardari, Bhutto’s son and husband, now co-chair the Pakistan People’s Party (PPP) with Bilawal slated as heir to the Bhutto mantle. Asif Zardari, who has shown some maturity over the last few days, will be playing a behind-the-scenes role, similar to that of Altaf Hussain of the MQM or Sonia Gandhi of the Congress Party across the border. Makhdoom Amin Fahim will be the next prime ministerial candidate.

Bilawal Zadari is a 19-year old with no political experience and questionable Urdu skills, having lived most of his life abroad. Sources have indicated that Benazir had provided a list of advisors who would serve as a sort of council of regents for Bilawal with his father as principal advisor until he was politically able and legally eligible to run for office.

The question begs to be asked: will the PPP survive?

The Short Answer
Yes.

The Long Answer
In the short term, the PPP will ride the crest of emotional outpouring and sympathy arising from the death of its leader and likely emerge as the winner of the next parliamentary elections. But what about the long term? Bilawal Zardari will not be taking on full party leadership for another 5 years. Can the party hold together and maintain its popularity until then? If history is any indicator, the answer again is yes.

Pakistani Precedent. Zulfikar Ali Bhutto was probably Pakistan’s most popular politician after Mohammad Ali Jinnah, Pakistan’s founder. His name and that of his family continues to elicit a cult-like following in all four of Pakistan’s provinces. Aside from being an impressive orator (just search YouTube), intelligent, and charismatic, Bhutto was the first politician that spoke for Pakistan’s poor and brought forth a populist message. Despite his many flaws, even those in middle and upper class were enthralled with the man.

Consider this: Zia-ul-Huq rose to power in 1978. He hanged Zulfikar Bhutto in 1979. After Zia’s mysterious death in 1989, a decade later, Benazir Bhutto swept elections and became prime minister. Two truncated premierships later and after nearly 8 years in exile, Bhutto returned to Pakistan as one of the most of the popular politicians in Pakistan’s political landscape.

The power of the Bhutto name is demonstratedly immense.

Subcontinental Precedents. In Pakistan, it’s the Bhutto’s. In India, it’s the Gandhi’s. The Gandhi dynasty of India presents a similar story of the power of a name tied with the longevity of a party. Indhira Gandhi, headstrong Indian prime minister and chairwoman of the National Congress party was assassinated in 1984. Her politically inexperienced son, Rajiv Gandhi, then an airline pilot, took on party leadership and became prime minister that same year. He was assassinated in 1991, following his parliamentary defeat in 1989. In 1998, 7 years after Rajiv’s death, his Italian-born wife, Sonia, became chairwoman of the Congress Party which finds itself in power today.

Sindhi’s, Seraiki’s, and the Poverty Stricken. Beyond emotionalism and the sentiment attached to the Bhutto name, there is the simple fact that the PPP has a solid, core constituency upon which to rely. Without the PPP, Pakistan’s Sindhi’s, Seraiki’s, and many of the nation’s poor, wouldn’t have a party to represent them. Punjabi’s after all, have the Pakistan Muslim League in all its lettered variants. The Sindh has the PPP. (Province-centric parties are ultimately dangerous though and only heighten the risk of ethnic/sectarian strife in Pakistan.)

The PPP survived the loss of Zulfikar Ali Bhutto. So too will it surive the loss of Benazir.